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Abstract
In recent years there has been an increase in using Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) sys-
tems in large companies and government corporations mainly in developed countries. While
there is wide adoption of ERP systems in Western economies, developing countries lag far
behind. However, due to recent economic growth, developing countries such as Kenya are
increasingly becoming major targets of ERP vendors. There is an urgent need for under-
standing ERP implementation issues in developing countries, as ERP systems are still in
their early stages in these countries. They face additional challenges related to economic,
cultural and basic infrastructure issues. This research investigates the organisational and
national context within which ERP is adopted and used in Kenya, and how the context and
ERP influence each other. In general, this research is based on the need to study organ-
isations in their societal contexts and information systems in their organisational settings.
The research contributes to the controversial debate on the conflict between standardisation
imposed by ERP systems and localisation of business practices. This study provides some
key insights into the implementation and use of ERP systems in the public and the private
sectors in Kenya. Case study findings suggest that the company sector plays an important
role in ERP implementations in several key dimensions. ERP systems with in-built business
practices express the tendency toward standardisation. In addition, the study investigates
the challenges faced by organisations implementing ERP systems in Kenya and factors influ-
encing ERP upgrade decisions. Findings of this research suggest that ERP implementation
and upgrade is influenced by, but not necessarily bound by, existing contextual factors – na-
tional and organisational. Two models, namely, the Empirical ERP Implementation Model
(EEIM) and the Upgrade Decision Model (UDM), are developed to represent ERP imple-
mentation and upgrade practices. The EEIM helps to identify why there will be particularly
high variance in potential outcomes and further validates which organisational contexts and
ERP implementation configurations create options during ERP implementation and usage.
The UDM makes a novel contribution by showing how different forces interact to bring an
aggregate of influences to a threshold level where an ERP system upgrade becomes necessary.
The findings of this study also aid the management of organisations that are implementing
ERP systems to gain a better understanding of the likely challenges they may face and to
enable them to put in place appropriate measures to mitigate the risk of implementation
failures. This study also proposes an IT strategy framework which can be used by organisa-
tions planning to implement ERP to align their business and IT strategy. Finally, the study
provides practical guidelines to practitioners on ERP implementation and upgrade based on
the experience of the case study organisations and the ERP consultants interviewed.
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This chapter presents an overview of this research. The presentation will thereafter be
followed by a problem discussion that will lead to the formulation of the statement of purpose,
research questions, objectives, and rationale of the study. In summary, this chapter discusses
the purpose, importance, timeliness, and relevance of this research study to information
systems research, and in particular to ERP implementation in developing countries with
Kenya as a case study.
1.1 Research Background and Problem
Lured by guarantees of improved business productivity, streamlined business operations, and
increased cost savings (Tilley et al., 2007), organisations worldwide have launched initiatives
to integrate ERP systems into their existing business environments. There has been a grow-
ing increase in using Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems developed by, for example,
SAP, Oracle, BaaN, PeopleSoft and JD Edwards as a business information system platform
for large organisations and government corporations in developed countries such as USA,
UK, Canada, and Australia (Davenport, 1998). Kumar & Hillegersberg (2000) state that:
ERP systems have now been adopted by the majority of the Fortune top
500 firms, and as the high end of the market becomes saturated, ERP systems
are filtering down to medium-sized organizations, and to regions beyond those
initially penetrated in Europe and North America.
While there is wide adoption of ERP systems in Europe and North America, developing
countries lag far behind (Huang & Palvia, 2001; Huang et al., 2004). However, due to eco-
nomic growth, developing countries such as Kenya are becoming major targets for ERP
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vendors (O’Kane, 2002; Davison, 2002; Huang et al., 2004). In some developing countries,
for example Kenya, a number of large and mid-sized organisations have implemented ERP
solutions and more are expected to follow suit. The majority of adopting organisations that
joined the ‘ERP bandwagon’ (Kraemers & Dissel, 2000) presumed that with relative ease
they can benefit from the alleged ‘best business practices’ that are embedded within ERP
systems.
However, the transfer of information systems like ERP – typically developed in developed
countries – to developing countries is often marred by problems of mismatch with local, cul-
tural, economic and regulatory requirements. For instance, (Huang & Palvia, 2001, page 276)
state that:
Meanwhile, ERP is beginning to appear in many organisations of developing
countries. Little research has been conducted to compare the implementation
practices of ERP in developed vs developing countries. . . ERP technology faces
additional challenges in developing countries related to economic, cultural, and
basic infrastructure issues.
Gargeya & Brady (2005) state that studies, mostly conducted in developed countries, show
that organisations often run into costly and sometimes fatal difficulties with implementation
and subsequent maintenance of ERP systems. For example, Akkermans & van Helden (2002)
and Monk & Wagner (2006) observe that a typical ERP implementation initiative takes
anywhere between one and three years and typical budgets are in tens to hundreds of millions
of dollars.
Popular press and trade journals have documented both successes (Johnston, 2002), and
failures (Voordijik et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2005; Alshawi et al., 2004; Sia & Soh, 2002) but
with very little explanation on the underlying causes. Poba-Nzaou et al. (2008) estimate
the failure rate of ERP implementations in developed countries to be between 66% and
70%. Since the trade press is now replete with articles on ERP failures in Europe and
North America where most these systems originate from, we agree with the Huang & Palvia
(2001) argument that ERP implementation is likely to be more problematic in less developed
countries like Kenya, given that “ERP technology faces additional challenges in developing
countries related to economic, cultural, and basic infrastructure issues”.
In Kenya, the state-owned Uchumi supermarket chain closed down in June 2006 after ad-
mitting it was insolvent — throwing more than 1,000 employees out of work and leaving
debts of hundreds of millions of Kenyan shillings (Vardan, n.d.). The over-ambitious expan-
sion strategy and the poor installation of the ERP system were cited by experts as some
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of the reasons which contributed to insolvency, especially since they were financed out of
working capital which resulted in tying up the much needed financial resources to pay off
suppliers, employees and other trade creditors. Analysts further argued that the ERP system
was poorly integrated and implemented, staff were poorly trained, and costs were unjusti-
fiable. The Uchumi supermarket experience is an example that there is an urgent need for
understanding ERP implementation practices in less developed countries, and in Kenya in
particular, because these systems are still in their early stages in these countries and face
economic, cultural and infrastructure challenges. The adoption and use of ERP in Kenya
raises a unique question for less developed countries within Sub-Saharan Africa that has not
been addressed in previous studies, i.e. the challenges faced by user and vendor organisations
during ERP implementation and the contextual factors (national and organisational) that
influence ERP adoption, implementation, and use. This research will, therefore, explore ERP
implementation and upgrade practices among the private and public sector organisations in
Kenya.
The difficulty in ERP implementation in developed countries may be exacerbated by the
claim that ERP embodies established ways of doing business thereby requiring organisations
adopting ERP systems to change their business processes to conform to business practices
inbuilt in ERP packages. Vendors argue that the adoption of these best practices makes the
configuring of the software less costly and brings about improvement in the organisation’s
processes. Consequently, organisations and their members often experience pressure to adopt
these practices (Gosain, 2004).
ERP systems are developed by vendors who draw on their existing sources of knowledge,
resources and norms. These would include the developer organisation’s own business strat-
egy and prevailing norms about what constitutes best practice. In general, the ‘spirit’ of
ERP packages reflects beliefs about the value of having a single enterprise-wide system, and
hence tend to have features that are aligned with cross-functional process integration and
enterprise-wide data sharing (Markus & Tanis, 2000; Soh & Sia, 2004b).
Soh & Sia (2004b) further argue that developers, while modeling likely organisational re-
quirements in order to design the system, usually draw on the network of organisations to
which they have access. These ‘referent’ organisations are usually those from their home
market and other markets in which they have a major presence. Such markets are likely to
be defined by national and industry boundaries. The structures embedded in the resultant
package will therefore reflect the context of the group of companies that the developers in-
teracted with most closely during the design and development of the software. As a result,
organisations adopting ERP systems may find the assumptions embodied by these systems
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about the nature of organisations and the ways in which they operate run counter to their
own existing structures and work practices. Soh et al. (2000), for instance, observed mis-
alignments between ERP packages and organisational structures expressed in formal rules,
procedures, and cultural norms in their study which was conducted in Singapore. They
stated that:
Our findings suggest the “misfit” issue (gaps between the functionality offered
by the package and that required by the adopting organisation) may be worse in
Asia because the business models underlying most ERP packages reflect European
or U.S. industry practices. Procedures in Asian organisations are likely to be
different having evolved in a different cultural, economic and regulatory context.
Given that Sub-Saharan Africa cultural contexts embody organisational practices different
from those encountered in North America and Europe where most of ERP systems are
developed, as discussed in Section 2.4.4.3, there can be significant problems associated with
the reengineering of local practices and processes. Furthermore, ERP being capital intensive,
is likely to be faced with constrained IT budgets (Heeks & Kenny, 2002) due to poor economic
performance in this region. Cultural conflicts escalate implementation cost, and can lead to
long implementation period as organisations spend more time and resources in resolving
cultural conflicts. This becomes a two fold problem: companies lack the financial resources
to gain access to tailored world-class ERP systems; and ERP companies are not prepared
to deal effectively with the customisation processes that these markets require. In many
cases, the basic infrastructure for supporting ERP may be lacking or insufficient to enable
organisations to reap optimum benefits from ERP investments. ERP implementation and
usage also require specialised skills which may not be sufficiently available in developing
countries.
The arguments above suggest that there is often a gap between the system and specific con-
texts, practices and requirements of particular user organisations. We can conclude that the
underlying business models in-built in ERP have implicit contextual biases such as country
(for example, European or American practices), sector (for example, private sector), indus-
try (for example, manufacturing), and even biases in organisational practices (for example,
process-oriented workflow). On this note, we argue that where contextual difference between
the ERP package vendor and the adopting organisation exist, it is important to explicitly
consider the difference and how it may influence the adoption and subsequently the use of the
ERP package. Therefore, this research will seek evidence on how the organisational context
influences ERP systems implementation and upgrade and how the organisational context is
affected by the implementation and and use of ERP system using Kenya as a case study.
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In spite of all the benefits, implementing ERP can be a risky undertaking (Poba-Nzaou et al.,
2008). Ward et al. (2005) observe that due to the behaviourial and management related chal-
lenges in the implementation process many ERP projects have been terminated. Arif et al.
(2005) and Alshawi et al. (2004) assert it is imperative for organisations to be aware of the
challenges and the experiences of others, and to learn from their challenges and practices,
because of the complex and integrated nature of ERP, and the large investment involved.
Identifying challenges relevant to local companies is one way to increase the chances of a suc-
cessful local ERP implementation (Otieno, 2008; Leopoldo & Otieno, 2005). Therefore, this
research will aim to identify challenges faced by Kenyan organisations during ERP systems
implementation.
Only one study Ng (2001) details the difference between technical and functional upgrades.
The absence of information about ERP upgrades is somewhat surprising given the general
consent that upgrading is essential for companies to survive and compete (Fourney, 2007).
As software vendors enhance their products to respond to anticipated business needs, they
release upgrades with more features and better performance. Although performance im-
provements are not necessarily anticipated in an upgrade, it is reasonable to expect or-
ganisations to upgrade ERP systems for the purpose of achieving benefits such as greater
efficiency and improved functionality that the current ERP system may be lacking (Paine,
2000; Beatty & Williams, 2006b). To the user of ERP systems, deciding whether and when
to upgrade from the current version requires an ongoing process of evaluation.
One of the most neglected issues related to ERP systems is the decision to upgrade from one
version to another. Although practical guidance to upgrade decisions have begun to appear
in the literature (e.g. Beatty & Williams (2006a)), most studies of ERP have focused on
initial adoption, and empirical research on ERP upgrade practices and decisions has been
limited both in developed and developing countries. Ng (2001) found that maintenance and
upgrades were adopted to realise increased business benefits and that cost was a major con-
cern in those decisions. Although valuable, Ng’s study combined maintenance and upgrade
decisions together making it difficult to understand the upgrade decision process indepen-
dently. Therefore, this research will investigate ERP upgrade practices and decision-making
process among Kenyan organisations.
Based on the suggestions of Friedland & Alford (1991) this research adheres to the need
to study organisation as located in their societal contexts and information systems in their
organisational setting. Therefore, in general this research investigates the organisational and
national context within which ERP is adopted and used in Kenya, and how the context
and ERP influence each other. ERP systems with in-built business practices express the
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tendency toward standardisation. This research seek to contribute to the controversial issue
on the conflict between standardization and localisation of business practices.
1.2 Aims, Objectives and Research Questions
Literature reviewed in Chapter 2 highlights issues that warrant further consideration with
respect to the relevance of best practices embedded in ERP systems, their implementation
and use in different organisational contexts. This research seeks to contribute to the debate
on ERP implementation and upgrade in the context of a less developed country, Kenya. The
research aims are stated as:
1. to explore ERP implementation and upgrade decision-making processes among private
and public sector organisations in Kenya;
2. to identify challenges faced by Kenyan organisations during ERP implementation;
3. to propose suitable solutions within specific organisational and national contexts.
Against the backdrop of these aims are the following main objectives of this study:
1. to identify contextual factors (organisational and national) that influence ERP systems
implementation and upgrade decisions in Kenya;
2. to identify challenges faced by vendors and organisations implementing ERP systems
in Kenya;
3. to establish whether there are differences in ERP implementation practices between
public and private organisations in Kenya;
4. to propose suitable solutions (contextually) in order to maximise the likelihood of
success of future ERP implementations and upgrades
In achieving these objectives the research attempts to answer the main research question:
What organisational and national factors affect ERP implementation in Kenya?
This research question can be refined thus:
1. Does national culture influence ERP system implementation in Kenya?
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2. Do organisations that have adopted ERP systems in Kenya encounter challenges in the
process of implementing them?
3. What factors influence ERP systems upgrade decisions?
4. Is there a difference between ERP implementation practices among public and private
organisations in Kenya?
1.3 Research Rationale
A number of arguments justify the importance of this study. First, despite the promises and
the continued popularity of ERP Systems, evidence is accumulating to demonstrate that
obtaining benefits from an ERP is not as straightforward as those selling and promoting
such systems would like us to believe (Boersma & Kingma, 2005).
Second, although a number of challenges of ERP systems adoption and use have been iden-
tified, they are mainly experiences of companies in the developed countries. There is very
limited empirical research on ERP implementation focused on developed countries. We
presume that the cultural problems in developed countries especially in Europe and North
America seem to be marginal and managerial approaches tend to be largely similar, which
makes adaptation of ERP software relatively easy. Despite these still many failures have
been reported. There is no study, in researcher’s knowledge that has been carried out in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Therefore, researchers in the field of Information Systems may
be interested in reviewing the findings of this project given the lack of literature covering
Sub-Saharan Africa and more so those based in Kenya.
Third, it is arguable that most ERP implementation frameworks and models reported in IS
journals are based on ERP studies carried out in developed countries like United States of
America, European countries, and Australia. The political, social, and economic unique-
ness that SSA presents, Kenyan context being the case study in this thesis, could provide
researchers with fertile ground for fresh extensions of existing theoretical paradigms and
sometimes development of entirely new and different research frameworks.
Fourth, upgrade of ERP systems appear to be inevitable for several reasons. ERP software
vendors typically establish ‘sunset dates’, after which vendors discontinue support for current
versions. Thus, organisations that require vendor support are pressured to upgrade before
the vendor’s sunset date. Although an organisation may choose to operate unsupported
software, ERP products eventually become incompatible with other software or require new
functionality. Unless organisations develop their own software or buy new software, their
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only option becomes upgrading to a new, vendor-supported version. However, organisations
do not need to upgrade to every new version of software because vendors typically support
multiple versions at the same time. Thus, choices must be made which, make it important
to study how organisations decide to migrate to the next version of ERP software and how
the upgrade is carried out.
Lastly, there is a need to investigate the relevance of best practices in the context of devel-
oping countries. Soh & Sia (2004b) state that ERP systems reflect Western ways of doing
business. Based on the above discussion it can be argued that foreign developers of ERP
systems usually make choices of what they personally consider relevant business practices.
Their views are focused through their intentions and experiences. In other words, ERP de-
velopers understand and model the environment as they perceive it through their personal
culture-bound perspective which often do not coincide with the view of the local users.
1.4 Scope and context of the study
According to Creswell (2003) ‘delimitation’ is a parameter defining the “boundaries, excep-
tions, reservations” in a research, and its inclusion and position in a research proposal or
write up varies from one situation to another.The delimitation defines the limit or scope of
the research. To research into the entire ERP topic, will not only mean researching into a
wide range of issues and assumptions but also researching into every aspect of ERP imple-
mentation, especially when viewed from the point of the existing large amount of literature.
Therefore, this section is aimed limiting scope and context of this research to in order to
make it manageable.
This dissertation is defined by the following boundaries and considerations:
• This study concentrates on both private and public organisations in Kenya. The rea-
son for inclusion of private organisations is that adoption of ERP systems is more
widespread in private organisations than in public sector organisations in Kenya. Ad-
ditionally, the few studies available on ERP adoption in the literature were conducted
in public sector organisations (Gable et al., 2003; Sedera & Gable, 2004). Thus by
looking at private firms, the study will add to the body of knowledge in the area where
it is still lacking. Public sector organisations on the other hand were included in order
to allow comparison to be conducted on ERP implementation practices between pri-
vate and public organisations. Moreover, the operational environments of the public
and private sectors differ considerably (Mansour & Watson, 1980; Khandelwal, 2001)
and findings from one may provide insights into the other.
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• This study discusses ERP systems at a generic level by concentrating on its basic func-
tionality rather than distinguishing between top brands and mid-market ERP products.
Empirical evidence exists suggesting that, in some respects the benefits of ERP may
be comparable even when systems types differ (Mabert et al., 2003; Laukkanen et al.,
2005). ERP systems classified as top brands have been noted to differ to the extent
that each might offer different capabilities (Shang & Seddon, 2002); the same is true
for mid-market products (Fisher et al., 2004). The foregoing explains the choice of this
research to include a variety of ERP systems rather than select only a specific type
of ERP. Moreover, in some respect, the inclusion of wide-ranging ERP systems in a
particular study may permit the generalisability of results from such a study, for the
software.
• This study incorporates both large, medium and small size organisations.
• All the ERP implementation life-cycle phases are studied in this research. This is due
to the fact that research area and ERP technology is subject to dynamic change. Or-
ganisations after going live with ERP usually embark on actions aimed at achieving
the full capabilities and benefits of ERP-enabled processes. The organisational context
is also in a state of continuous change in a bid to adapt to the ever changing environ-
mental context such as entry of new competitors, new government regulations, etc. A
‘snapshot’ view of these events could not capture the sweeping changes taking place
and the influence they had on case study organisations hence the decision to study all
the implementation life-cycle phases.
• Context as used in this dissertation is limited to the three aspects of an organisation’s
context which previous studies by Tornatzky & Fleischer (1990) and Rogers (1983) re-
port to influence the process by which organisations adopt, implement, and use techno-
logical innovations: (a) Technological context describes both the existing technologies
in use and new technologies relevant to the firm, (b) Organisational context refers to
descriptive measures about organisation such as scope, size, and the amount of slack
resources available internally, (c) Environment context is the arena in which a firm
conducts it business–its industry, competitors, and dealings with the government. The
choice of the three contexts is consistent with the innovation diffusion theory which
emphasises technological characteristics, and both the internal and external character-
istics of an organisation, as drivers for technology diffusion.
• Finally, the study’s unit of analysis is at the national and organisational level.
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1.5 Expected Contribution to Knowledge
The research aims to make contribution towards the promotion of contextually/culturally
valid ERP implementation model. While investigating the limitation of current implemen-
tation models with regard to contextual issues, this research aims to enhance effectiveness
of these models. Through merging theory and empirical data from the field study organisa-
tions, the research seeks to refine the existing models by proposing context sensitive model.
The research also aims to make a novel contribution by developing an ERP upgrade decision
model which will provide insight on why and when organisations choose to upgrade their
ERP systems.
By reviewing literature on culture, and drawing insights into the core dimensions of culture
and exploring the theoretical frameworks for understanding culture forms, the study con-
tributes to ERP practice by identifying what organisational factors to look for when initiating
ERP implementation and subsequent culture change – how individuals, ERP implementation
and organisational change are linked. The findings of the study can help the management
of corporations to better support the deployment of ERP in their organizations.
The findings of this research are expected to contribute towards ERP implementation prac-
tice. The findings of this research are expected to be of importance to various stakeholders.
For example, Vendors who contemplate entering foreign markets can use the proposed models
to better understand global ERP markets and develop better strategy. ERP implementers
can also recognise the environmental and internal requirements and prepare accordingly.
Given the complexity and integrated nature of ERP and large investment involved it is im-
perative for organisations to study the experiences of others, and learn from their practices
and success factors (Umble et al., 2003; Leopoldo & Otieno, 2005). In this light, organisa-
tions planning to implement ERP in Kenya can learn from the successes and failures of the
case study organisations and therefore, avoid pitfalls which can lead to ERP project fail-
ures. Based on the findings of this research, we intend to come up with a set of systematic
steps (implementation guideline) and a methodology for helping managers, implementers
and organisations adapt to the demands of the environment.
The research also presents avenues for continuing theoretical and empirical research investi-
gations in the field of IS, in particular ERP. By identifying the impact of local context on
IS, the research intends to create a better understanding of the limitation technologically
deterministic approaches that little account of local conditions and high risks of strategies
involved.
In general, this research would contribute towards a theoretical and practical improvement
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of ERP adoption, implementation and upgrade in diverse cultural and contextual setting,
based on a Kenyan case study.
1.6 Thesis Structure
In this introductory chapter, the impetus to understand the background and motivations
towards the undertaking was highlighted, presenting the reader with the research questions,
study design and potential contributions from the study. By providing a background to the
overall context of the study, the motivations and rationale for the study are put forth.
Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant background literature. We highlight the devel-
opment of the research model (that guides the discourse) as well as present the research
questions and hypotheses. The inter-relations between the subject areas, related studies and
their implications for the study are discussed.
In Chapter 3, the research methodology is presented. The methodology used in the study’s
context is the multi-paradigm approach, using a combination of techniques including survey,
content analysis and multiple case study. Our research design recognises that understandings
gained through interpretivist analysis might provide a basis for developing propositions.
The Lee (1991) framework is used which integrates qualitative and quantitative research
approaches.
In Chapter 4 of the national context where the case studies were drawn. The chapter also
provides background information of the five case study organisations.
Chapter 5 presents the results of qualitative data analysis. The preliminary ERP implemen-
tation model is presented and used as basis of coding.
Chapter 6 presents and discusses the Extended ERP Implementation Model (EEIM) and
Upgrade Decision Model (UDM) derived from qualitative and quantitative data analyses.
The models’ constructs and dimensions are defined followed by discussion of their interrela-
tions. Finally, the models are verified to ascertain their validity. The chapter also presents
the results of validation of the two the models.
In Chapter 7, the findings of the study are summarised. The detailed discussion reflecting
on the main findings reported in Chapter 5 is presented. Finally, the chapter concludes the
thesis by discussing the research’s contribution to the body of knowledge in research, practice
and the methodological perspectives, its limitations and directions for future research. Other





This chapter reviews the academic and practitioners literature published on Enterprise Re-
source Planning (ERP) systems relevant to the focus of this research. Easterby-Smith et al.
(1991) notes that it is important for researchers to familiarise themselves with existing re-
search prior to collecting their own data . An appreciation of previous work relevant to this
research served three further purposes. First, through providing direction in the construction
of data collection instruments, it guarded against the risk of overload at the primary data
collection stages of the project. Second, working the findings from extent literature into
a formal review helped maintain throughout the study a sense of the topic’s perspective.
Finally, this activity raised opportunities for articulating a critical analysis of the actual
“meaning” of the data collected when the data analysis stages of the research were reached.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the focal point of this study is the influence of context on ERP
implementation, spanning all the ERP life-cycle phases. This research broadly classifies
current ERP literature in terms of its contribution to understanding the nature of ERP
implementation project initiatives. This approach provides a base in which to situate this
study. The chapter begins by defining ERP and elaborating how ‘best practices’ embedded in
ERP systems lead to organisation restructuring and the likely consequences in the following
sections.
2.2 What is ERP?
Klaus et al. (2000) and Al-Mashari et al. (2003) assert that ERP systems are not easy to
define, more so if the stakeholders’ points of view are to be taken seriously. Their assertion
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is supported by Boersma & Kingma (2005) who argue that there is no universally accepted
definition of ERP. Different stakeholders of ERP will, depending on their position in the or-
ganisation, have quite different views of and experiences with ERP (Markus & Tanis, 2000).
Therefore, individuals or group definitions vary according to their “awareness context”.
However, Deloitte Consulting ERP Second Wave report published in 1998 provides a useful
starting point. According to Deloitte (1998), an ERP system is a packaged business software
system that allows a company to:
• automate and integrate the majority of its business processes,
• share common data and practices across the entire enterprise, and
• produce and access information in a real-time environment
Davenport (1998) defines an ERP system as “a packaged software product that can be
bought ‘off-the-shelf’ by an organisation in order to integrate and share its information and
related business processes within and across functional areas”. His definition emphasises the
integration, laid by ERP, between various organisational networks, in particular functional
divisions within organisations like finance, marketing, procurement, inventory, sales and
distribution, human resources planning and payroll while downplaying the implicit side of
the ERP systems, for example business processes embedded in the ERP. Shehab et al. (2004)
supports Davenport’s perspective that over-emphasises integration aspect of ERP systems
by asserting that ERP is more than a software package that seeks to integrate functional
departments within an organisation. This perspective is popular with most scholars and
researchers who generally consider and define ERP on the basis of its capacity to integrate
formerly segregated IT systems.
The second perspective which is fundamental for conceptualising ERP systems in this re-
search, is related to best practices embedded in ERP systems. Umble et al. (2003) articulated
this less known or, if known, less talked about perspective of ERP systems by asserting that:
. . . buying an ERP package means much more than purchasing software, it
means buying into the software vendor’s view of best practices for many of com-
pany’s processes.
ERP systems embody best practices which are supposedly established ways of doing business
(Soh et al., 2000; Soh & Sia, 2004a; Boersma & Kingma, 2005; Arif et al., 2005). These ‘best
practices’ represent the underlying assumptions and beliefs embedded in the operation of
ERP software by the vendors. Akrich (1992) in (Boersma & Kingma, 2005) purports that
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best practices embedded in ERP, contain ‘script’ for users, informing them about what
actions should be undertaken, when, where, and how. Therefore, it is arguable that ERP is
not just a software package to be tailored to an organisation but an organisation business
blue-print that affects how people work by “imposing its own logic on a company’s strategy,
organisation, and culture” (Davenport, 1998; Lee & Lee, 2002).
An ERP system gives instructions at the workplace about how to organise activities vis-a`-vis
co-workers, management and other elements in the business cycle. It may be perceived to
operate in a similar to self-evident way as roads in the traffic system do, guiding drivers
towards their destinations. Unlike custom-built software that must be programmed in tra-
ditional ways to meet local needs, ERP software is ‘generic’, targeting multiple industries,
and should be configured to predefined business practices before it can be used. Therefore,
a company that implements ERP must, for the most part, accept the vendor’s assumptions
about the company and change the existing processes and procedures to conform to them.
This notion of best practices has been backed by management consultants and ERP vendors.
Technology, in this case ERP, is considered as a driver to organisational change. The ’best
practices’ embedded in these packages are seen as a summary of best practices and standards
of operations, but pays no attention to how local context affects the process of implementa-
tion, the actual operation and use of the systems, and whether a package is compatible with
the organisations’ values and way of doing things.
While ERP vendors try to structure the systems to reflect best practices, it is the vendor not
the client, who is defining what ‘best’ means. It implies that there is an objective function
against which the ‘best’ can be evaluated. Studies such as (Kosalge, 2005) have proved that
there is no single best way of doing business and the context plays a major role in the way
business is carried out. For example, SAP AG being a German company following German
best practices, international differences can be critical in the successful implementation of
their software(Wei et al., 2005). On the premise of the views expressed above, we also argue
that‘best’ is relative and what is best in one organisation, industry, region or country may
not apply to others.
ERP is also referred to in the IS literature as enterprise systems (ES) and less frequently as
enterprise-wide systems. Davenport (2000) calls for the replacement of these terms with a
more generic classification of ERP as ‘business systems’. He argues that the technology has
developed to such an extent that it now includes front and back office functionality making
it inappropriate to assign an ERP label which is reminiscent of its material requirements
planning (MRP) heritage. Whilst we take Davenport’s point, we choose to employ the term
ERP throughout the thesis as a reminder of the lineage of the technology in the manufac-
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turing context. In other words, the use of the phrase ERP in this study is purposeful and is
meant to conjure images of technology that is informed by a traditionally hierarchical view
of organising where business functions are clearly delineated (Kumar & Hillegersberg, 2000).
The working definition of ERP system in this study is based on the three major characteristics
associated with ERP systems identified in the above literature discussion. Therefore, an ERP
system:
1. is a set of packaged application software modules, within an integrated architecture,
that can be used by organisations as their primary engine for integrating data, pro-
cesses, and information technology, in real time, across internal and external value
chains;
2. impounds deep knowledge of business practices that vendors have accumulated from
implementations in a wide range of client organisations, that can exert considerable
influence on the design of processes within new client organisations;
3. is a generic ‘semi-finished’ product with tables and parameters that clients or organisa-
tions and their implementation partners must configure, customise, and integrate with
other computer-based information systems to meet their business needs.
2.3 Drivers for ERP
As Walsham (2002) states, the 1990s was a decade where companies were turning away from
decentralised computing systems in favour of enterprise-wide initiatives for organisational
transformation. He argues that company managers began situating their organisations within
a global context and in turn they developed a sense of worldwide business solutions. This
awareness was supported by international management consultancies whose revenues increase
as approaches become more widespread and standardised. Walsham (2002) and Koch (2001)
argued that these consultancies were the “driving force” behind both ERP adoption and its
precursor, Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) which forms an integral part of most ERP
implementations.
In the mid- and late- 1990s, Y2K compliance was a major concern for many companies as
well as the wish to replace existing and poor quality systems. Management consultants were
touting the global ERP software solutions available from the several vendors as a panacea
to the Y2K potential nightmare. Business executives seeking expert advice about operating
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in the new millennium were encouraged by management consultants and ERP vendors to
replace outdated, home-grown systems with a single integrated solution.
Other major reasons reported in the literature as drivers for ERP adoption relate to: improv-
ing firms’ performance and decision making, reducing labour costs, bureaucracy and errors.
Other reasons are: pressure from the side of the competitors, business partner requirements
for faster service, integration between functional units, organisational standardization across
different locations and globalisation of businesses. Acquisitions and mergers between the
units are forcing companies to change and function as a single system. However, for each
company the drivers for implementing ERP are different as well as their priority order de-
pends is likely to be influenced by the organisation’s context – internal and external.
O’Leary (2004) grouped the ERP drivers into four categories: technology, business practices,
strategy, and competitiveness. Holland et al. (1999) recognised three main dimensions: tech-
nical, operational and strategic. Some studies such as Markus & Tanis (1999) narrow down
the reasons even to broader groups: technological and business performance. Based on the
literature review, the foremost reasons that have caused fast growth in the use of ERP
systems are summarised in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Drivers for Adopting ERP systems
Technical Operational Strategic
Need for a common plat-
form
Process improvement Y2K compliance
Replacement of legacy sys-
tems
Data visibility Globalisation of business









Olson (2004) summarises two studies, which have examined the motivations for ERP adop-
tion. One study was carried out on U.S. manufacturing organisations and the other on
Swedish firms. Organisations studied in both countries ranked the replacement of legacy
systems, and the simplification and standardisation of their systems as their primary rea-
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sons. Other reasons that received high ranking were the improvement of interactions with
suppliers and customers, the gaining of strategic advantage, and the creation of supply-chain
in order to link to global activities. Pressure to keep up with competitors, ease of upgrad-
ing systems and restructuring organisation received low ranking from both of these studies.
Given that there is increased ERP systems implementation in Kenya among large compa-
nies and some mid-sized companies are expected to follow suit. Hence, it is imperative to
investigate the motivation towards the increased implementation trend.
2.4 ERP as a change process–Business Process Re-
engineering (BPR)
According to Revere (2004) and Light (2005a), a typical ERP implementation often involves
some degree of business process re-engineering (BPR) and customisation. Arif et al. (2005)
assert that if a company is not already conducting business in the manner assumed in the
ERP software package they acquire, then the organisation must re-engineer its business
processes and practices. Therefore, BPR can be considered as a key practice in ERP im-
plementation. Keller & Teufel (1998) describe BPR as a pre-planning phase of ERP which
can be done by either ERP software vendors and consultants or organisations’ own in-house
team. ERP system analysts carefully examine the existing business procedures and practices
in order to propose IS solutions that aimed at introducing radical changes to the business
practices.
In BPR the goal is to replace the existing business processes with ones that are much more
effective for both the customer and the organisation itself. Therefore, BPR can conceived
as a technique for restructuring business operations to achieve improvements. However, the
technique is not new. BPR has deep roots in, and was widely developed by, management
consultancy companies in the 1990s. Improvement of business operations can also be achieved
through TQM or process improvement, but with BPR the targeted improvements will be
more significant and radical. Eardley et al. (2008) state that the aim of TQM or process
improvement approach is to streamline the process in the organisation’s value chain in order
to add value incrementally.
Abdolvand et al. (2008) caution that inclusion of BPR in the implementation of ERP adds
considerably to the risk of implementation failure and also expense of implementation. Prob-
lems with BPR occur when the radical or “clean sheet” approach is adopted during ERP
implementation. Problems with BPR is further supported by Attaran & Wood (1999) ar-
gument that organisations may neither be willing to “obliterate” their present infrastructure
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and to implement completely new one, nor be willing to interrupt their business while its
core processes are re-engineered.
According to Eardley et al. (2008) introduction of ERP systems require organisations to re-
think and redesign their processes to fit in with the ERP system. In this case, BPR is driven
by IT and seeks to radically alter existing business practices. This IT-driven BPR view and
other similar technocentric views of IT call for discarding existing practices and reconstitut-
ing an organisation on the basis of completely fresh ideas. This view omits the role of human
agents and the existing organisational and social contexts in the introduction of new tech-
nologies (Sarker & Lee, 2002), assuming that organisations can be fully redesigned through
new technology. There are two possible problems with this view. First, the redesigned pro-
cess may be less than optimal in terms of process efficiency. Second, strategic misalignment
may occur, as the new process may not contribute to the achievement of strategic business
objectives. Reijers & Mansar (2005) argue that this in turn can lead to a full or partial
“failure” of the BPR effort.
According to Abdolvand et al. (2008), better results can be realised if ERP is used as a BPR-
enabler, and also as proactive tool for BPR. For organisations to use ERP as BPR-enabler
the organisation IT strategy needs to be aligned with the business strategy so that there is no
“technology gap”. ERP supported by the IT infrastructure then allows the business strategy
to be enacted. In order to use ERP as proactive tool for BPR, the organisation IT strategy
and business strategy need to be not only aligned but also interdependent. In the enabling
role, the IT strategy supported the business strategy. In the proactive role, the IT strategy
is a part of the business strategy. Therefore, it important for organisations implementing
ERP to formulate clear vision of the type of organisation that needs to be built, then using
ERP as an enabler of change to achieve that vision (Bjorn-Andersen et al., 1994).
2.5 ERP Implementation
ERP implementation is a complex and dynamic process, one that involves a mix of tech-
nological and organisational interactions. According to Al-Mashari & Al-Mudimigh (2003)
implementing ERP systems in many instances cause dramatic changes that need to be care-
fully administered to reap the advantages of an ERP solution. In some well-documented
cases, spectacular results have been achieved (Johnston, 2002). Failures, on the other hand,
have been relatively high (Carlo, n.d.). Zhang et al. (2003) report that about 90% of ERP
implementations are late or over budget while ERP systems success rate is only about 33%.
Our deduction based on the literature review is that this trend has not changed significantly.
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In addition, failures are much less extensively documented. As a result the pitfalls to be
avoided tend to be less well known. It is aimed that the findings of this research will help in
improving ERP implementation success in Kenya and other Sub-Saharan countries.
As Esteves & Pastor (2001) note, the implementation phase of the ERP lifecycle is currently
the most widely researched in the IS discipline. They associate this focus with the difficul-
ties of ERP implementations. Esteves & Pastor (2001) subdivide the ERP implementation
literature into four topics relating to implementation: case studies, success, approaches, and
other issues. Whilst the number of case studies on ERP might be higher than the other three
topic areas, we argue that the focal point of these case studies varies.
We reclassify the ERP literature in terms of main project foci: implementation strategies;
implementation models; ERP system upgrade, implementation challenges, critical success
factors (CSFs); and trend and future of ERP systems. These are discussed in the following
subsections.
2.5.1 ERP Implementation Strategies
The decisions taken during ERP implementation system are strategic in nature. These
decisions relate to: the ERP system to be adopted, the scope of implementation, the imple-
mentation strategy, the ‘go-live’ strategy, the training strategy, whether or not to upgrade
and so on. The literature rarely consider this decisions to be strategic.
These decisions are strategic decisions in ERP because they: are normally adopted in organ-
isations to support strategic objectives of organisations; commit a large amount of organisa-
tional resources; have a long-term impact on shaping the ERP system and/or organisation
processes; are complex because they spurn the entire organisation and involves different
stakeholders (Lee & Myers, 2004). Figure 2.1 illustrates the ERP implementation phases
and the organisational choices to be made by organisations implementing ERP systems.
Project preparation phase of the implementation process consists of getting ready by plan-
ning and organising people and tasks. It is a very important and critical stage of the ERP
project since it constitutes the basis for the project. Among the decisions organisations have
to make are decision on the ERP product, decision on functionalities or modules, decision on
the implementation consultant etc. Blueprint phase comprises a detailed analysis that will
allow the production of documentation on the business process requirements. In addition,
blueprint phase consists of analysing the current business processes and investigating the
chances for BPR or customisation. During blueprint phase, organisations need to decide on
whether to customise the ERP system or re-enginer the existing business processes. Real-
isation phase deals with the technical aspect and involves building up a system prototype
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based on the processes and procedures investigated in the former stage. Final preparation
phase is critical to the success of the implementation project and involves conducting a set of
tuning and testing activities related to the configuration, integration, quality, interfaces and
reports of the system. Moreover, this phase is concerned with the education and training
of the users on the system processes, data discipline and modules. Therefore, organisations
must make a decision on personnel training strategy. Lastly, go live and support phase deals
with the maintenance and improvement issues to keep the implemented ERP system running
and up to date. The Go Live phase includes also the monitoring of the implemented system
in order to make sure to make the necessary changes and modifications if problems are to
occur and that could affect the performance of the ERP. During this phase, organisations
make decision on : go live strategy, maintenance strategy, and bolt-on applications. Figure
2.1 provides a pictorial representation of the ERP life-cycle phases and the implementation
decisions organisations are required to make based on the researcher’s conception.
Figure 2.1: ERP implementation phases and organisational choices
The fundamental decisions regarding physical scope, BPR scope, technical scope, resource
allocation and implementation strategy to be used to implement ERP system is based on such
aspects as organisation size, complexity and structure, available resources, attitude towards
change among many other organisational characteristics. Each implementation is unique
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because different organisations will make different decisions based on their contextual factors.
The decisions taken by the ERP implementation project teams significantly influence ERP
implementation outcome. Therefore, organisations intending to implement ERP systems
need to be aware of the trade-offs involved in making these important decisions in order
to minimise the risk of failure and to optimise their ERP implementation. For illustration
purpose, we discuss three main ERP strategies that can have profound influence on ERP
implementation outcome: enterprise suite vs. best of breed, configuration vs. customisation,
and Big-bang vs. phased approach.
Organisations implementing ERP system must decide whether to purchase all the ERP
modules from a single vendor or to select ERP modules from different vendors based on their
particular needs. These two strategies are referred to as enterprise suite and best of breed
respectively. Light (2005a) states that both of these strategies are undoubtedly complex due
to their scale, scope and BPR requirements. While highlighting Light (2005a), Mabert et al.
(2001a) and Mabert et al. (2003) postulate that multi-vendor solution can provide the best
functionality for each module, but implementing it becomes more complex because of the
interfaces that need to be established. A single vendor solution on the other hand may not
have all the functionality required, but will be easier to implement.
Similarly, organisations implementing ERP system must decide to either adopt business pro-
cesses embedded in ERP or to customise the ERP system to make it fit with the existing
business processes. The former is referred to as configuration while the later is referred to
as customisation. According to Krumbholz & Maiden (2000),‘misfits’ resulting from differ-
ences between system requirements and business requirements normally occurs during ERP
implementation due to contextual differences between the package and the implementing
organisation, requiring it to either configure or customise their system in order to resolve the
‘misfits’.
Grabski & Leech (2007) and Shehab et al. (2004) state that configuration known as ‘Vanilla
approach’ can take the form of conscious redesigning of organisational processes and struc-
tures to accommodate the functionality of the ERP system accompanied by substantial
change management, to more piecemeal, evolutionary workarounds as individuals adapt to
the package and their practices become part of the new organisational structure. This means
deep changes in long-established ways of doing business (that may provide competitive ad-
vantage) and a shake up of important peoples’ roles and responsibilities (Grant et al., 2006;
Dewett & Jones, 2001; Koch, 2001). Based on this we argue that organisational setting can
facilitate or hamper adaptation to the working principles of an ERP system.
Vendors and consultants tend to promote the ‘Vanilla approach’ with the argument that
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the embedded structures in ERP represent best practice, and that customisation will make
future upgrades more difficult. Management concerned about the cost and risks associated
with customisation, may also support the adoption of package structures with minimal cus-
tomisation. It tends to assume the persistence of current organisational structures within the
organisation that have evolved over time (Grant et al., 2006; Soh & Sia, 2004a; Sheu et al.,
2003). However, the researcher’s own experience and supported by Light (2005a),Light
(2005b), and Wagner et al. (2006) indicate that a completely ‘Vanilla’ implementation is
often not feasible.
Nicolaou (2004) describes customisation as the changing of the software to fit the already
existing business processes in order to cater for organisation-specific and/or country-specific
requirements. In the context of ERP implementation, package modification can range from
customising the package code, to interfacing with custom developed modules of other ven-
dors. Many researchers report that (Light, 2005a; Nicolaou, 2004; Nadhakumar et al., 2005;
Koch et al., 1999) customisation slows down the project, introduces dangerous bugs into the
system and makes upgrading the software to the ERP vendor’s next release excruciatingly
difficult, because the customisations will need to be torn apart and rewritten to fit with
the new version. Conversely, it implies less organisational changes, because it does not re-
quire dramatical change in the organisation’s best practices (thereby retaining competitive
advantage), and the way people work.
Whereas literature on ERP argue that ERP customisation is not rational, it is increas-
ingly clear, as illustrated by authors such as (Arif et al., 2005; Soh et al., 2000; Soh & Sia,
2004a; Huang & Palvia, 2001; Hong & Kim, 2002) that successful implementation does not
necessarily mean to adopt standard processes, but requires focusing on the improvements
which give competitive advantage to the company. This point is emphasised by Soh & Sia
(2004a) who found out that the reasons for customisation may concern the absence of a
required functionality in the standard system and also lack of consistence of a standard pro-
cess with organisational decision making. Therefore, a typical ERP implementation usually
involves a mix of organisation and software customisations (Light, 2005a; Ward et al., 2005;
Umble et al., 2003; Shehab et al., 2004; Al-Mashari & Al-Mudimigh, 2003).
Therefore, the decision an organisation may take in response to each ‘misfit’ is the result of
a process of interaction and negotiation among various parties including management, users,
IS personnel, and consultants. The nature of ‘misfit’ exerts a strong influence on whether
the package structures would be more likely to prevail (i.e. the organisation would adapt
the package), or the organisation structures would be more likely to prevail (i.e. the package
would be customised via addition of supplementary modules or modification of package code).
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Once installed, organisations are required to decide on big-bang or phased-in (modular) as
a‘go-live’ strategy. The big-bang implementation approach refers to a scenario where the old
system is discarded and all modules of the new system are introduced into each business unit
over a weekend (Nicolaou, 2004; Motwani et al., 2002; Shehab et al., 2004). Although the
big-bang approach presents a number of advantages, as it does not require parallel running
of legacy and ERP software, it requires peak resource utilisation in a short period of time
with lower resources available to address problems for particular modules, thus increasing
the risk of total system failure (O’Leary, 2000).
The modular implementation approach on the other hand refers to a scenario where one
module is implemented, and then it is run in parallel with the legacy system until the output
results are satisfactory (i.e. reports and data). Although this approach presents a minimal
risk of failure, it leads to increased costs of ERP. It is imperative that organisations planning
to implement ERP need be aware of inherent trade-offs in different competing strategies so
that they can make informed decisions and boost their implementation outcome.
2.5.2 ERP Implementation Models
Implementing an ERP system is generally an extensive challenge, with a typical ERP imple-
mentation taking between one and five years (Poston & Grabski, 2001; Robey & Ross, 2002).
In addition, the performance of the firm will get worse before it gets better and firms are
expected to counter the staff resistance throughout the stages of ERP implementation (Ross,
1999). Several researchers have developed different models for ERP implementations. For
instance, Ross (1999) proposed a five-stage model for ERP: implementation, stabilisation,
continuous improvement and transformation.
Markus & Tanis (1999) suggested a model named enterprise system experience cycle, which
has four phases: charter, project, shakedown and onward and upward. In 2000, Parr and
Shanks developed a Process Phase Model (PPM) for ERP implementation, which is an
extension of Ross (1999) and Markus & Tanis (1999) models, but integrating CSFs for each
implementation stage. In the PPM, an ERP project is divided into three continuous phases:
planning, project and enhancement (Shanks, 2000). In the project phase, it includes activities
of set-up, re-engineering, design, configuration and testing, and installation.
The ERP implementation models mentioned above contain implicit assumptions with regard
to the content, context, and nature of the change process. Like conventional IT implementa-
tion models, they rely on linear, staged models which do not take into account the dynamic
23
interplay and reciprocal interaction between technology and the social process involving its
use. Change is seen as Lewinian:
“inertial, linear, progressive, goal seeking, motivated by disequilibrium and
requiring outside intervention” and the change manager’s role revolves around
“creating and influencing change” with focus on inertia. (Weick & Quinn, 1999,
page 366).
We would argue that Parr and Shank’s model (PPM) was a move towards what can be called
an implementation model because it attempted to identify the pertinent factors which should
be controlled in each phase of implementation in order to achieve a successful implementation.
However, the main weakness of the PPM is that it over-emphasis the project management
aspect of a ERP implementation project at the expense of other pertinent factors such as
organisation itself – its characteristics – and external factors such the environment in which
an organisation operates.
Whereas we argue that ERP implementation models can help to improve our understanding
of enterprise systems, and also can be a good guide for successful ERP implementation, what
has been reported as ERP implementation models are more of ‘possible’ ERP implementation
cycles. The question is whether a ‘cycle’ is synonymous to a ‘model’. We argue that a
model should go a step further to give guidelines while taking context into consideration
with the aim of improving the implementation outcomes. To do so, a good model should
provide a rich picture of an implementation scenario and the possible sources of influences
on implementation and how these actors interact and interrelate to come up with a working
acceptable relation beneficial to both the organisation and the individuals.
However, ERP models discussed above do not include or consider other relevant contextual
or environmental influences. In their famous work, DeLone & McLean (1992) caution re-
searchers not only to focus on the dimensions of IT systems success, but to also consider
other contingency factors. DeLone & McLean (1992) as well as other researchers, includ-
ing Saunders & Jones (1992), Myers et al. (1997), and Ballantine et al. (1997) assert that
deeper understanding could emerge when the contextual influences are duly considered in
the discourse of IT systems success evaluations or assessment. Duncan (1972) provides a
distinction between contexts when he writes, “. . . the internal environment consists of those
relevant physical and social factors within the boundaries of the organisation . . . the external
environment consists of those relevant physical and social factors outside the boundaries of
the organisation. . . ” (p. 314). We discuss three models which will inform the development
of an ERP implementation model in this study. These three models are important due to
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the fact that they take into consideration the influence contextual factors on ERP imple-
mentation. Even though Myers et al. (1997) and Somers et al. (2000) refer to their works
as frameworks, we refer to them as models in the discussion.
Saunders and Jones (1992) Model
Saunders & Jones (1992) include contextual variables in their study of the performance of the
IS function. The authors investigate both the organisational factors such as top management
support, size, mission, industry, and so forth as well as the peculiar dimensions that might
improve the effectiveness or success of the IS function. They proposed an evaluation model
which they term “IS Function Performance Evaluation Model” (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: IS function performance evaluation model by Saunders & Jones (1992).
The relevance of the Saunders & Jones (1992) to this study rests on the extent to which
it provides support to the view that a model can include both the impact of contingency
factors and the dimensions of usage or success. In the same vein, Willcocks & Sykes (2000)
discussed the role of the IT function in ERP acquisitions and Sedera et al. (2002) has also
used a combination of the Saunders & Jones (1992), DeLone & McLean (1992), and the
Myers et al. (1997) frameworks to discuss the impacts and success of ERP systems in
Australian public sector organisations.
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Myers et al. (1997) framework
Building on the work of Saunders & Jones (1992), the framework of the “contingency the-
ory of IS assessment” was developed by Myers et al. (1997). Essentially, the framework
extends the Saunders & Jones (1992) framework in the context of the assessment of quality
and productivity of the IS function. The Myers et al. (1997) framework also recognises the
pertinence of both contingency factors. Additionally, Myers et al. (1997) clearly delineate
“external environmental variables” from the organisational factors, which Saunders & Jones
(1992) did not do. Thus, by separating the contextual levels into two main parts, their
approach provides insights which would be useful in the development of an ERP implemen-
tation model in this study. As briefly stated above, prior literature (e.g. Duncan, 1972)
suggests that such delineations are necessary for insights.
Somers et al. (2000) framework
With regard to ERP systems in particular, this research will borrow from the framework
proposed by Somers et al. (2000) that includes contextual factors such as industry type,
size, structure, which these researchers imply are critical in achieving positive outcomes from
ERP acquisitions. The Somers et al. framework is shown in Figure 2.3. These authors are
suggesting that the value that adopting organisations would obtain from their ERP software
could depend on the extent to which there is a match between the process, contexts, and
contingency factors. We contend that the Somers et al. (2000) framework is rooted in the
contingency approach, which will inform the development of this study’s model.
In conclusion, the ERP models discussed above are based on studies conducted in developed
countries which are significantly different from developing countries. Given the contextual
differences between developed and developing countries, we argue that Sub-Saharan Africa,
Kenya being the case study, can provide a rich context in terms of diversity which could be
used to refine the already existing ERP models or develop new ones.
2.5.3 ERP systems upgrade
One of the least addressed issues related to ERP software is the decision to upgrade from one
version to another. According to Microsoft’s support web page, “An upgrade is a software
package that replaces installed version of a product with a newer version of the same product.
The upgrade process typically leaves existing customer data and preferences intact while
replacing existing software with the newer version” (Upgrade, 2006).
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Figure 2.3: Somers et al. (2000) contextual framework
There is extensive research literature on the reasons why organisations adopt ERP systems.
However, unlike the more general case of new ERP adoption, upgrading an ERP system
is a decision to continue using software that has already been adopted, implemented and
used. As a result, factors that are considered crucial for new technology adoption may be
less relevant to the decision to upgrade.
The research that is most closely related to ERP system upgrade is software maintenance.
Kidd (2001) defines software maintenance as “the activities performed on software after
the program have been installed”. The main commonality between maintenance and ERP
upgrade decisions is the importance of responding to users’ business needs. Just as user
demand for enhancement and extensions is the most important problem of maintenance
(Lientz & Swanson, 1978), users may also demand upgrades to obtain functionality that an
existing version of an ERP system lacks. Thus IT maintenance and ERP system upgrade
serve a similar functional purpose. However, there are major differences between ERP system
upgrade and traditional software maintenance. For example, ERP system upgrades usually
replace the previous version with a new version, whereas maintenance usually targets specific
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functions that need to be corrected or perfected. These differences between ERP system up-
grade and traditional software maintenance are likely to make the decision process different.
ERP upgrade decisions may also be influenced by an organisation’s strategic orientation
toward new technology. Maier et al. (1997) show that a firm that prides itself as an exploiter
or innovator of technology will probably adopt the latest upgrade as soon as the new software
is released in the market. On the other hand, a firm that considers itself as a follower of
technology will probably wait to uprade until migration is absolutely necessary and the new
version has been thoroughly tested by earlier adopters.
In addition to a firm’s own strategic orientation toward technology, upgrade decisions may be
influenced by the environment (Lederer & Mendelow, 1990). It may be important to include
environmental factors such as vendors in upgrade decisions. The most obvious relevant
environmental influence is ERP vendors, who stand to profit by selling or licensing ERP
software. Vendors actively market new versions well before their ability, promising features
and functions that have not yet been built or properly tested. Such pre-annoucements can
affect the timing of customer’s decisions to upgrade or purchase. When ERP supports critical
processes and the current version of the system is no longer being supported by the vendor,
an organisation is forced upgrade to the next version. As a result, upgrade of ERP systems
appear to be inevitable for several reasons. ERP software vendors typically establish ‘sunset
dates’, after which vendors discontinue support for a particular version. Thus, organisations
that require vendor support are pressured to upgrade before the vendor’s sunset date.
Although an organisation may choose to operate unsupported software, ERP products even-
tually become incompatible with other software or require new functionality. Unless or-
ganisations develop their own software or find another source , their only option becomes
upgrading to a new, vendor-supported version. However, organisations do not need to up-
grade to every new version of software because vendors typically support multiple versions
at the same time. Thus, choices must be made, make it important to study how organisation
decide to migrate to the next version of ERP software and how the upgrade is carried out.
2.5.4 What makes ERP implementation a nightmare?
ERP systems promise to improve an organisation’s key performance indicators such as pro-
ficiency, efficiency, profitability, customer satisfaction and other measures of value. On the
other hand, ERP systems are highly complex information systems and the implementation
of these systems is difficult and a costly process placing tremendous demands on corporate
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time and resources (Huang et al., 2004). Shehab et al. (2004), point out that although or-
ganisations spend millions on ERP packages and implementation process, there is extensive
evidence that they experience considerable problems, particularly during the actual imple-
mentation.
Studies have reported several failed ERP attempts, and companies lost not only the capital
invested in ERP packages and millions paid to outside consultants, but also a major portion
of their business. Unisources Worldwide, Inc., a $7 billion distributor of paper products,
wrote off $168 million in costs related to an abandoned nationwide implementation of SAP
R/3 software while FoxMeyer Drug, a former $5 billion drug distributor, went bankrupt in
1996 and has filled a $500 million lawsuit against SAP (Monk & Wagner, 2006). FoxMeyer
charged the ERP giant that its package was a “a significant factor” that led the firm into
financial ruin. Dell Computer Corp. abandoned a much-publicised SAP R/3 following
months of delay and cost overruns. Dow Chemical, after spending half a billion dollars over
seven years of implementing SAP R/2, the mainframe version, decided to start all over again
on the new client/server version (R/3) (Soh & Sia, 2004a).
The next section will give an overview of implementation challenges reported in the ERP
literature and the change process resulting from BPR. Given that there is no study on
ERP which has been conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa we will look at the challenges faced
by organisations in developed countries which have implemented ERP systems, and the
challenges faced by organisations in developing countries in implementing information and
communication technologies (ICT). We presume that these challenges which can be relevant
to ERP systems because ERP is a type of information system. Careful consideration of these
challenges will ensure a smooth rollout and realisation of full benefits of the ERP solution.
2.5.4.1 General ERP implementation challenges
Limited research has been conducted about ERP implementation issues: mainly case studies
in individual organisations have been reported. A major problem with such ERP case studies
is that very few implementation challenges resulting in these failures have been reported in
the literature, and thus the reasons implementations failure is not known to practitioners or
researchers. That is a motivation towards conducting empirical studies to explore challenges
that affect ERP systems implementation. Identifying challenges relevant to local companies
is one way to increase the chances of a successful local ERP implementation. A number
of challenges to effective implementation and use of ERP systems have been documented,




Al-Mashari (2003) and Markus et al. (2000) states integration is often cited as a key goal
associated with the implementation of ERP. According to Berente et al. (2009), ERP cre-
ates many interconnections among various business processes and data flows to ensure that
any other unit of the organisation can obtain information in one part of the business. In-
formation that was previously maintained by different departments must be integrated and
made available to the company as a whole. Business processes must be tightly integrated,
jobs redefined and new procedures created throughout the company. The whole process
of change is challenging and employees are often unprepared for new procedures and roles
(Rishi & Goyal, 2008; Laudon & Laudon, 2006, 2000).
Berente et al. (2009) argues that integration of existing stand-alone information systems with
ERP systems is a major problem for many organisations. This is further complicated by the
fact that ERP systems also seek to integrate business processes in organisations which were
previously function-based. Thus, the process-orientation resulting from process integration
is against the functional differentiation which is common in traditional organisations. While
client/server and open systems solve some technical difficulties, there are still problems of
integrating different types of data and procedures used by functional areas. Also, there is an
issue of information sharing, which may contradict existing practices and culture (O’Brien,
1997). Coleman (n.d.) captures the key problems in his article “ERP integration options”:
The problem of integrating ERP applications is as old as ERP itself. Not long
after ERP suites first debuted in the early 1990s – touted panaceas for corporate
integration woes – companies have struggled to improve the level of integration
between their ERP packages and other applications such as legacy systems and
e-commerce sites.
Technological complexity
According to Lowe & Locke (2008), ERP systems are perhaps the most complex and com-
prehensive of business information systems. Report by Institute for Data Research report
(Aiken, 2002) further asserts that ERP systems are built on new powerful technologies that
require very different skill sets than legacy systems. Most large organisations still require
use of large scale, main frame legacy systems. Managers find it very challenging to manage
the technological complexity of different platforms and to harness the technological power
of new enterprise technology. While emphasing the complexity of ERP systems, Bingi et al.
(2002) noted that:
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An ERP package is so complex and vast that it takes several years and million
of dollars.
Sawah et al. (2008) concurs with Bingi’s claim and states that ERP implementation is so
complex that it has proven to be too difficult for many organisations. A study by Rogers
(1983) shows that organisations that perceive ERP to be a complex business solution are
likely to diffuse it slowly and in limited capacity, and may end up not realising its full benefit.
Lack of proper ERP management
Laudon & Laudon (2006),argue that most managers are trained to manage a product line, a
division, or an office. Their arguement is supported by Rishi & Goyal (2008). They are rarely
trained to optimise the performance of the organisation as a whole. However, Bingi et al.
(2002) reports that enterprise systems require managers to take a much larger view of their
own behaviour, to include other products, divisions, departments and even outside business
firms. Therefore, ERP systems must be developed and implemented over time guided by a
shared vision of objectives. According to Laudon & Laudon (2000), many organisations find
it very difficult to develop a shared, enterprise wide vision to guide systems implementation.
Cost of technology
Even though the price of prewritten software is cheap compared with in-house development,
Monk & Wagner (2006) observes that the total cost of implementation could be three to
five times the purchase price of the software. This is because ERP is a semi-finished prod-
uct which needs to be configured and tailored to organisational needs by consultants. The
implementation cost is even higher when an organisation decides to undertake major cus-
tomisation. The cost of hiring consultants and all that goes with it can consume up to 30
percent of the overall budget for the implementation. Therefore, arguably, ERP systems
are generally expensive to purchase and implement in organisations. The move to ERP is a
project of breath-taking scope and the prices quoted are enough to make any financial man-
ager twitchy. In addition to budgeting for software costs, financial executives should plan to
write cheques to cover consulting, process rework, integration testing and a long laundry list
of other expenses before the benefits of ERP start to manifest. Koch et al. (1999) state that




Many companies simply strive to complete the projects quickly for fear of poaching by head-
hunting agencies and other companies. According to Gartner Group, total cost of an outside
SAP consultant is around $1600 per day. Going for in-house SAP-trained technologists
creates its own worries. Once the selected employees are trained and after investing a huge
sum of money, it is a challenge to retain them, especially in a market that is hungry for
skilled SAP consultants (Skok, 2001). Employees could double or triple their salaries by
accepting other positions. Retention strategies such as bonus programs, company perks,
salary increases, continual training and education, and appeals to company loyalty could
work. Other intangible strategies such as flexible work hours, telecommunication options,
and opportunities are also being used (Skok, 2001) .
Organisational change
As stated by Umble et al. (2003), ERP implementation is not just a software project but an
organisational change project. The projects call for co-operation, teamwork, and planning
for organisational change are difficult to do when senior management is too busy to give the
project adequate attention. Wagner et al. (2006) further argue that installing ERP systems
successfully is not an easy task because of the major changes to a company’s business pro-
cesses required by ERP software. The projects bring about massive organisational changes
as they consist of many functional modules that can span the whole organisation and yet
share a database. Because departments are part of a larger organisation, they are forced
to share systems and act not as independent units but as a larger organisation, requiring a
whole new understanding of their work (O’Brien, 1997).
The introduction of any new technology may result in massive staff layoffs and morale prob-
lems. The integration of departments leads to reduced need for many staff to man operation
hence leading to staff layoffs. The company may lack resources to compensate employees over
their job loses. Therefore, managers must anticipate resistance to ERP systems, especially
when combined to BPR (Laudon & Laudon, 2006).
Product quality and vendor unreliability
According to Fourney (2007), although ERP systems are becoming increasingly similar in
functionality, they are still different in their quality, ease of implementation and vendor
support. The stability of the a new release of an ERP system may not be guaranteed. System
developers are changing hardware platforms, sometimes operating systems and database
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platforms, and other times overall system architecture. Given that vendors are continualy
developing new version of their ERP products, one vendor may have several versions of the
same system. It may also mean that the version you want to buy is brand new, leading edge,
but unstable hence prone to crashing, and full of bugs (Al-Mashari et al., 2003).
2.5.4.2 ERP implementation challenges-Developing countries
The challenges discussed were derived from studies conducted in developed countries where
ERP systems emanate. Previous studies state that transfer of information systems like ERP
– typically developed in industrialised countries – to developing countries is often marred by
problems of mismatch with local cultural, economic and regulatory requirements.
Research has also acknowledged information technology’s potential for helping to promote
economic growth in developing countries, but its realisation depends largely on acquiring
the ability to appreciate local conditions and develop applications to address them. Local
conditions consist of a variety of dimensions, including specific social and economic settings,
cultural values, and technical issues such as the availability of equipment, lack of trained and
experienced personnel, the reliability of power supplies, and telecommunications infrastruc-
tures (Heeks, 2002; Walsham, 1988; Lind, 1991).
Lind (1991) argues that computer-based solutions which work in one organisation in a specific
country will not be applicable to another organisation or country if a different rationale
prevails. He introduces the concept of ‘computer model fit’, to reflect the applicability of a
system within a specific context. An evaluation of the applicability of any information system
should therefore consider the cultural characteristics and social values of the environment
(Galliers et al., 1998; Robey, 1988), which can reveal the level of risk expected when a system
created in the West is implemented in a developing country.
Bingi et al. (2002) also identified several issues that developing countries have to face that are
not quite important or common in developed countries: human resources, technical concerns,
and socio-political challenges. Regarding human resources, technology users in developing
countries are limited in their opportunities for career development. Regarding technical
issues, there are concerns about quality, security, and availability of data. Socio-politically,
there are challenges that arise from illiteracy, language barrier, political instability etc.
As a result, Heeks & Kenny (2002) suggest that there is a strong need to understand the con-
textual setting of developing countries being studied in order to effectively apply information
technologies developed in the west (Europe and North America) to these countries. In the
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same light, the following sections examines the likely challenges to be faced by organisations
implementing ERP in developing countries.
Incompatibility with work practices
Whilst ERP is a global product, most of the major ERP developers are located either
in North America or in Western Europe. As a result, the developers’ interpretations of
business systems are likely to be reflected in the software (Sia & Soh, 2007; Fenema et al.,
2007; Soh & Sia, 2004a). ERP systems thus incorporate values and practices that may
not necessarily match all environments. As such organisations face different problems with
ERP that customised system development owing to the need to change their organisational
practices in order to fit the software ‘best practices’ (Davenport, 1998; Pollock & Conford,
2004; Wagner & Newell, 2004; Light, 2005b; Chiasson & L.W. Green, 2007).
Since organisations need to change their internal processes in order to match the processes of
an ERP system, we argue that in North America and West Europe where most ERP devel-
opers are located, this may not be very problematic since the underlying business processes
and practices reflect European and US industry practices. The literature reports companies
in developed countries which have been forced to discard ERP implementation altogether
due to operational rigidity of the systems (e.g., FoxMayer in (Bingi et al., 2002; Soh & Sia,
2004a); Dell Computers, (Bingi et al., 2002). However, in cultural contexts embodying or-
ganisational practices which are different to those encountered in North America and Europe
like Sub-Saharan Africa, there can be significant problems associated with re-engineering of
local practices and processes. Moreover, ERP companies have moved into providing solu-
tions for vertical industries in many different countries giving way to problems of regional
adaptation and customisation.
Many authors (e.g.,(Soh & Sia, 2004a; Wagner & Newell, 2004; Wei et al., 2005; Light, 2005a;
Wagner et al., 2006; Sia & Soh, 2007; Chiasson & L.W. Green, 2007)) suggest organisations
in countries and industries other than those envisioned by the package developers will often
discover many instances of package-organisation misalignment. This, they argue will oc-
cur with increasing frequency as emerging economies in other parts of the world adopt ERP
system developed largely for the US and Western Europe. For example, Soh et al. (2000) sur-
veyed “misfits” observed in ERP implementations and found that these tend to be higher in
Asian companies because of differences from European and US business practices. Pursuing
a ‘vanilla’ implementation in such instances will result in significant changes to the processes,
structures, roles, and policies of the implementing organisation. Some of these changes may
adversely affect operational efficiencies and may even undermine an organisations’ customer
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service and competitiveness. Davison (2002) also argues that ERP causes significant cul-
tural transformation to the organisation and tends to reset organisational values in terms of
discipline, change and processes.
Therefore, ERP systems developed for one set of institutional contexts may not fit organi-
sations operating in different institutional contexts yet social context is an often overlooked
or underemphasised influence affecting the success or failure of new technology adoption
(Kosalge, 2005). Further evidence from the cultural construction of technology literature
indicates that universal applicability of information technology (IT) such as ERP, is more of
a myth than a reality (Orlikowski, 2000). In the parlance of (Bijker & Law, 1992, page 13):
. . . technologies and technological practices are built in a process of social
construction and negotiation, a process often seen as driven by the social interests
of participants.
In order to create appropriate information systems, there is a need to understand how the
social context influences the use of information technology, and how organisations use in-
formation technology within their own circumstances (Avgerou, 1991). This is especially
relevant for developing countries because:
while there is not a universal ‘culture of developing countries’, local practi-
tioners in developing countries need to devise appropriate ways of coping with
features of the local practices (Ojo, 1992, page 108).
This implies that the internal workings of the technology developers and the values of its
members affect the technological outcome. By the same token, therefore, local work practice
influences the application of IT and transforms technology when it is in use.
ICT Infrastructure and ICT Policy
Bijker & Law (1992) and Mbarika et al. (May 2005) reviewed the literature for policy issues
that specifically concern ICTS in the least developed countries in Africa. It is often the case
that the government exerts excessive control over the national communications operator.
The government often operates national communications directly, largely because the private
sector is often incapable of operating such an infrastructure (ITU, 1994). Although there
has been a move towards deregulation and privatization of telecommunications in many
countries, the process is still slow, often being opposed by government telecommunication
ministries (Chowdary, 1992) and national security forces (Pisciotta & Kibati, 1994).
35
In combination with inefficient state-run telecommunications, another major impediment to
ICTs in Sub-Saharan Africa come from the onerous tariff structure. It works out that the
average telecommunications revenue per subscriber line in SSA is twice as much in Europe,
and four to six times as much in North America (Mbarika et al., May 2005).
Other challenges reported by Xue et al. (2005) in his study of Chinese organisations which
are likely to be applicable to Kenya and other developing countries include: lack of end-
user preparedness, resistance to change, lack of user education and training, high turnover
of key personnel, lack of communication and support documentation, the layer of consul-
tants in addition to pure technological problems such as software bugs and configuration
difficulties. Studies carried out in developed countries (Chen, 2001; Markus et al., 2000;
Gulla & Brasethvik, 2002; Kumar et al., 2003) point out people, organisational issues and
change management as the biggest obstacles in ERP implementation. Kumar et al. (2003)
further asserts that people challenges are considered to be more difficult to manage than the
technical problems.
In conclusion, given that hard currency is not easily available in most developing countries
and unfulfilled social needs compete for resources, it is important for these countries to try
to ensure that investments in information technology deliver tangible benefits. Identifying
the possible challenges and devising means to mitigate the risks they pose to ERP imple-
mentations and usage can greatly improve ERP implementation success and value.
2.5.4.3 National and organisational culture
Most ERP studies point towards organizational culture as the primary factor responsible for
the demanding character of ERP technology. In their study, Zhang et al. (2002) noted that:
Organisation culture is embedded within national culture and it is regarded
as the unique factor affecting ERP systems implementation success (Zhang et al.,
2002, page 57).
Research has revealed that when adopting an ERP system, there is a need to recognise
the unique social context given that the existing business models typically reflect Western
practices (Soh et al., 2000; Davenport, 1998; Umble et al., 2003; Wagner & Newell, 2004;
Ward et al., 2005). Moreover, there is a growing evidence that failures to adapt ERP systems
to fit different organisational and national cultures leads to projects that are expensive and
late.
The environment in which an ERP system is developed, selected, implemented and used
constitutes a “social context” (Skok & Legge, 2002). This ecosystem includes several stake-
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holders: from the developers of the system, to vendors, the consultants, the project team,
and the ultimate users. Each one of these holds a certain cultural assumption towards the
ERP implementation and use process. Particularly, the developers’ and consultants’ cul-
tural assumptions are embedded in the very roots of the software (the technology) itself.
We can identify two main sets of culture at work in any ERP situation of development,
implementation and use.
On one hand, there is a culture reflecting the views of the ERP developers, vendors and
consultants which, as described above, will come to be “embedded” in the ERP system. On
the other hand, there is a culture reflecting the views of the implementing organisation’s
project team, managers and users. We refer to the first as the ERP system culture (‘to-
be’ culture) and to the second as the ERP host organisation culture (‘as-is’ culture). In
summary, ERP is encoded or designed in one particular socio-cultural configuration but
decoded or used in another. If cultures of producers and users are different it results in a
cultural clash.
According to Davenport (1998)and Davison (2002), ERP system culture represents a certain
understanding of problem solving, which is often implicitly promoted in the form of “best
of breed” business practices. As a result, ERP vendors and consultants consider that ERP
embodies the best universally applicable business processes without taking into consideration
potential clients’ cultural distinctiveness. Because ERP vendors focus on core competence,
low cost strategies and mass production, ERP appears to reflect a universalism culture
(Skok & Doeringer, 2001).
Nevertheless, the cultural assumptions within ERP systems and the whole notion of cultural
universalism are challenged. For example, the study of ERP implementation in Singapore
hospitals by Allen & Kern (2001), revealed a significant misfit in terms of data format,
procedures, and legal requirements. Allen & Kern (2001) assert that when ERP systems
are implemented in the public sector they are criticised as reflecting a specific “ideology of
the private sector”. All these point to the importance of organisational context during ERP
implementations. To emphasise on the importance of context, Kosalge (2005) argues that:
Context comprises the deeply embedded business models and mindsets that
drive organisations . . . changes in context must precede any change in content.
Four out of the six leading ERP vendors are from the United States and one is from Europe.
The national culture of these countries influences and shapes the organisational culture, thus
the so called “best practice processes” integrated in the ERP standard software reflect, to
some extent, European and U.S. industry practices (Soh et al., 2000; Kumar & Bjorn-Anderson,
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1990). Additionally, as such software packages are relatively inflexible and only to a lim-
ited degree modifiable to existing business processes, the re-engineering upon which the new
resulting work practices are based, may cause various culture clashes. Moreover, even es-
tablished Western companies are struggling with their reengineering and business software
implementation approaches. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for instance that has diverse
value and belief system inevitably need substantially longer time for the adaptation and
acceptance of such a major organisational change.
This difference in context certainly leads to conflicts, for example ERP systems certainly
affect the distribution of power and authority, which is far deeply rooted in some cultures
than others (Soh et al., 2000; Wagner & Newell, 2004; Kosalge, 2005). ERP philosophy
is process-based, rather than function-based therefore initiating disruptive organisational
changes (Hammer, 1990; Marnewick & Labuschagne, 2005). Boersma & Kingma (2005) as-
sert that standard protocols and norms implicit in ERP systems affect power relations within
organisations. Precisely internal and external (hierarchical as well as functional) boundaries
can be affected by ERP. Marnewick & Labuschagne (2005) further mention that it is often
difficult to implement an ERP system in an organisation with strict hierarchical structures
and line reporting. “The culture of the organisation must first be changed for the ERP system
to be successful” (Marnewick & Labuschagne, 2005). Allen argues that “. . . each functional
areas has specialised expertise, specialised tasks, and different affiliations and identities that
extend beyond immediate work environment” (Allen, 2005, page 34).
In line with these studies, we contend that no universal ERP system can be implemented in
different countries successfully without resolving ‘misfits’ resulting from national differences.
The business models, including operating processes underlying most ERP software packages,
reflect European and US industry practices. Such operating processes are likely to be different
in Sub-Saharan African countries, having evolved in a different cultural, economic, and
regulatory environment. Potential ‘misfits’ could arise from areas including data format,
operational procedures (e.g., billing and collection), and output format. Resolving such
‘misfits’ has required extra implementation time and expense which adds financial strain to
these poor performing economies, whose priority investments is not in information technology
(Montealegre, 1999; Wilson & Heeks, 2000).
Research carried out in various African nations such as Nigeria, show that traditional social
arrangements prevail in the way organizations operate (Ojo, 1992). This kind of adaptive
feature of any human society has led to many researchers to identify the need for flexibility in
information systems. Such flexibility is vital if benefits from using information technology are
to be achieved in the socio-cultural contexts of organisations in developing countries (Robey,
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1988; Robey & Ross, 2002; Walsham, 2002; Khoelif et al., December 2005). Information sys-
tems research carried out in developing countries has reinforced the finding that information
technology is not value free (Lind, 1991; Woherem, 1992) because it incorporates models of
reality derived from the contexts in which information system are developed. These models
are generally imbued within Western values, which are not necessarily universal (Lind, 1991,
2000; Walsham, 1988).
Therefore this research study argues that as ERP systems spread into developing countries,
it is essential to be aware of the implications of cultural assumptions embedded in ERP
software and those reflected in developing country organisations settings. Such awareness
can assist in assessing ERP suitability, in devising mechanisms to mitigate the impact of
cultural misfit, and in increasing value from relatively expensive ERP investments.
IS authors (see Siakas & Georgiadou, 1999; Davison, 2002, etc) have applied the concept
of national culture as proposed by Hofstede (1980, 2001) to explain and predict how peo-
ple of certain nationalities will interact with information systems. A common aspect of
these researchers’ work is the application of Hofstede’s dimensions to make sense of users’
actions. Although Hofstede’s work on culture has been widely accepted in the IS litera-
ture (Marnewick & Labuschagne, 2005), it has also been equally criticised (Walsham, 2002;
Avison & Myers, 1995). In most cases not all his dimensions are found to be relevant. These
approaches share ontology of culture in which its manifestations were tested, measured, typ-
ified, quantified, and catalogued: from this point of view, culture is already there. These
approaches would therefore be useful in capturing organisational and national culture in this
research study.
However, this study would not focus solely on the organisational and national culture while
disregarding system users within the organisations. The fact that ERP systems are encoded
or designed in one particular socio-cultural configuration but is decoded or used in another
calls for culture to be studied both at macro-level and micro-level. Recht & Wilderom (1998)
seem to support our argument by asserting that the transfer of ERP into developing countries
is likely to face the “double-layered acculturation” problem. Hence, it is essential to address
cultural dimensions that cover both these two layers. This is consistent with the approach of
(Krumbholz et al., 2000, page 269) who argued that “corporate and national cultures can be
described using multiple dimensions which give us a set of overlapping characteristics with
which to describe aspects of culture”.
To address culture at a macro-level, the study will adopt more generalised dimensions that
draw from work on national culture, though recognising that national culture impacts norms,
beliefs and values at the organisational level (Ciganek et al., 2004). One starting point would
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be identification of generalised dimensions of national differences in approaches to prob-
lem solving that may create difficulties during ERP implementation (Krumbholz & Maiden,
2000). As a result, this study would also investigate Hofstede’s “power distance” and “un-
certainty avoidance” national culture dimensions relevance in Kenyan context. This is par-
ticularly of interest because Myers & Tan (2002) suggest that the very concept of national
culture is problematic. They argue that there is no necessary alignment between culture and
the nation-state, and propose a more dynamic view of the relationship between culture and
information system in a global context –one that sees culture as contested, temporal and
emergent.
Walsham (2002) takes this argument further. He proposes a structural analysis based on
Giddens (1984) that can accommodate elements such as the links between structural con-
tradiction and conflict, cultural heterogenity, an analysis of detailed work patterns, and the
dynamic and emergent nature of culture. This research will adopt Myers & Tan (2002) and
Walsham (2002) in carrying out micro-level analysis of culture.
2.6 Critical Success Factors (CSFs)
In response to these problems, there has been a developing body of academic and practitioner
literature (Bancroft et al., 1998; Holland et al., 1999; Markus & Tanis, 2000; Nah et al., 2001;
Motwani et al., 2002; Leopoldo & Otieno, 2005) which addresses the difficulties of ERP im-
plementation by proposing Critical Success Factors (CSFs) of ERP implementation.
It is not a new phenomenon for IS researchers to determine a list of critical success factors’
for IT-enabled project initiatives (Reich & Benbasat, 1990; Nadhakumar, 1996). Many re-
searchers (e.g. Nah et al., 2001; Umble et al., 2003; Sarker & Lee, 2000; Leopoldo & Otieno,
2005) have carried out research in this area to identify similar factors specific to ERP imple-
mentations. Most recently, authors have employed positivist research approaches to test the
validity of these factors as truly necessary conditions for implementation success and then
predict the effect of installed ERP technology on organisation performance (Pawlowski et al.,
1999).
Research in this area prioritises critical success factors in order to advise managers about
which of the factors are most critical for the organization (Parr & Shanks, 2000; Somers
& Nelson, 2001). This observation ties with that of Kallinikos (2004) who observes that
a managerial outlook dominates the ERP literature, with its focus on successful ERP im-
plementation guidelines. The outcome of this is a number of non-industry-specific CSFs
that were introduced as aids to assist ERP projects (Holland et al., 1999; Beard & Summer,
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2004). For example, the study by Umble et al. (2003) has categorised the key factors under
10 main points namely: clear understanding of strategic goals, commitment by top manage-
ment, excellent implementation project management, great implementation team, successful
coping with technical issues, organisational commitment to change, extensive education and
training, data accuracy, focused performance measures, and multi-site issues resolved.
As noted by Robey et al. (2002), while these findings are useful in predicting the success-
ful outcome of ERP projects, they offer few insights beyond conventional wisdom because
they do not adequately explain why the investigated business outcome occurred. In light
with their observation, we argue that these studies are not without benefit because they
illuminate important issues for consideration and point to the complexity of software project
initiatives. Organisations and researchers may find consulting a list of a priori ‘factors of
success’ beneficial, such items are not in-themselves keys to a preferred outcome. Rather,
they tend to focus attention on controlling and simplifying innately complex situations.
Studies in ERP when compared to other research in the field of IS, shows that theo-
ries on ERP systems implementation have been given less attention (Robey et al., 2002;
Esteves & Pastor, 2001; Zhang et al., 2003). Most of the studies carried on critical suc-
cess factors areas lack theoretical basis that successfully link the critical success factors to
implementation outcomes of any kind. Besides, there is no consensus on critical success fac-
tors owing to difference in context between implementing organisations (Leopoldo & Otieno,
2005).
2.7 Current ERP trend
ERP systems evolutionary process continues as standard ERP packages are redesigned by
vendors seeking to penetrate untapped markets and extend their products to look beyond the
four walls of the organisation – intra-organisational integration (Bennett & Timbrell, 2000;
Everdingen et al., 2000a; Sprott, 2000; Poba-Nzaou et al., 2008). Huang et al. (2004) affirm
that:
The ERP vendors are now trying to fight for the new generation of ERP
systems and extend their market to companies in developing countries, Small
and Medium Sized enterprises, and different kinds of industries.
Davenport, whose academic writings on ERP crossover most readily to a practitioner audi-
ence, observes that ERP is a prerequisite for operating in the 21st century (Davenport, 1998,
2000). We interpret Davenport’s perspective as quite powerful especially with the advent of
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web-technology which makes an ERP to a ‘must have’ application if an organisation needs
to exploit advantages of e-commerce. Beard & Summer (2004) support this argument by
commenting that “today, enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems are one of the most
significant business software investment made in new era”.
Web-based technology has brought in a new notion. In the last two years or so, the Gartner
Group has coined the current ERP systems as ERP II –the next generation of ERP systems,
which are based on collaborative principles (Zrimsek et al., 2001). ERP has acquired a new
look by including more“front-office” functions, such as sales force and marketing automation,
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and Supply chain Management Systems (SCM).
With the advent of e-commerce, there were fears that ERP would rest in peace. However,
it is beginning to emerge that ERP is a prerequisite to a sound e-commerce infrastructure
hence the former is viewed as a supplement. Norris et al. (2000), reports from their works
with clients that properly implementing e-commerce and ERP technologies in harmony truly
creates a situation where one plus one is more than two. They argue that web-based tech-
nology puts life and breadth into ERP technology that is large, technologically cumbersome,
and does not always easily reveal its value. At the same time, ERP allows e-business to
come into full flower, by putting real substance behind the organisations’ e-commerce web-
sites. While ERP organises information within the enterprise, e-commerce disseminates that
information far and wide. In short, ERP and e-commerce technologies supercharge each
other (Norris et al., 2000).
Today, the drivers behind ERP implementation are most likely to focus on maximizing
strategic flexibility and improving business operations by reducing operational costs, enabling
business integration, support customer responsiveness, improving data visibility and making
better business decisions. For these reasons, enterprise systems remain a vital part of the
Kenyan business scene.
2.8 Summary
Literature presented in this chapter indicates there are emerging interests in the impacts of
ERP systems. Literature reviewed highlights issues that warrant further consideration with
respect to effect of context on ERP adoption, implementation and upgrade. The insights
gained from the literature should be interpreted in the light of a number of limitations.
Firstly, to the researcher’s knowledge, there is a limited number of studies that have been
conducted in less developed countries, particularly in Kenya, to address ERP implementation
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issues. This points to the urgent need for understanding ERP adoption, implementation
and usage issues in developing countries since ERP systems are still in early stages in these
countries and face additional challenges related to economic, cultural and basic infrastructure
issues.
Secondly, although research into ERP systems has recognised the need to address indigenous
local conditions in terms of social aspects, generally it is limited in the identification of how
the social conditions and cultural aspects actually influence the use of this technology.
Thirdly, prior research suffers from either not using an analytic framework or only focusing
on one aspect of ERP impacts. Most of the studies as pointed out adopted a perspective of
technological determinism offering little help in terms of understanding and interpreting the
effect context has on ERP systems adoption, implementation and usage.
Fourthly, literature reviewed points a gap between theory and practice by the inability of
research to produce integrative and representation framework for implementation, as well as
“reliable” generalisations on ERP.
Lastly, it is obvious that ERP consciously introduces vendor organisation or vendor na-
tional culture into an organisation. This can have a significant effect, cultural conflict, given
that there is no single universal business practice as assumed by the ERP vendors, due to
contextual differences among nations, regions, organisations, and industries.
In light of the gaps identified in literature, this research aims at filling the gap by studying





The aim of this chapter is to provide the pathway through which the objective of this study
is achieved. It presents the philosophical assumptions underpinning this research, as well as
introduces the research strategy and the empirical techniques applied. The chapter defines
the scope and limitations of the research design, and situates the research amongst existing
traditions in information systems.
The research assumptions are important for the reader to understand the research analysis
and findings contained in further chapters. These assumptions were developed with respect
to the research topic, environmental constraints and the uniqueness of the research sites.
In choosing appropriate research methods, we took into consideration the fact that: 1) the
research method influences the way of data collection; 2) specific methods also imply different
skills, assumptions and research practices.
3.2 Relevant Research Methods/Approaches
Research methods can be classified in various ways; however there is a major distinction be-
tween qualitative and quantitative research. Myers & Avison (2002) state that quantitative
research methods were originally developed in the natural sciences to study natural phe-
nomena. Example of quantitative research methods now well accepted in the social sciences
include survey methods, laboratory experiments, formal methods (e.g. econometrics) and
numerical methods such as mathematical modeling.
Qualitative research methods on the other hand were developed in the social sciences to
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enable researchers to study social and cultural phenomena. Examples of qualitative research
are action research, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study research.
Action research aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate
problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a mutu-
ally acceptable framework (Rapport, 1970 as cited in (Myers, 1997)). Ethnographic research
comes from the discipline of social and cultural anthropology where an ethnographer is re-
quired to spend a significant amount of time in the field. Ethnographers immerse themselves
in the lives of people they study and seek to place phenomena studied in their social and
cultural context. Grounded theory is a research method that seeks to develop theory that
is grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed. Case study research is the most
common qualitative method used in information systems (Myers, 1997).
According to Myers & Avison (2002), qualitative research methods are aligned to the in-
terpretive paradigm whereas quantitative research methods are aligned to the positivist
paradigm. The issue of whether these two paradigms can be accommodated within one
study has been a subject of considerable schism among academics.
Multi-paradigm Approach
Lee (1991) developed a framework which can be used to combine qualitative and quantitative
research in a study. It is referred to as multi-paradigm approach. In his framework, Lee
(1991) identifies three levels of understanding discussed below (p. 35).
• Understanding at the first level (subjective understanding) belongs to the observed
human objects. This understanding is the making of sense of everyday behaviour
which manifests itself in social settings.
• Understanding at second level (interpretive understanding) belongs to the observer
(researcher). This understanding is the reading or interpretation of the first level,
common sense understanding.
• Understanding at the third level (positivistic understanding) belongs to the researcher.
This understanding involves the researcher creating and testing propositions in order
to explain the empirical reality that he or she is investigating.
Lee (1991) suggests that methodologies associated with interpretive research (e.g. case study,
action research, ethnography, grounded theory etc.) can be used to develop the researcher’s
second level of understanding. The second level, interpretive understanding then informs
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the development of testable propositions addressing institutional/structural aspects of the
social phenomenon being investigated. The patterns or themes identified in the second level
are represented by testable propositions to constitute a third level of understanding. These
testable preposition can then be subjected to more conventional methods of scientific testing.
The objective of this additional method is to achieve data triangulation. The advantage
of Lee’s (1991) multi-paradigm approach is that it recognises that understandings gained
through interpretivist analysis might provide a basis for developing testable propositions.
3.3 Selected Research Method
This study will adopt the multi-paradigm approach discussed above. Multi-paradigm re-
search involves mixing of methods from different paradigms. In general, research methods
develop within a particular paradigm, but the relationship is far from clear. Pragmatists
believe that methods can be mixed and matched to best answer the research questions
(Petkov et al., 2006). Mingers (2001) claims that “multimethodology, or critical pluralism as
he calls it, may be seen as a new paradigm which can encompass multi-paradigm research
combinations without taking the extant paradigm’s assumptions at face value”. While pro-
moting the use of multi-paradigm approach, Mingers (2001) argues that “studies will get
the greatest benefit from multi-paradigm as an approach in managing complex problems
by mixing of methods to take maximum advantage of benefits gained from using method-
ologies premised upon alternative paradigms”. Mingers (2001) further states that research
results will be richer and more reliable if different research methods, preferably from different
paradigms, are routinely combined together.
Fernandez et al. (2006) adopted multi-paradigm approach to grounded theory while study-
ing ICT in Australia. Their study was designed to have three phases each including data
collection and analysis: phase one in which the survey instrument was developed, phase two
in which the survey was conducted and analysed, and phase three which involved the con-
duct and analysis of the interviews and the final integration of conceptualisations. They used
statistical methods to discover patterns, and interviews and focus group to obtain rich data.
The approach taken by Fernandez et al. (2006) is similar to the approach applied in this
research except for the difference in the sequence of the phases. Whereas Fernandez et al.
(2006) started by conducting a survey in phase two and then interviews in phase three, our
study conducted interviews in phase two and concluded by carrying survey in phase three.
The underlying principle is that methods aligned to different paradigms can be employed in
the study of information systems.
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In addition to the merits of multi-paradigm approach discussed above, it is well-suited for
this research because it provides an opportunity to exhaustively study the phenomenon of
interest, i.e. ERP implementation and upgrade in Kenya. The approach allows for the
design of a study that capitalises on the advantages and minimises on the disadvantages
of qualitative and quantitative research methods even though they are aligned to different
paradigms. The multi-paradigmatic approach promises to provide a richer understanding of
what constitutes ERP systems implementation given the relative lack of theory relevant to
the subject. Therefore, multi-paradigm approach is attractive in this research in terms of
its richness and increased validity (Mingers, 2003). Another justification for combining two
research methods from different paradigms in this study is based on the research carried out
by Siakas (2002) who combined qualitative and quantitative research methods to study the
effect of culture on quality of information systems in her doctoral research.
The case study research method will be used for carrying out the qualitative (interpretive
paradigm) part of this research – Lee’s second level understanding – while the survey will be
used for the quantitative (positivistic) part of this research – Lee’s third level understanding.
3.3.1 Case Study Research
Yin (1984) defines the scope of a case study as follows:
A case study is an inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident.
The case study research method is particularly well-suited to IS research, since the object of
the information system discipline is the study of information systems in organisations, and
“interest has shifted to organizational rather than technical issues” (Benbasat et al., 1987).
Benbasat et al. (1987) point out three reasons why case study research is a practical IS
strategy:
1. The IS researcher can study the IS in a natural setting, learn about the state of the
art, and generate theories from practice
2. Case method allows the IS researcher to answer “how” and “why” questions, that is to
understand the nature and complexity of IS processes
3. Since there is a rapid pace of change in the IS field, many new topics emerge each year
for which valuable insights can be gained through the use of case research.
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In addition, for situations when
• the research and theory are at their early and establishment stages (e.g. in ERP
research); and
• the actors and context are important and the researcher wants to understand the
practice based on problems;
case study research method gives the best results.
The use of a case study in this research may be validated by assessing the research against
the criteria necessary for case study research developed by (Benbasat et al., 1987). The
answering of the following questions in the affirmative can validate these criteria.
1. Can the phenomenon of interest be studied outside its natural setting?
2. Must the study focus on contemporary events?
3. Is control or manipulation of subjects or events necessary?
4. Does the phenomenon of interest enjoy an established theoretical base?
Yin (1994) argues that “The case study allows an investigation to retain holistic and mean-
ingful characteristics of real-life events such as life cycles, organisational and managerial
processes, neighbourhood change, international relations and the maturation of industries”.
Therefore, the case study approach is especially useful in situations where contextual condi-
tions of the events being studied are critical and where the researcher has no control over the
events as they unfold. The adoption, implementation and use of ERP are contextually de-
pendent. There is a need to study organisations in their social contexts (Friedland & Alford,
1991) and information systems (more so ERP systems) in their organisational settings
(Orlikowski, 2000; Ojo, 1992) reason being that different countries have national differences
such as national culture, language, management style, politics, regulations, customs, etc.
which affect “the way of doing business” (Huang & Palvia, 2001; Siakas & Georgiadou, 1999;
Shore & Venkatachalam, 1996; Hofstede, 1980).
The need for this study to be undertaken historically in order to capture the opinions of the
implementation staff and users at different stages of ERP implementation also justifies the
use of case study. This was to ensure the coverage of post-implementation activities being
undertaken by organisations to optimise performance of their ERP systems. There exists
a plethora of literature on ERP implementation and to a less extent literature on effect
of culture on ERP implementation, based on studies carried out in developed countries.
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However, studies conducted in developing countries are still minimal and non-existent in
African countries.
3.3.2 Survey
Case study research has been subject to criticism on the grounds of non-representativeness
and lack of statistical generalisability. The research design for this study aims to address
this limitation by incorporating a survey in the second phase of the research. Survey is
one of the most prevalent research methodologies used in information system (IS) research
(Vogel & Wetherbe, 1984; Pinsonneault & Kremer, 1993). The benefit of using surveys is
that the researcher can easily cover large populations quickly at a relatively low cost especially
with the availability of modern communication technologies.
3.4 Research Design and Techniques
The research questions to be answered in this research influenced the research design. This
research is aiming to answer the questions listed in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1. This section
describes the research design which outlines the intended research activities to be undertaken.
The research will be carried out in four phases. The phases 1, 2, and 3 correspond to
Lee’s first, second, and third level understanding respectively, while phase 4 will be used for
validating the models to be developed from the research findings.
3.4.1 Phase One: Pilot Study
The pilot study phase will consist of five steps discussed below. This phase corresponds
to Lee’s first level understanding and is aimed at gaining subjective understanding of the
research topic.
Step 1: Preliminary Literature Review
Preliminary literature review will be conducted in order to familiarise with the previous
research work on ERP systems. Preliminary literature review will aim at providing direction
in the construction of data collection instruments in addition to guarding against the risk of
overloading the primary data collection stages of the project.
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Step 2: Development of the Data Collection Instrument
An initial questionnaire will be developed based on insights gained from the preliminary lit-
erature review. This instrument will be used to gather data relating to ERP implementation
project management practices among Kenyan organisations.
Step 3: Questionnaire Administration
The questionnaire and a letter outlining the motive of this research will be distributed by
email to organisations which have implemented, or are in the process of implementing ERP
systems in Kenya. The data gathered will be used for pilot study.
Step 4: Pilot Data Analysis and Interpretation
The pilot study findings will be analysed by means of comparisons in order to identify similar-
ities, differences, and patterns in the data. The insights gained from the preliminary findings
will be used to refine the questionnaire and to develop interview protocols in preparation for
the first field study.
Step 5: Revision of Data Collection Instrument
Based on the pilot study findings, the questionnaire will be refined to enable data collection
during field study to be focused on the insights gained. In addition, the refining of the
questionnaire would aim at avoiding ambiguity and misunderstanding.
3.4.2 Phase Two: Qualitative Research
The phase two of this research will involve an in-depth case study of the chosen Kenyan
case study organisations with the aim of gaining richer understanding of the environmental
and organisational context in which the ERP systems are deployed, and how the contexts
influence ERP systems adoption, implementation and upgrade. The role of field study within
the qualitative methodology is to locate practice in its historical, as well as its economic,
social and organisational contexts in order to help in understanding the social structures
which shape current practices.
Step 1: Further Literature Review
Literature review carried in phase two will be focused on the subject of study. It will be
informed by the preliminary research findings from the pilot study. The in-depth literature
review will aim at helping to maintain, throughout the study, a sense of the topic’s perspective
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by working the research findings in the following phases from extensive literature. The
review will also aim at raising opportunities for articulating a critical analysis of the actual
“meaning” of the data collected when the data analysis stages of the research were reached.
In addition, the insights gained from the review will be useful in the development of this
research’s conceptual model discussed in section of Chapter 5.
Step 2: Development of a Preliminary Conceptual Model
A preliminary conceptual model will be developed based on the insights gained from the
in-depth literature review and the pilot study findings. The preliminary will guide data
analysis and provide foundation for an empirical model to be developed later.
Step 3: Development of Data Collection Instrument
Based on the insights from the preliminary findings, a semi-structured questionnaire (in-
terview protocol) to be used for conducting interviews during the first field study will be
designed and developed.
Step 4: Choice of Case Study Organisations
In this study, the case study organisations will be sampled based on the Glaser & Strauss
(1967) technique of theoretical sampling. While sampling, attention will be given to the
differences and similarities of the organisations.
Step 5: Data Collection – First field study
The first field study will be conducted in Kenya (in situ) between July 2004 and February
2005. In line with Benbasat et al. (1987) and Pozzebon (2004) recommendations, various
types of data will be collected from the case study organisations. Data will be collected
through various routes which include participant observation, semi-structured interviews,
document analysis of the ERP project documents and company official documents such as
reports, bulletins, and minutes of meeting. The electronic and scanned documents on the
internet that contain company policies, newsletters, emails, document templates, letters from
customers, and customers’ surveys will also be used as data sources.
Step 6: Qualitative Data Analysis
Case study research has been subject to criticism that it lacks a detailed step-by-step data
analysis of the case data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). To address this concern, this study will
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use data analysis methodology formulated by (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which is widely used
not only by grounded theory researchers, but also by researchers whose primary research
methods lack detailed data analysis procedures. Recent evidence shows that the use of
Grounded Theory analysis techniques in case studies has been rewarding for IS researchers.
For example Lehmann (2001) claims that:
Applying Grounded Theory to Case Study was very successful. It produced
a prolific amount and yielded a great richness of information...The case settings,
furthermore, contained more varied data than could be expected from individual,
purely homocentric studies. Efficiency and abundance combined to make this
method an exceedingly fruitful one.
The methodology of data analysis in grounded theory is iterative, requiring a steady move-
ment between concept and data, as well as requiring constant comparison across types of
evidence to control the conceptual level and scope of the emerging theory. As Pettigrew
(1985) notes, this “provides an opportunity to examine continuous processes in context in
order to draw out the significance of various levels of analysis and thereby reveal the multiple
sources of loops of causation and connectivity so crucial to identifying and explaining pat-
terns in the process of change” (p. 14). To facilitate this iteration and comparison, multiple
field sites will be studied and analysed in this research.
Coding represents “the analytic process through which data are fractured, conceptualised,
and integrated to form theory” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Glaser & Strauss (1967) and
Glaser (1992) make mention of open coding and selective coding, while Strauss & Corbin
(1998), suggest three coding activities – open, axial, and selective in sequence. This study
adopted the Strauss & Corbin (1998) three coding activities. Nvivo which is a Computer
Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), was used to facilitate the three coding
activities – open, axial, and selective coding.
Open coding is “the analytic process through which concepts and categories are identified
as their properties and dimensions are discovered” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). While under-
taking the suggested three coding activities, Strauss & Corbin (1998) recommend coding by
“microanalysis which consist of analysing data word-by-word”and“coding the meaning found
in words or groups of words”. The microanalysis of the data word-by-word and line-by-line
can be time consuming given the amount data generated by qualitative research. Nvivo was
used to facilitate the process of open coding. Nvivo allows for the text or groups of texts
perceived to be representing concepts to be identified, marked, grouped, and labeled into
categories. The grouping of similar concepts is represented by nodes in Nvivo. The tran-
scripts, electronic project documents, and journals were uploaded into Nvivo. Once they
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were upload, the coding process started by reading the documents to gain familiarity. As the
uploaded documents were read, texts and sentences were identified, marked, grouped, and
labeled to form nodes, whenever they are considered to be describing concepts, actions, and
events, which answer our research questions. Concepts, in grounded theory denote concep-
tual labels placed on discrete happenings, events, and other instances of phenomena. The
names given to the concepts were derived directly from the data or from an awareness and
familiarity with the ERP literature. Concepts derived directly from the data are referred to
as in vivo codes. The properties and dimensions were identified, marked, and labeled. It is
important to emphasise that the use of Nvivo still require intensive input of the researcher
in identification of the concepts as they emerge from the data. In other words, the use of
Nvivo only reduces the time and effort required by the researcher to carry out coding. The
researcher must still make sense of the coded data. The software significantly increases the
rate at which data can be accessed, retrieved and viewed while undertaking the three coding
activities.
Axial coding is “defined as the process of relating categories to their sub-categories, termed
“axial” because coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking categories at the level
of properties and dimensions” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Category refers to the classifica-
tion of concepts. This classification is discovered when concepts are compared one against
another and appear to pertain to a similar phenomenon. The advanced data handling and
manipulation features of Nvivo which aids in data management allowing text to be edited,
coded, annotated, hyperlinked to other texts, and queried using user-defined parameters is
the reason for using Nvivo to conduct axial and selecting coding. The ability of Nvivo to
calculate the frequency of concepts is also important in judging the importance of the iden-
tified concepts. As concepts emerge from organisational context, they can be contrasted,
elaborated, and qualified with case studies in different organisational contexts. The two
field studies across five different organisations enabled the collection of rich data which re-
quired data handling software for effective manipulation. The role of field sites within the
interpretive methodology, which is based on a belief that business practices and processes
are socially constructed, is to locate practice in its historical, as well as its economic, social
and organisational contexts. This helps in understanding the social structures which shape
current practices.
3.4.3 Phase Three: Quantitative Research
The third phase of the research will involve formulating testable propositions based on phase
two and the development of a survey instrument. The aim of this phase will be statistical
53
generalisation of phase one research findings. The research method to be used in phase
three will be survey, which is the most common research method used to measure dependent
and independent variables of an environment without any controls on the environment.
Testable propositions will be formulated upon completion of analysis of quantitative data.
By conducting a survey, this study acknowledges that gathering evidence that can support
the validity of the hypothesis in other organisational settings can provide useful insights or
suggest changes in behaviour beneficial to an organisation and its stakeholders. Additionally,
methods associated with positivism lend credibility to an assertion that insights obtained
in one context might be usefully generalised or transferred, thus increasing the relevancy of
those research findings to the practitioner community. Phase three of this study corresponds
to understanding at the third level in Lee’s framework.
Step 1: Development of Testable Propositions
Based on the research findings in phase two of this research, testable propositions will be
developed which will then be tested using statistical methods.
Step 2: Questionnaire Development
A questionnaire will be designed by following the Churchill (1979) guideline to ensure con-
sistency and internal validity.
Step 3: Sample Selection
This study’s sample population will be limited to organisations which have implemented ERP
systems in Kenya. The organisations used for case study will also be included in the survey.
There is no clear data on the total number of organisations which have implemented ERP
systems in Kenya. However, an indicative figure will be obtained from ERP implementation
consultants based in Kenya. The respondents to be targeted will include top managers,
project managers and system end users as they were identified as the most appropriate
informants for this study.
Step 4: Questionnaire Administering – Field Study 2
The questionnaire and the cover letter will be emailed to a list of organisations which have
implemented ERP systems in Kenya. For case study organisations, the questionnaires will
administered by hand during the second field study. Administering the questionnaires per-
sonally will provide the researcher with an opportunity to conduct follow-up interviews. The
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study will also employ structured interviews as a data collection technique during the second
field study for case study organisations.
Step 5: Quantitative Data Analysis
Quantitative analysis will be carried out using SPSS. Both descriptive and inferential statis-
tical analyses will be used in data analyses. The inferential statistical analysis will be carried
out using both parametric techniques such as independent t-test; and non-parametric such
as factor analysis and chi-square test to determine the significance of the formulated propo-
sitions using p values.
3.4.4 Phase Four: Model Development and Validation
Based on both the qualitative and the quantitative research findings, an ERP implementation
and ERP upgrade decision models will be developed.
Grounded theory model validation technique will be used to validate the two models. Valida-
tion phase in grounded theory validates the emerged model through comparison with extant
literature. This inductive model building research method is often criticised because of its
weaknesses with respect to objectivity, consistency and transferability (Gasson, 2004b). Val-
idation will be carried out by comparing the developed models with similar and conflicting
models.
The developed model will be compared with the existing models discussed in section 2.4.2
Chapter 2 to find out similarities and differences. In line with Pinsonneault & Kremer (1993),
carrying out comparison of the developed model with conflicting models will improve the
internal validity whilst comparison with similar frameworks will improvement of external
validity.
3.5 Summary
Methodology is seen as the cornerstone in every research project; the way it is understood
and handled in a research project determines its (project) credibility or validity. It is argued
that methodology is an important yardstick used to measure the scientific nature of research.
The main argument or dividing line between qualitative and quantitative research largely lies
on the methodological orientation. This research combines both qualitative and quantitative
research methods–multi-paradigmatic approach.
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The chapter identified the different data sources that will be utilised in this research and the
proposed overall research plan aimed at answering the research questions.
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Chapter 4
Kenya and Case Study Organisations
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the reader with a description of the Kenyan context and background
information of the case study organisations. Organisations operate within the boundaries of a
nation and therefore the national context within which they operate is likely to influence the
way they conduct business. This chapter examines Kenya in its socio-cultural environment
and also provides an overview of the case study organisations. The main objective of this
chapter is to describe the generic factors related to the country, which impact on decisions,
processes, and adoption of IT.
4.1.1 Overall Background
The Republic of Kenya is situated in Eastern Africa, with an eastern coastline on the Indian
ocean and cradled within Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania (see Figure 4.1).
Its major seaport is in Mombasa. Kenya covers an area of 582 650 sq km, of which 13 400 sq
km is covered by water, mainly located in the Great Rift Valley on the western side of the
country. Its direct neighbours are Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan. Kenya’s
population of 34.3 Million (July 2005 UN estimate) is largely young, with over 40% of its
population being under the age of 14 years. The population growth rate is estimated at
1.14% (GoK, 2004). Literacy rates are high at 85.1% although there is a gender discrepancy
between men (90.6%) and women (79.7%) (Library of Congress, 2007).
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Figure 4.1: Kenyan Map
4.1.2 Economic environment
The Kenya economy has not been performing well in the last 10 years. The poor state of
infrastructure, roads, railways, and airports. Bad weather, poor maintenance and neglect also
contribute to the poor performance of the economy. The effects of the HIV AIDS epidemic
have added to the problems as it hits hard more on the productive members society in the
age group 19-49. The country’s GDP growth stood at 0.4 % in 2003 and improved to 5.6 %
in 2008 under the new government which came to power in 2002 general elections (WHO,
2005). However, the situation deteriorated in the first and second quarter of the year 2008
due to the post-election violence which followed the disputed presidential general-election
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results.
Poverty data indicate that more than 50% of the population live below the poverty line. Un-
employment figures are estimated at over 40%. Although only 19.1 % of GDP is contributed
by agriculture, it employs about 75% of the labour force (2007 est.). The main agricultural
products are tea, coffee, corn, wheat, sugarcane, fruit, vegetables; dairy products, beef, pork,
poultry, eggs. Industry contributes 18.3% with the remainder provided through services. The
major industrial activity is based on the production of small-scale consumer goods (plastic,
furniture, batteries, textiles, soap, cigarettes, flour), agricultural products processing; oil
refining, cement; and tourism. The main export products are tea, horticultural products,
coffee, petroleum products, fish, and cement. Inflation rates have fluctuated over the past five
years but have generally been in the single digit range, accompanied by an almost constant
USD/KES exchange rate (78-81) (WHO, 2005).
Concerns about continued corruption within the government were mentioned on numerous
occasions, particularly relating to a number of large government-initiated ICT projects e.g.
the passport issuing system has delivered little, with very large financial payments made
(Ochuodho & Matunga, 2005). Most opportunities for large ICT project exist through gov-
ernment ICT contracts and e-government initiatives along with some banking and petroleum
industry projects. Due to the high levels of corruption in the awarding of government IT
tenders, there is general suspicion towards the IT sector for non-delivery. This is an impor-
tant factor affecting ERP implementation given the fact that they are expensive ventures.
The industry is not regulated and competition is driven by market forces. One of the major
issues raised by both the industry players and ICT users is the lack of ICT standards and/or
accreditation. This has resulted in a poor perception of the ICT industry with service quality
being a major obstacle. The penetration of IT services into rural areas is generally very low,
and offices tend to be concentrated in Nairobi and Mombasa.
Given the prevailing economic condition, most ICT access and use is prohibitively expensive
for the majority of individual and organisations. Ochuodho & Matunga (2005) cited cost
as the greatest obstacle to widespread access and use of ICT in Kenya. Therefore, lack
of readily available capital and finances is regarded as one of the major barriers to ICT
adoption, particularly in the ERP system adoption.
4.1.3 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in Kenya
The growth of ICT in Kenya has been relatively slow over the past five years, except for
mobile telephony which shows the same remarkable growth as in the rest of Africa. 2007
figures show that 82.9% of all phone subscriptions are mobile (ITU, 2004).
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Three e-readiness studies were carried out in Kenya during the period 2001- 2006 (bridges.org).
The assessment study was conducted by the government-led IT Sector Working Group and
Netcom Information Systems. The results are presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: E-readiness Assessment in Kenya (Source: bridges.org)
Indicator Stage Indicator Stage
Network Access
1. Information Infrastructure 2.0 11. Locally Relevant Content 2.5
2. Internet Availability 2.0 12. ICTs in Everyday Life 2.0
3. Internet Affordability 2.0 13. ICTs in Workplace 2.5
4. Network Speed and Quality 2.0 Networked Economy
5. Hardware and Software 3.0 14. ICTs Employment Opportunities 2.5
6. Service and Support 2.5 15. B2C Electronic Commerce 2.0
Networked Learning 16. B2B Electronic Commerce 2.0
7. Schools Access to ICTs 2.0 17. E-Government 1.5
8. Enhancing Education with ICTs 2.0 Network Policy
9. Developing ICT Workforce 3.0 18. Telecommunication Regulation 2.5
Network Society 19. ICT Trade Policy 2.0
10. People and Organisations Online 2.5
Internet usage in Kenya greatly increased in the year 2007. This is attributed to the avail-
ability of relevant local content which is believed to drive Internet growth all over the world.
For example, when the Ministry of Education released the Kenya Certificate of Secondary
Education results via the web in March 2007 the Internet traffic increased drastically.
However, major deficiencies are notable in the areas of infrastructure availability and Internet
affordability. This situation does not seem to have changed much and the fieldwork visit of
July 2007 revealed much of the same problem. Internet availability, as judged by the growth
in the ISP sector since 2002, seems to have stagnated when assessed in 2007 and it is unlikely
that the e-readiness score would be as high if the survey was carried out in the present. The
stagnation can be attributed to the difficult climate in which ISPs have been functioning
under the TelKom monopoly, which provided the only international gateway in the country.
Even though higher values for ICT employment and development of skills for the ICT sec-
tor were scored (3.0), the relevance and appropriateness of ICT skills development for the
industry needs a closer scrutiny. The ICT sector is one of the fastest growing sectors in
the Kenyan economy. The ICT industry is generally well-educated, although perceptions are
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that the level of engineering and technical training is not sufficient to meet industry demand.
According to several sources in the industry, there is a general lack of project management
and general management skills in the ICT sector, which has resulted in low levels of deliv-
ery on ICT projects. The success rate of government and parastatals ICT projects is low.
Institutional memory is poor and new projects need to be started from scratch due to lack
of recorded experiences from prior projects (WHO, 2005).
The scrutiny relevance and appropriateness of ICT skills would especially be relevant in
the case of ERP skills where there are immensely insufficient skills to support the needs of
organisations. This had led to high turnover of staff with ERP skills and higher salaries for
their expertise. In addition, organisations are paying hefty costs by sending their staff to
South Africa for training.
A good ICT skills base exists in the private sector, but skills levels in the government are low
and exacerbated by the low salaries paid to civil servants. This has resulted in an exodus of
ICT staff to the private sector. ICT curricula in universities are regarded as too theoretical
and not synchronised with the needs of a fast-changing ICT sector. Increased ICT literacy
levels are required in the general public to grow the demand for ICT products and services,
and monitoring of government ICT projects. The generally low levels of understanding of
ICT (e.g. ERP systems) in government were raised as a cause for concern. One of the major
interventions identified by those interviewed and those who participated in the interviews,
was the need to establish broad ranging awareness initiatives targeted at specific Ministries
and the broader public. Specific recommended interventions include the development of an
ongoing exhibition facility where new technologies could be showcased for government and
the industry, IT seminars, and the promotion of ICT to the public through cybercafe´s, and
popular TV programs (Obura et al., 2005).
The areas showing least progress are in the introduction of ICT into schools and the estab-
lishment of e-government systems. Both have shown progress since 2002, with the expansion
of school networking and e-government projects. The government has set up a programme
for providing computers to schools in Kenya – Computers for Schools in Kenya (CFSK),
which was established in 2003. This initiative is likely to increase schools access to ICT.
CFSK intends to place 20 computers per school into all secondary schools in Kenya. Their
2007 target was to provide 20,000 PCs in schools, 2,300 PCs in community centres, 3,000 in
ICT trained teachers, 230 to community centre officials and 2,000 board members trained in
ICT awareness (Obura et al., 2005).
The low score on service support is due to the fact that the IT industry in Kenya is char-
acterised by a few large companies, the majority being smaller IT companies of 3–10 staff.
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There are very few medium-sized companies. Most of the large IT companies are represented
through appointed dealers e.g. HP, IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, Sybase and Samsung.
Some of the larger local companies include Symphony (the second largest IT company), Fin-
tech Group and ICL East Africa. These are involved in hardware, software and related IT
consulting and training services with staff complements of more than 250. The national and
regional offices tend to be small and characterised as distributors and resellers of products
and services.
Little local innovation and development takes place, except in specific industry applications
e.g. insurance, healthcare, financial services and web development services. There are a
number of companies interested in developing industry wide healthcare information systems,
which include the development of industry databases and systems to interconnect healthcare
providers using a variety of technologies. These initiatives are driven by the need to improve
services in an industry characterised by payment spread over long time and by verification
lead times and high costs.
4.1.4 Policy and Regulatory Frameworks
The present policy and regulatory environment can best be described as restrictive, with
a weak independent regulator. During the fieldwork period in January 2005, the general
sentiment from industry players was that Kenya was experiencing a restrictive policy and
regulatory environment not conducive to the growth of the industry. Subsequent interactions
with key ICT experts in Kenya show that numerous changes have taken place and that the
environment is perceived as more positive than that experienced during our fieldwork. The
positive change could be attributed to the establishment of the new Ministry of Information
and Communications in July 2004.
For example, until the end of June 2004, Jambonet which is operated by state-owned
Telecommunications of Kenya (TelKom) as internet gateway and backbone operator in Kenya
(CSK, 2003). Due to this monopoly, the quality of fixed-line infrastructure is poor and the
proportion of non-operational lines is significant. Congestion of the international gateway
is a problem for many companies, and for international firms, which rely largely on online
applications for their operations. System downtime is a serious problem more especially with
the companies which want to embrace ERP systems. The high cost of telecommunications,
as well as the lack of penetration of connectivity into the rural areas has been a major stum-
bling block in improving access to basic telephony and the internet for organisations which
operate nationally.
62
However, plans are underway where additional internet gateway and backbone operators
will be able to apply for licenses on a first-come, first-serve basis. All mobile operators will
be allowed to construct and operate international gateways. All these additional operators
will be able to carry Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and other forms of multimedia.
Following the recent ending of the five-year exclusivity period for the monopoly operator,
TelKom, the CCK anticipates complete liberalisation of the sector by 2009 (Waema, 2004).
In addition, the regulator intends to move, within the next two to five years, towards a
technology-neutral market restructuring which will make provision for three categories of
service providers in Network Facilities (NFPs), Application Services (ASPs) and Content
Services (CSPs). This measure will highly reduce the cost incurred in setting WAN using V-
Sat technology by organisations implementing ERP systems in all their dispersed branches.
The country still lacks policies to govern e-business and e-commerce trading. As a result
only a handful of organisations and individuals indulge in e-business and e-commerce. This
acts as an impediment to enterprise systems implementation, especially the current second-
wave which extend beyond the four walls of the organisations by utilising the Internet. This
probably explains the low score obtained with the regard to B2B e-business and B2C e-
commerce e-readiness measures (Table 4.1).
Another area where there is lack of policy is in the regulation of tariffs on ICT products.
Tariffs range from 5% to 30%, with uncertainty as to what tariffs will be charged, due to
lack of ICT knowledge among Kenyan customs officials. Software tariffs are unpredictable
and can range from a zero-rating to tariffs being charged. This makes it a difficult climate
for ERP vendors and their distributors (Ochuodho & Matunga, 2005).
4.2 ERP Adoption in Kenya
In the past five years, a number of companies in Kenya have implemented Enterprise Re-
source Planning systems in their organisations. Since Kenya Power and Lighting Company
(KPLC) implemented the SAP R/3 system in 1997, a number of other companies have
also implemented similar products. In 2006, three government corporations namely: Kenya
Ports Authority, TelKom Kenya Ltd., and Kenya Pipeline embarked on ERP implementa-
tion. There are many others that also may be planning to implement these systems for
their operations. The major focus is on large ERP and inventory management systems. JD
Edwards has carried out a few ERP implementations in Kenyan companies, primarily in the
petroleum, soft drinks and manufacturing sectors. SAP has been implemented in a large
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number of companies primarily in the power, transport and petroleum sectors.
The smaller ERP systems include Navision, Accpac, Great Plains, and Sun Accounts systems.
There is no clear data on the total installed base but the Table 4.2 is an indication of the
market.
Table 4.2: ERP Installations in the Kenyan Market (source: symphony consulting)
ERP Target Comments











Baan Large enterprises Bidco, Firestone,
Unga




Ebizframe Small and Medium
sized enterprises
ACFC, Kenya Tea De-
velopment Authority








JD Edwards Large/ Medium enter-
prises
Shell & BP
4.3 Introduction to Case Study Organisations
As mentioned in Chapter 3, this study adopted a multiple case study approach. The following
sections provides an overview of the case study organisations.
4.3.1 Bidco Oil Refineries Company Background
Established in 1985 and with yearly sales of more than Ksh.9.2 billion ($128 million), Bidco
Oil refineries has grown to become the biggest processor of edible oils in Eastern Africa.
The company currently has four factories – in Nakuru and Thika (Kenya), Dar es Salaam
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(Tanzania), and in Jinja (Uganda). As a large enterprise manufacturing mass goods, the
firm’s turnover has grown to more than Ksh. 14.4 billion ($200 million) annually. It has more
than 3,500 employees on its payroll and it produces 28 brands across 14 African countries.
The pinnacle of Bidco management policy is to use technology as a tool for reducing the cost
of production as well as penetrating the emerging African market. The company’s vision is
to deliver products to the market at a speed few of its competitors can match.
When Bidco Oil refineries made its debut in the edible oils, fat and soaps market in 1985,
the market was dominated by multinationals. Unilever was then the largest player in the
fast moving consumer goods (FCMG) sector in the East Africa region at that time with
its headquarters based in Kenya. In order to survive the competitive environment, the
company’s challenge was to provide quality product at affordable prices.
The company went regional in 1998, when it acquired Elianto and expanded its capacity by
500 per cent to meet an increasing demand for the brand in the region. In addition, Bidco
acquired edible oil business from Unilever a move which bolstered its drive to dominate the
regional market after purchasing Kimbo, the oldest brand of cooking fat in the region, with
an estimated turnover US $ 25.9 million and other brands. As part of its extension program,
Bidco entered the Tanzanian market in 2001 when it established a refinery in Dar es Salaam.
In 2004 in a move aimed at meeting its long-term plan of dominating East and Central
Africa, Bidco ventured into Uganda where it is undertaking an integrated palm oil project
involving the development of palm oil plantations, a state-of-art refinery and a soap plant to
utilise the by products.
Despite the sluggish economic growth in Kenya over the past decade, the Bidco group has
grown to become the largest manufacturer of edible oils and fats, and soaps in East and
Central Africa. The company currently exports its brands to Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritriea, Zambia, Malawi, Madagascar, Democratic republic of
Congo, Zanzibar and Somalia.
4.3.2 Bamburi Cement Limited (BCL) Background
Bamburi Cement Limited (BCL) is the largest cement manufacturing company in East and
Central Africa region. The company’s Mombasa plant in Kenya is the second largest cement
plant in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also one of the largest manufacturing export earners in
Kenya. Its export markets include Reunion, Uganda and Mayotle. In the past, they have also
included Mauritius, Sri Lanka, The Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles and the Congo. Bam-
buri Cement Limited was founded in 1951 by Felix Mandl – a director of Cementia Holding
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A.G. Zurich in conjunction with the Kenyan government. Following successful privatisation–
under the umbrella of Structural Adjustment Programme – in 1992 which saw foreign in-
vestors (Cementa, Lafarge, and Blue Circle) increase their shareholding, BCL transformed
from being a government corporation to a limited local public company quoted in the stock
market. Cementia later went into partnership with Blue Circle PLC (UK).
In 1989, Lafarge, the world’s largest building materials group, acquired Cementia, and thus
became an equal shareholder with Blue Circle. Lafarge bought Blue Circle in 2001 to become
the largest building materials company in the world and Bamburi Cement Limited principle
shareholder. In terms of shareholding Lafarge is leading with 73% of issued share capital,
followed by National Social Security Fund (Kenyan government trust) 15.8% and other pri-
vate investors through stock market, holding 17% issued shares. The majority shareholding
by Lafarge in BCL makes it more of a foreign company.
In order to supply the Ugandan market better, and also capture the Democratic Republic of
Congo market, it acquired 100% shareholding of Hima Cement Limited when the Ugandan
government privatised the company. Today, Hima cement is owned by BCL and ultimately
Lafarge. BCL has seven sites; three in Kenya and four in Uganda. The seven sites are
linked via a V-sat. In addition, BCL benefits from Lafarge Net, an Internet system that
interconnects Lafarge personnel globally and provides secured Internet access.
4.3.3 Agro-chemical and Food Company (ACFC) Background
ACFC was incorporated in 1978 as a joint venture between government of Kenya through
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), Agricultural Development
Corporation (ADC), and Private Investors namely International Investment Corporation
(Mehta Group). The government is the majority shareholder with 54% of the total shares.
ACFC refines molasses (primary raw material) to produce Rectified spirit, Neutral spirit,
Kenya methyllated spirit, Industrial spirit, Active dry yeast, compressed wet yeast (bakers’
yeast ), technical alcohol and fodder yeast. The company employs 300 full-time employees
and has a turnover of Ksh 5 million (US$100,000).
4.3.4 KPLC and KenGen Company
Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) is a limited liability company responsible
for the transmission, distribution and retail of electricity in Kenya. KPLC’s core business
activities include the transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity purchased in bulk
from the Kenya Electricity Generating Company Limited (KenGen), Independent Power
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Producers (IPPs) and the Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETCL). The
company owns and operates the national transmission and distribution grid. It is responsible
for scheduling and dispatching of electricity to more than 500,000 customers throughout
Kenya. The company employs 7,000 employees and has an annual turnover of Ksh. 28
billion (US$ 350 million).
The vision of KPLC is “To achieve world class status as a quality service business enterprise
so as to be the first choice supplier of electrical energy in a competitive environment”.
The mission of KPLC is “To efficiently transmit and distribute high quality electricity in
Kenya at a cost effective tariffs; to achieve the highest standards of customer service; and to
ensure the company’s long term technical and financial viability” .
The government of Kenya owns 40 per cent of the shares at KPLC. The National Social
Security Fund (NSSF), a government trust, owns 12 per cent of the company’s shares. The
government of Kenya has been exercising authority in the company as if it has a 52 per cent
majority stake–by purporting to own NSSF’s 12 per cent shares. As a result, ownership of
KPLC has been along standing dispute.
Kenya Electricity Generation Company (KeGen) is a public limited company. It has an
annual turnover of KSh. 14 billion (US$ 20 million). The organisation has a workforce
of 1,480 employees. KenGen is the leading electric power generation company in Kenya,
producing about 80 per cent of electricity consumed in the country. The company utilises
various sources to generate electricity. However, in future, there may be stiff competition
among and between KenGen and the IPPs.
The vision of KenGen is “Provision of reliable, safe, quality and competitively priced electric
energy in East Africa”. Its mission is “To efficiently generate competitively priced electrical
energy using state of the art technology, and skilled and motivated human resources to ensure
financial success.” The organisation has adopted Balanced Score Card in defining its vision,
mission, and objectives.
The company has 20 sites located in remote areas where the dams used to generate hy-
droelectricity are located. In addition, it has few geothermal stations used for generating
geothermal electricity. The sites are linked via Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT). Most
of the places where the dams are located are deserted and are uninhabitable.
KenGen was carved out of KPLC to undertake in the power/electricity generation in 1998
as part of Structural Adjustment Program which was sweeping across Africa. Before its
separation, the task of power generation was being carried out by KPLC. Structural Ad-
justment Programme was initiated in 1980 by the World Bank and IMF as a prerequisite
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Figure 4.2: KenGen corporate objectives (KenGen Newsletter
to be met by governments seeking donor funding. The programme provided an economic
and social framework by the governments in Sub-Saharan Africa to embrace reforms in the
public sector. Even though the programme was initiated in 1980, majority of the reforms in
the public sector took effect the early and mid 1990s.
The two main policy objectives of the structural adjustment programme was to 1) improve the
efficiency of the public sector by accelerating and streamlining reform in the civil service and
public enterprises, and improving the delivery of infrastructural services; 2) enhance external
and domestic competitiveness of the economy through further liberalisation of markets.
Public sector reform aimed to form a basis for sustainable long term economic growth. In
order to achieve public sector reform imposed by the Bretton Wood institutions, the Gov-
ernment had to progressively reduce the role of public sector in the economy through ratio-
nalisation of public sector firms and an accelerated programme of privatisation. In 1994, the
government embarked on privatisation of 211 non-strategic enterprises. In addition, the Gov-
ernment was required to divest its shareholding in six key government corporations including
Kenya Airways, Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Kenya Ports Authority, Kenya Power and
Lighting Company (KPLC), and Kenya Posts and Telecommunication Corporation (KPTC).
In the case of KPLC, the government was also required to segregate the power generation
business, and transmission and distribution business.
In July 1997, as part of the continued reform, legislation passed in parliament that split
KPLC into three separate entities: Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen), Elec-
tricity Regulatory Board (ERB), and Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC). Al-
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though KPLC retained its name, the power generation business was transferred to the newly
formed KENGEN
Figure 4.3: Power generation, transmission and distribution bodies in Kenya
4.4 Summary
This chapter provided an insight into the Kenyan context where this study is situated.
The chapter also introduced the case study organisations. This understanding is needed in
order to identify the relations between the national and organisational context, and ERP




Qualitative Data Presentation and
Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents data analyses and interpretations of phase 1 and phase 2 of this
research. Phase 1 of this study involved conducting a pilot study with the aim of gaining
subjective understanding of ERP implementation practices in Kenya, and the contextual
factors that are likely to influence ERP implementation and upgrade decisions.
Phase 2 of this research aimed at gaining a richer understanding of ERP system implementa-
tion and upgrade practices among the case study organisations. It also aimed at identifying
the contextual factors and their interrelationships, and how these factors influence ERP im-
plementation and upgrade. The steps followed during all the phases of this research were
presented in the previous chapter. The Sections that follow highlights the activities which
were carried out in both phase 1 and 2. Finally data analyses and interpretation is presented.
5.2 Phase 1: Pilot Study
As mentioned in section 3.4.1 of Chapter 3, preliminary research phase coincides with the
Lee’s first level understanding. A pilot study was instrumental in preparation for the phase
2 of this research. The pilot study consisted of five steps discussed in Section 3.4.1 namely,
preliminary literature review, development of the data collection instrument, questionnaire
administration, pilot data analysis and interpretation, and revision of data collection instru-
ment. The activities carried out in the steps mentioned mentioned above are discussed in
this section. This section also presents the summary of the findings of the pilot study phase
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of this study.
5.2.1 Preliminary Literature Review
During this phase the researcher conducted a preliminary literature review in order to identify
the gaps and limitations of the previous work. Given that quantitative research belongs to
the interpretive research paradigm, literature review was minimised to avoid compromising
the interpretation of data during analysis.
5.2.2 Questionnaire Design
After identification of the areas that needed to studied and explored further, the researcher
developed a structured questionnaire (Appendix C) addressing ERP system implementation
practices in Kenya. The questionnaire was pre-piloted with colleagues before being sent out
in order to ensure that the questions were clear and well formulated.
5.2.3 Questionnaire Administation
A letter together with the pilot study questionnaire was posted to 10 Kenyan organisations
requesting their participation in the research project. The letter outlined the aim of the
research project. Confidentiality of the data provided was guaranteed and the organisations
were given choice of discontinuing their participation in the project at any time if they
wanted to. These organisations were known to have implemented or to be in the process
of implementing ERP systems. All the organisations accepted to participate in the project.
However, five of the organisations were in the processes of implementing ERP and therefore
could not respond to most of the questions. As a result, their data were discarded. The
remaining five organisations had implemented ERP and had used ERP for at least 5 years.
Two had upgraded their ERP systems to the latest version provided by their vendors while
one was planning to upgrade.
5.2.4 Pilot Study, Analysis, and Interpretation
We carefully examined the data gathered, identified patterns, similarities, differences, and
relations, made interpretations and finally drew conclusions. The result from pilot study
analyses is presented as a summary in Table 5.1. The preliminary results provided an insight
into the ERP system implementation practices among the case study organisations. The
study yield factual data with regards to organisational size, ownership, and an estimate of
ERP system implementation cost that was provided by the case organisations. In addition,
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the study provided an indication of challenges faced by Kenyan organisations during ERP
implementation. The study also provided preliminary results on factors which influence
ERP upgrade decisions. These results were useful in refining the questionnaire and interview
protocol for use during the first field study. In addition, the results informed the selection





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2.5 Revision of Data Collection Instrument
Based on the preliminary findings, the questionnaire (from here henceforth will be referred to as
interview protocol) was revised in order to capture data which were regarded as missing. For
example, initially organisations were required to state whether they had carried out ERP upgrade
and the number of times the upgrade has been carried out. On discovering that some of the
organisations had carried out two upgrades within a span of two years whereas others had not
carried out ERP upgrade for about 8 years, the interview protocol was revised to capture factors
which influence ERP upgrade decisions. Preliminary analyses showed that public organisations were
unwilling to disclose the cost of their ERP implementation. There the question was reversed such
that the cost of implementation was segmented into ranges which just required the organisations
to choose predefined ranges.
5.3 Phase 2: Qualitative Research
The remaining sections present data analyses relating to first field study conducted between July
2004 and February 2005. This research phase corresponds to Lee’s second level understanding
which calls for interpretive understanding of the phenomenon under investigation using qualitative
research methods.
5.3.1 Further Literature Review and Conceptual Model Develop-
ment
The preliminary conceptual model presented in Figure 5.1 was developed based on the insights
gained from the literature review. Specific contexts in which ERP is used are worthy of investigation,
because the same technology may be used differently in different environments. Tornatzky & Fleischer
(1990) argue that the TOE framework serves as an important theoretical perspective for studying
contextual factors. The TOE framework identifies three aspects that may influence organisational
usage of technological innovation: (1) the technological context describes the existing technologies
in use and relevant technical skills available in the organisation; (2) the organisational context refers
to internal measures of the organisation such as its size; and (3) the environmental context is the
external arena in which a company conducts its business – its industry, competitors and trading
partners (Tornatzky & Fleischer, 1990).
The aim of the proposed preliminary model was to aid in data analysis and provide theoretical
grounding for emperical ERP implementation model to be developed in later. The preliminary
conceptual model will be used to offer illustrative rather than exhaustive examples, based on the
empirical data collected, the bi-directional influence between contingencies and ERP implementa-
tion and upgrade.
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Figure 5.1: Preliminary ERP implementation conceptual model
The preliminary conceptual model highlights the bi-directional influence of the contextual factors
on ERP project outcome and business outcome. The dotted lines are used to separate the environ-
mental contexts (i.e., external and internal). The ERP delivery service is used to denote the ERP
project management activities and their influence on ERP scope. The arrows show the influence of
organisational context on ERP implementation scope, and in turn the influence of ERP scope on
ERP implementation outcome.
5.3.2 Selection of Case Study Organisations
Five organisations were selected based on their similarities as well as their differences (Table 5.2).
Theoretical sampling requires paying attention to theoretical relevance and purpose. With respect
to relevance, this selection process ensures that a substantive area is addressed –in this study
adoption, implementation and use of ERP systems –is kept similar, or as Eisenhardt (1989) notes,
“is likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory” (p. 537). Thus, all the organisations chosen
for this study had within the past few years implemented ERP systems.
Differences were sought in organisational conditions, such as the nature and scope of ERP imple-
mentation with the aim of generating findings applicable to various organisational contexts. As
a result, the five organisations selected also differ in other organisational dimensions, such as in-
dustry, location, size, structure, and culture. Willingness to participate also formed part of the
selection criterion. In brief, the organisations had the following characteristics: (1) ERP had been
implemented and was being used, and had triggered misalignments in all of them; (2) each of them
presented different cultures and contexts of use. Three of the organisations are state-owned with
two running SAP R/3, and the other Ebizframe. The remaining two organisations are privately
owned with one running SAP R/3, and the other Baan. So, whilst commonalities of the sites gave
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Table 5.2: Summary of five case organisations
Case Public/Private Business sector ERP system implemented
ACFC Public Manufacturing Ebizframe
Bidco Private Manufacturing Baan
Bamburi Private Mining SAP R/3
KENGEN Public Power generation SAP R/3
KPLC Public Service/Utility SAP R/3
a baseline for valid comparisons, the different aspects of each site enriched the understanding of
the social construction of ERP systems.
5.3.3 Data Collection
The first field study was conducted at the sites between July 2004 and February 2005, after which
a steady correspondence has been maintained with different informants at the sites. The focus of
data collection in this research was congruent with what was suggested by Harper (2002), that
focus should be given to the ways in which organisations produce and work with technology.
Data was collected using the revised questionnaire (interview protocol) found in Appendix D. Table
5.3 provides a summary of how the data was collected and the interview topics. Primary data was
gathered via project documentation analysis, and interview. A total of 39 interviews were conducted
with 17 end users, 12 ERP project team members, and 10 senior/mid-level managers at the case
the case study organisations. The interviews lasted an average of 1 hour each. In addition, two
consultants were interviewed; one from PricewaterhouseCoopers and one from Symphony.
In addition, to the data collection techniques in Table 5.3, participant observation was employed.
Data gathered through participant observation and document analysis allowed the researcher to
corroborate what was heard in the interviews with what was observed on the site or read in the
documents. The project documents that were selected and analysed were project schedule, project
tasks, bug reports, functional changes, suggestions, and checked tasks. The first two categories of
project documents were helpful in describing ERP adoption and implementation practices. The
last four categories of project documents were important for this research since it was in these
that the organisational contexts influence was manifested and the relevance of ERP systems were
questioned, negotiated and re-constructed. Bug reports registered what users considered to be
problems in ERP system which we inferred to result from organisational characteristics. While bug
reports referred to glitches in the program code making it unstable, others were related to unmet
expectations of users about functionality issues. Normally, the bug reports were rejected and re-
entered as functional changes. Only bug reports reporting functionality issues –and not genuine
code problems –were collected and analysed since it was in these documents that the interpretive
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ACFC 5 2 3
KenGen 3 2 2
KPLC 3 3 2
Bamburi 3 2 1
Bidco 3 3 2
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flexibility of ERP embedded best practices was manifest. Another type of project document was
suggestions, which were based on recommendations about system improvements.
5.3.4 Data Analysis
According to the qualitative research literature, the relationship between data collection and the
data analysis phases are either “disconnected”or “integrated” (Ezzy, 2002). “Disconnected”analysis
commences only after data collection is completed. In this study, data collection and data analysis
was disconnected in the sense that data analysis began once data collection had been completed.
Data analysis began by transcribing all the verbatim. The transcripts were transcribed sequen-
tially in a organisation based order –that is, transcripts of interviews within the same case study
organisation were coded before proceeding to another case study organisation.
Data analysis followed the three steps prescribed in grounded theory. These steps are open coding,
axial coding, and selective coding. The coding process is the central mechanism through which
data is analysed. Concepts, categories and properties are identified and developed.
Open Coding
The first step in open coding involved conceptualising. The data was broken into actions, events,
incidents, and ideas by asking questions such as what, where, when, and how much. The unit of
analysis used was the lines of text. The smallest unit of analysis is word. Lines, paragraphs and
sections come next. There is no hard and fast rule on how to carve up a document: we chose lines
simply because this choice preserves a degree of flexibility as to how far to go in categorising a
chunk of text. This choice enabled us to operate at the level of paragraph or section while at the
same time preserving the option of embedding finer-grade codes in lines or set of lines.
Inferences from careful reading of all interview transcripts and other documentary sources, namely
project documents, minutes of meetings and company reports enabled identification of phenomena
which are important central ideas and represented as concepts to describe issues, problems, and
concerns. Given that the qualitative research phase was aimed at interpretive understanding, we
took social identities, interactions, and processes of sense-making as our object of analysis. The
emphasis in data collection was on discourses and narratives about interplay between organisational
setting and the ERP system during its implementation and upgrade. We also focused on project
description to identify ERP implementation practices by the case study organisations with aim of
understanding ERP implementation practices in Kenya.
Figure 5.2 provides a sample excerpt taken from Nvivo. From that excerpt the phenomena shown
in Table 5.4 can be identified. These concepts can then be corroborated with other excerpts from
users in different case study organisations. As mentioned, coding involves attaching meaning to
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Figure 5.2: Sample Excerpt from Nvivo software
events, actions, observations, and verbatim. For example, the phenomena listed below were derived
as follows:
“...so that all the whole thing is combined or integrated ‘kata mana’ [even] up to now...” This
excerpt is a user’s description of the state of integration of the implemented ERP system hence the
label “integration”.
“..the people at the top never consult with us before embarking on projects...” This excerpt is an
indication of lack of user involvement and also depicts a top-down organisational structure and
hence labels “lack of user involvement” and “organisational structure”.
“Me I just came in-between when they were going on. But from what we were doing or from where
I joined, it was like there was no prior plan”. This excerpt was used by a user to describe how the
ERP system implementation was carried out. It indicates how poorly the initial and subsequent
planning was carried out hence the label “project planning”.
The second step in open coding involved abstraction process to organise concepts into categories.
Categories are concepts derived from the process of grouping concepts at a higher and more abstract
level. The preliminary model discussed in Section 5.3.1 provided predefined categories namely,
organisational context, external environment, ERP implementation scope, ERP implementation
outcome, and ERP delivery service. Concepts encountered in the literature especially the models
discussed in section 2.5.2, ERP implementation strategies discussed section 2.5.1, and ERP imple-
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Table 5.4: Sample identification of concepts
No Phenomena
1 Integration
2 Lack of user involvement
3 Project planning
4 Organisation structure
5 ERP adoption Decision
mentation drivers discussed in section 2.3, provided pre-existing categories which were adopted in
the coding process. It is not desirable for the researcher to invent new names for concepts and
categories that are well known in the field of interest. Statements were identified and marked up as
describing other concepts, categories, and properties that the researcher interpreted as being raised
by the interviewees as important. This process enabled easy access to the data that was ascribed
to any particular category. Reasons for the coding pieces of data were documented on the research
memo to ensure consistency and efficiency in coding, and to avoid overlap in coding.
Axial Coding
Axial coding aimed at finding relationships between categories and subcategories by identifying
properties and dimensions related to the subcategories. Properties a) define the meanings of a
category, and b) explain the general or specific characteristics and attributes of a category. Di-
mensions a) define the varying range of general properties of a category, b) give the specification
to a category, and c) identify the location of a property. A subcategory is a category that has
properties and dimensions, and stands for phenomenon which is a happening, an event, an issue
or a problem. Focus was placed on statements that were deemed to form a rationale whether it
expressed an opinion (positive or negative) or if it expressed objectives sought or located in ERP


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Selective coding involved integrating the categories identified open and axial coding to develop an
empirical ERP implementation model, and ERP decision model discussed in Chapter 7. The above
data analysis steps were carried out within the case study organisations (within-case analysis) and
across the case study organisations (cross-case analysis). The following sections present the research
findings and interpretation of the within-case and cross-case analyses.
5.3.5 Within-Case Analysis and Interpretation of Findings
Appendix A presents the ERP project description, data analyses and interpretation for each case
study organisation. The analysis was based on the categories identified during the open coding
stage of data analysis. The definition of the categories are given below.
ERP Implementation Practices
This category refers to the manner in which ERP implementation was carried out from project
preparation phase to ‘go-live’ and support phase. It is debatable whether ERP implementation
practice is a category or not. However, in order to enable the description of ERP implementation
practices, of the case study organisations in a structured manner, it was coded as a category.
Therefore, ERP implementation practice is discussed along these properties: ERP background
and drivers, ERP implementation scope, level of integration, level of customisation, training, and
post-implementation activities. These six properties were considered because they affect ERP
implementation success.
ERP background is intended to provide the general background of activities leading to ERP adop-
tion and implementation. The ERP drivers are meant to enable the discernment of factors which
catalysed the adoption and implementation of ERP systems. The pattern from data showing dis-
parity in the number and the nature of modules implemented provided the basis for the inclusion
of the ERP implementation scope. Level of integration is intended at finding out if the claim that
ERP systems lead to seamless integration was achieved by the case study organisations. Training
on the other hand was considered to be effecting ERP usage hence the reason for inclusion in
ERP implementation practices. Finally, the post-implementation activities aimed at identifying
measures being taken by organisations to optimise their ERP system once it is operational.
Organisational context
This category refers to the structural establishment of the organisations as a whole, based on its
management and functional divisions. This category was derived from the preliminary research
model discussed in section 5.3.1 of this chapter. Given that coding recommends using known
terminologies in the literature to label categories and their dimensions, we used some of the dimen-
sions of organisatonal culture in the Detert et al. (2000) framework. The organisational context
properties derived from the empirical data and their definition in this research is presented next.
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Orientation to change refers to the extent to which organisations have a propensity to maintain a
stable level of performance that is‘good enough’ or a propensity to seek to always do better through
innovation and change.
Organisation Structure refers to the extent to which organisations have decision making structures
centred around a few vs. decision making structures centred around dissemination of decision
making responsibilities throughout the organisation.
Orientation to Collaboration refers to the extent to which organisations encourage collaboration
among individuals and across tasks or encourage individual efforts over team-based efforts.
Basis of Truth and Rationality refers to the extent to which organisations seek truth through
systemic, scientific study using hard data or through personal experience and intuition.
Orientation to Work refers to the extent to which individuals in organisations focus on functional
areas or to which they focus on the processes which cuts across functional areas.
Nature of Time Horizon refers to the extent to which organisations focus on the long-term or the
short-term.
Organisation and IT Strategy Alignment refers to the extent to which organisations’ IT strategy
support the organisations’ both short-term and long-term plans.
ERP Challenges
This category refers to factors which were identified to be having direct adverse effect on ERP
implementation and upgrade, and usage. While investigating challenges among the case study
organisations, special attention was given to incompatibility issues. This was aimed at espousing
the effect of local context on ERP implementation. In the case study description in Sections A.1.3,
A.2.3, and A.3.3 of Appendix A, we identify incidences of ERP system and organisational business
process misalignment occurred in the case study organisations in the case study organisations.
Refer to Appendix A for detailed data analyses of the case study organisations along the categories
discussed above. The following section provide cross-case analyses findings and interpretation.
5.3.6 Cross-Case Analysis and Interpretation of Findings
This Section draws comparison from the case studies with the aim of identifying similarities and
differences in ERP implementation practices and organisational characteristics. The findings in
this section were derived from the axial coding procedure discussed in section 5.3.4. Additional
categories were identified and are discussed towards the end of this Section. By carrying out
comparison among the case study organisations properties and dimensions associated with each
category were identified. In addition, values for each dimension were identified and scored against
each case study organisation. The summary of the results is presented Table 5.5. The following
sections present the narrative of the cross-case findings and interpretation of the results.
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5.3.6.1 ERP Implementation Scope
Four properties of this category emerged namely ERP breadth, ERP depth, BPR breadth, BPR
depth, and BPR magnitude. These properties were further subjected to quantitative data analysis
in Appendix B, section B.6.2.7. This section discusses ERP implementation scope in general based
on the observation from case study organisations. The organisations differed greatly in their ERP
implementation scope. Bidco and BCL are both private sector organisations in comparison to
KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC – all public organisations. Both Bidco and BCL which had greater ERP
breadth were regarded in Kenya as premier organisations and market leaders. For example, Bidco
was voted the most respected manufacturing company in East Africa by PricewaterhouseCoopers
and the Nation Media Group 2004 CEO’s survey. Both proactively deployed ERP, often being the
first in their industry to develop particular applications. Both Bidco and BCL “have taken care of
their ERP needs and are now extending to CRM, and SCM”. ERP is adopted to allow the extension
of the capabilities of technology and the work environment. For example at Bidco, all the modules
of Baan ERP (Manufacturing and non-manufacturing) are running including the latest installation
of the Baan E-business module. Both Bidco and BCL have implemented Intelligent Resource
Planning and business intelligent systems in a venture aimed at optimising the use of ERP. On the
other hand, KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC have implemented just the core ERP modules (finance
and material management modules). These organisations have not made any attempt to extend
their ERP systems beyond the four walls of their organisations.
Empirical data indicated that ERP implementation scope is significantly influenced by the ERP
implementation drivers, i.e. the motivation for implementing ERP in an organisation. For
example, Bidco, BCL, KenGen, and KPLC were strategically proactive and at the same time
reactive to the environment and the needs of their customers. Bidco was continuing to grow and
expand and therefore realised that it needed an enterprise system to support its wide range of
its operation and to support its expansion strategy in Africa. BCL on the other hand needed to
streamline its operations and align them with its parent company – Lafarge – operations. Both
Bidco and BCL are market leaders in their respective business areas not only in Kenya, but in the
entire East Africa. As a result, the justification for ERP at BCL and Bidco were based on strong
business case. Therefore, motivations for adopting and implementing ERP by Bidco and BCL were
business oriented. They were more focused on adding value to business in order to provide them
with competitive edge. Both the organisations were proactive in adopting and implementing ERP.
KenGen and KPLC on the other hand were reacting to sweeping global change which required
deregulation of a formerly regulated market and the donor initiated structural adjustment pro-
grammes (SAPs) which required state corporations to streamline their operation in order to make
them more productive. In contrast, ACFC realised the problems with their legacy systems and
therefore, were more reactive in their desire for ERP systems. Therefore, the main motivation for
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implementing ERP systems at KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC, was to resolve the technical problems
related to their legacy systems, and the change in the regulatory environment. ERP implementation
in these organisations was reactive.
The four case studies differed in the strategy used for ERP implementation. Bidco’s approach to
implementing the ERP in retrospect seemed to have been hurried and not strategically thought out.
The company introduced Baan “all-at-once” within a time frame of only 3 months of preparation
(January 1998 through to March 1998). They took into account that disruptions to the information
systems in their peak production season of September through December could prove fatal and
therefore time the implementation to be immediately afterwards. BCL, KenGen and KPLC, on
the other hand devised a strategic plan that tied in with their ERP and Business Process Change
(BPC) efforts that focused on incremental improvements.
For example, the project leader in BCL was tasked with developing the master plan and implemen-
tation deadline. The first step was to determine which modules of Business Process Change System
(BPCS) to implement. BPCS is like many ERP systems in that it has a modular design. The
project team determined that the finance function (Configurable Enterprise Financials including
sub-modules for accounts payable, accounts receivable, general ledger and fixed assets) would be the
first to be converted to the new system, giving users time to get used to the new system. Converting
the operations function of the ERP system was carried out in this order: Sales and Distribution
including sub-modules for configurable order management and out-bound logistics management,
Manufacturing Data Management, Shop Floor Control, Master Production Scheduling, Manufac-
turing Resource Management, Distribution Resource Planning, Purchasing, Inventory Control, and
various other implied support modules.
The modules were selected in conjunction with the determination of which facilities would be im-
plemented first. Senior management further determined that BPCS would be installed concurrently
in the main components division plant in the Bamburi plant in Mombasa. This plant was selected
because of the unique business needs of this plant compared to the Athi River plant. The Athi
river plant relied on centralised distribution facilities for the material control functions and shipped
finished goods to centralised customer service centers. The legacy system was designed to support
wire harness needs and was a poor fit for the components division plant.
Empirical data also revealed that ERP implementation scope is a great determinant of level of
ERP integration. The organisations differed on the level of integration achieved as a result of ERP
adoption and implementation. This research findings revealed that despite the growing dominance
of integrated ERP very little is known about what impact ERP is having on the integration of
functional areas within business, what levels of integration companies are achieving with integrated
business solutions, and what benefits are being realised through software, data and information
integration.
Our prior belief was that it would be difficult if not impossible to measure integration. However,
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after consultation and interview with ERP consultants, a number of ideas were floated as to how to
assess integration. Suggestions included: Developing a checklist of items that represents integration
and scoring against the checklist to determine the percentage which would translate to the degree of
integration; measuring how information is shared among departments. . . electronically; measuring
the relationship between departments; look at how many interfaces you have between individual
component systems. The less you have, the better you are integrated; degree of automation i.e.
number of [data] transformation. In this study, we looked at the number of interfaces between the
modules and the number of modules implemented to determine the level of integration. Bidco scored
the highest in terms of level of integration given that it had implemented all the Baan modules
thereby achieving internal integration. In addition, Bidco has integrated its ERP system with that
of its suppliers and customers through its SCM and CRM extensions. BCL was also regarded
as having a high level of integration. Even though BCL retained some of its legacy systems, the
organisation made an effort to create an interface between legacy systems and the ERP system.
These interfaces allow for batch transfer of data from the legacy systems to the ERP system. For
KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC most of the legacy systems were retained after ERP implementation.
Little effort has been taken in all the companies to create an interface between the ERP systems
the legacy systems. As a result, most of the legacy systems are still running as stand-alone. This
requires periodical manual entry of data into the ERP system.
Another factor which significantly influence ERP implementation scope was the level of cus-
tomisation . Level of customisation refers to the extent to which the ERP software needs to be
modified in order to conform to an organisation’s business processes. It is important to understand
the difference between customisation and configuration. The crux of the difference is complexity.
Customisation involves code changes to create functionality that is not available through configura-
tion. Configuration on the other hand involves setting ERP in-built parameters to meet organisation
business requirements. Configuration relies on inherent flexibility of ERP systems to add fields,
change field names, modify drop-down lists, or add buttons. Most of the case study organisations
customised the base system but the degree of customisation varied from minor to major rewrite of
code for certain functionalities.
Again two dimensions which are congruent with literature were identified namely major customi-
sation and minor. Major customisation depicts a strategy that assumes that the best practice of
the ERP software does not satisfy business needs, therefore many and sometimes major changes
to the software are needed to derive value from the implemented ERP. On the contrary, the minor
alternative assumes that the value of ERP application is derived from the integration capabilities
and the best practices built into the software. Therefore if a misfit exists, the business process
and not the software need to change. Decision to adopt either of the strategies by the cases was
influenced by a range of organisational and external factors discussed in sections 5.3.6.2 and 5.3.6.3
respectively. The level of customisation had a direct effect on BPR breadth and BPR depth as two
dimensions of ERP implementation scope. This consequently influence the business process and
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the project outcome.
The case study organisations elicited varying levels of customisation. The level of customisation
was based on ERP implementation project team respondent’s own rating. Customisation has a
significant effect on the cost of ERP implementation and business processes outcome. Among
the case study organisations, the human resource and payroll module was heavily customised in
most of the case study organisations where it was implemented, i.e. at KenGen, KPLC, and
ACFC, except at Bidco. In all the cases where customisation was involved, a generic copy of ERP
provided the starting point for customisation. For SAP adopters, the starting point was a special
version of SAP called Industry Solutions, which had already been customised and preconfigured for
particular industries. In addition, SAP R/3 provided a special country version for human resource
and management module. Organisations proceeded with customisation when unique requirements
of the business were not met by either the generic version or the Industry Solutions. Even though
SAP R/3 offers country versions for Human resource and payroll modules, this research found that
only one African country’s version (South Africa) existed. Therefore, consultants implementing
SAP R/3 at Bamburi, KPLC and KenGen while configuring the human resource module used the
South Africa’s configuration presumably because they assumed that Africa is homogeneous which
is far from the truth.
Customisation can also involve writing extensions to ERP also called “Add-ons”, using the in-built
programming language to create new programs, screens, interfaces and other adaptations. In the
case of our case study organisations, add-ons were mainly used to address needs that were not
adequately met by implemented ERP systems particularly in the areas of reporting, specific system
functionality, and flexibility. Respondents in all the five case study organisations do not feel that the
available reports are adequate. KenGen and KPLC trained one user each on ABAP programming
to be responsible for creating parametised reports. BCL and Bidco on the other hand have deployed
business / data Warehouse technologies to solve many specific reporting inadequacies. And while
this function and others can also extend the capabilities of an ERP system, the inability to meet
reporting and specific organisational needs is clearly a key reason why most organisations writing
add-on extensions to their ERP systems.
However, there are potential drawbacks to customising ERP in this way – for example KPLC had
300 add-on programs which made upgrade to be very difficult and expensive. In addition, it adds
to the ERP cost because basis users’ who are mandated to carryout this role in the SAP system
are very expensive to license.
This research findings indicate that because of high cost and complexity of the major customisation
approach, the final choice may not be an issue of assumptions but issues of cost, risk and the
amount of complexity the business can afford. Cost in particular is a major driver towards minor
customisation amongst the case study organisations. Choosing either of the two approaches has
major implications on the change management strategy that accompanies the implementation of
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ERP, because:
when best practice is chosen, people issues become top priorities. When the imple-
mentation strategy is geared towards customisation, it is more of a technical challenge”
(Consultant, PricewaterhouseCoopers).
5.3.6.2 Organisational Context
This catetory was defined in section 5.3.5 as the structural establishment of the organisations as a
whole, based on its management and functional divisions. The data analyses and interpretations
along the properties of this category are presented next.
Orientation to Change
In terms of orientation to change, KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC operate in a relatively stable industry
and enjoy monopoly as a result of market regulation by the government, and are thus traditionally
more stability-oriented than change-oriented. Bidco and BCL on the other hand were operating in
a competitive market requiring them to put in place strategies which could keep them in business
in order to survive. Therefore, Bidco and BCL were more agile in changing processes during and
after implementation, whereas KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC were faced with resistance. Although
KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC were making efforts to change, they seemed unable to sufficiently over-
come their orientation to stability to do so. The differences in this orientation between the two
sets of organisations offer further insight into the differences in ERP implementation between the
two sets. Organisations that are more stability-oriented may wish to maintain the status quo, and
thus are reluctant to engage in the BPR which requires radical changes in the current business
processes within the organisation. They instead prefer peace-meal changes and extensive customi-
sation during ERP implementation which is likely to increase the cost and ERP implementation
time. Furthermore, organisations that are more change oriented may not only be more willing to
implement ERP for the sake of it, but because they desire change, they may better understand
what it takes to do so. Because sharing knowledge is part of what it takes, they may be better at,
or more aggressive about facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, the contextual configuration value
on this dimension that best facilitates ERP implementation is an orientation towards Change.
Basis of Truth and Rationality
Bidco, KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC differ from BCL in their basis of truth and rationality. Bidco,
KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC emphasise personal experience and tacit knowledge in addition to hard
data, whereas BCL relies primarily on hard data. The likely reason for reliance on hard data by
BCL is the influence Lafarge has on its operations. Lafarge is a large reputable company operating
in the West where hard data forms the basis of rationale in decision making. On the other hand,
the remaining organisations were home grown companies which are known to rely on employees
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personal experience. In Kenyan home grown companies, data reside in soft form in the minds of
top managers who do not rely on information much even though information systems have been
implemented. They rely more on extrapolations from experience and intuition.
For example, the claim that decision making rationale is hinged on personal experience is supported
by discourse with one of the senior employees at Bidco. Specifically, data analysis and our observa-
tion of work and work processes suggest that decision making in the company was not focused on
quantification but was linked to the qualitative experience and hunches of long-serving managers.
As the director explained:
We like to talk to people. . . I mean data is one thing but nothing beats experience.
We have people here who are born entrepreneurs and who would be running other
businesses if they were not here. They give us a feel for the market and this helps us. . .
(Team leader and Family member).
This had two effects on ERP implementation: (1) knowledge sharing, (2) ERP usage. BCL’s
reliance on hard data alone affected ERP implementation in that it often discouraged members
from sharing “softer” knowledge which is essential at the requirements elicitation stage of ERP
implementation. Reliance on personal experience also had a negative effect during ERP usage in
that ERP was reduced to transaction processing software. That could explain why KenGen, KPLC,
and ACFC have not taken measures to enhance their ERP system reporting capabilities. Because
users relied more on their personal experience, the reports produced by ERP were not used to
inform decision making. This suggests that, although sharing hard data is important, this alone
is not sufficient for the type of knowledge sharing that is needed for a cross-functional, enterprise
wide system such as ERP. Thus, the contextual configuration value that is most appropriate for
ERP implementation is a combination of hard data and personal experience.
Information Sharing Perception
With regard to information sharing, some case study organisations were enthusiastic about sharing
information during ERP implementation whereas others were not. At ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC
information was perceived to be a personal asset rather than an organisational resource. This can be
explained from the fact that the legacy systems in use before ERP implementation were restricted to
managers. Discretionary power is maintained by careful control on key information. Information is
selectively released to subordinates and co-workers instead of being widely shared across the whole
organisation. The managers at ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC did not cooperate with the consultants
and did not share all information with them. They preferred to minimise the amount of information
that would be processed by the system, because they did not want to lose control over information
that they previously controlled. This observation coincide with Burns & Turnipseed (1991) claim
that the way in which information is accepted is central to the way information systems are used
within an organisation. This had a significant effect on information sharing amongst team members
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and across project teams. Through senior management involvement, KenGen and KPLC managed
to inculcate information sharing attitude amongst employees. Therefore, the project managed
to pick up well in the initial implementation stages with senior managers working along junior
employees sharing knowledge.
However, it is important to note that information sharing broke down in KenGen and KPLC as the
project progressed. Senior people began to resent the knowledge that junior people had gained and
the power the environment provided the junior people. They began to retreat to the old culture of
isolation by not listening to or not valuing the input of the junior people in the team. Although
the project managers had implemented successful interventions in the beginning of the project to
facilitate knowledge sharing, they did nothing to reestablish an environment of collaboration when
it broke down, even though they recognised that it occurred. One possible explanation may lie
in the influence of the traditional culture of isolation ; perhaps the intervention was viewed as an
effort to overcome an orientation to isolation, and the break down was viewed as evidence that this
dimension of the culture could not be overcome. Hofstede’s power distance culture dimension can
also be used to explain the events which unfolded at KPLC and KenGen. Both organisations were
regarded in this study as being oriented towards high power distance.
At BCL and Bidco, information was perceived as an organisational resource and project team
members were more than willing to share the information. ERP implementation requires extensive
knowledge sharing during the installation stage. In addition, once installed the system requires
collaboration among the organisation functional units given that the processes runs across the
functional silos of the organisation.
Orientation to Collaboration
The case study organisations differed in terms of their orientation to collaboration during work.
Bidco and BCL favoured working on collaboration whereas ACFC, KenGen and KPLC favoured
working in isolation. Due to the process-based nature of ERP, it tends to promote collaboration
in carrying out tasks and activities in information systems. Therefore, work culture that favours
collaboration fits well with the ERP trajectory. While orientation to collaboration is important for
ERP implementation and usage as evidenced in Bidco and BCL, our findings suggest that a culture
oriented towards collaboration alone is also not sufficient to facilitate ERP implementation and
usage. For example, even though ACFC’s culture was one of collaboration and the implementation
team members were accustomed to working in teams prior to the implementation, they found
knowledge sharing during ERP implementation to be difficult because the environment of the
ERP implementation team was not conducive to knowledge sharing. Thus, a prior orientation to
collaboration does not ensure that knowledge sharing will occur in any given new context. The
environment of the team must be addressed and managed from the beginning of the implementation.
The research findings also indicate that whereas orientation to collaboration is advantageous during
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ERP implementation, it also poses a great challenge during the appropriation of the ERP system.
Orientation to collaboration predisposes the culture against computer based communications be-
cause these media mutate the group effect. Workers in highly collaborative environments favour
high personal meetings and phone calls to IT communication technologies resulting from ERP
system usage.
In addition, the research findings show that prior orientation to isolation does not necessarily
impede knowledge sharing in ERP implementation. For example, KenGen and KPLC facilitated
ERP implementation through knowledge sharing early on in the implementation even though their
existing culture valued isolation more than collaboration. It did so by structuring the team so that
barriers to collaboration such as seniority and functional distinctions were removed. This structure
helped create an environment of collaboration. Teams can take proactive steps or initiatives to
overcome the isolation orientation that is rooted in the broader organisational culture. Thus, team
environment and structure can overcome a culture of isolation.
Although traditional orientation to isolation is not sufficient to impede ERP implementation and
its subsequent usage, the interventions to overcome this must be carefully managed and monitored
throughout the project to maintain their impact. The preferred cultural configuration value that
can lead to successful ERP implementation as witnessed in Bidco and BCL is collaboration.
Organisational Structure
Interestingly, Bidco and BCL differed from each other on two dimensions, centralised and decen-
tralised, which defines the control and coordination of responsibility in an organisational setup.
Motivation. Bidco’s control, coordination and responsibility was manifest in decentralised silos
making autonomous decisions; whereas, BCL was largely centralised with concentrated decision
making. The planning and decision making at ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC was hierarchical, with
the CEOs initiating the search for the ERP package without intensive interaction with other func-
tional managers. In ACFC, one employee who opposed the implementation of Ebizframe was
warned that if he did not cooperate, he would lose his job. Later on, the employee was transferred
from the IT department to the purchasing department and the move was as punishment for his
opposition to the project.
All the case study organisations had functional-oriented structure prior to their ERP implemen-
tation. They are built over solid, rigid and isolated organisational foundations. In some cases
e.g. ACFC, the functional units were pitted against each and regarded each other as competitors.
More emphasis is put on in-group relationships built over long time. The in-group relationships are
stable and difficult for outsiders’ access. This rigid structure inhibited cooperation across different
functional areas where ERP was in use. The organisations therefore had to put extra measures
to break down the functional-oriented structures before and after ERP implementation. The func-
tional oriented structure also inhibited information sharing amongst the team members and across
project teams during ERP implementation.
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KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC are managed in a highly hierarchical, authoritarian and centralised
manner relative to their Bidco and BCL counterparts. This restricts the need for information
exchange among managers. Thus, ERP is used to reinforce hierarchical (vertical) control instead of
peer-to-peer (horizontal) communication and cross functional integration which is the distinguishing
characteristic of ERP.
Orientation to Work
The case study organisations varied in terms of their orientation to work with some putting more
emphasis on processes and employees, and others emphasing on project deadlines. At ACFC,
there was strong emphasis on efficiency for the company and much lesser emphasis on quality of
life issues for employees. On the other hand Bidco, BCL, KenGen, and KPLC placed emphasis on
employees’ well being and processes. For example, Bidco’s employees were reassured that as a result
of implementation, their life would be more enjoyable. Even though some employees (particularly
in the IT unit) were concerned that the new system would result in extra work for them, the
majority of employees were enthusiastic about the system and that was one of the reasons for their
support of the project. The project team at KenGen and KPLC were more concerned with getting
things right as opposed to meeting deadlines. Therefore, if things were not right, they preferred to
delay the project until the problem was sorted out before moving to the next phase. As a result
of this, the projects at Bidco and BCL were highly successful – they both remained within the
expected budget and were completed before their deadlines. The organisations were thus more
inclined towards process than towards deadline. In contrast, ACFC was more interested in meeting
deadlines as opposed to having things done right. It is for this reason that the system was hastily
completed when it was evident that the deadline set for the project completion was nearing. The
system was therefore ‘completed’ without adequate testing and without some modules and features
being implemented.
The research findings suggest that an orientation to the process – focused on process and employees
rather than on deadlines – is generally more conducive to ERP implementation. Bidco and BCL
both had a process and employees orientation, yet so did KenGen and KPLC. However, the influence
of this dimension on ERP implementation at KenGen and KPLC may have been minimised by
factors within other dimensions discussed above. Thus, the impact of orientation to work on ERP
implementation may be contingent upon the presence of, or lack of other factors, such as external
change agents, in the organisation’s environment.
Decision-making Style
Another area where case study organisations exhibited significant differences was on the decision-
making style. By this we refer to the decision-making hierarchy in the organisation and the manner
in which decisions are made within the organisation. When decisions are kept at the top then
that organisation is said to be centralised, whereas in decentralised organisations, decisions are
delegated to lower organisational levels. Our case studies exhibited a varying degree to which the
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structure of decision making is concentrated or shared. Top-down decision was eminent in public
organisations (i.e. KPLC, ACFC, and KENGEN) in which case these organisations were required
to take directives from the permanent secretaries in their respective ministries. Seniority was highly
observed in these organisations. The work norm was highly structured with control system in place.
Bottom-up was more prevalent in private companies (i.e. Bamburi and Bidco). For example,
even though the major shareholder at Bamburi is Lafarge, the decision on which ERP system
to implement was entirely left for the Bamburi management to decide. In addition, users were
widely consulted in finding a suitable ERP solution. Bidco on the other hand exhibited a very
unique decision making culture ingrained in the family culture called ‘voteless’ decision making.
An overriding norm in many of our case study organisations is silo behaviour where individual
divisions, units, or functional areas operate as independent agents within the organisation.
KPLC, KenGen, and ACFC have a strong, top-down, bureaucratic organisational arrangement, as
shown by many respondents’ comments. We attributed this observation to the fact these organisa-
tions are partly controlled by the government given that the government is the majority shareholder
and the government corporations have traditionally been very bureaucratic, slow to change, and
have also been a technology laggard rather than an early adopter of new technologies, compared to
other organisations (Henderson and Lentz, 1996). Even though KPLC, KenGen and ACFC have
some decisions decentralised some functions in the business units, there are still strong elements of
centralisation within the IS division.
While the term ‘bureaucratic’ often suggests negative connotations, research suggests there are
some positive aspects associated with it. Being “bureaucratic” may mean that an organisation
plans thoroughly, commits the necessary resources from the top, is attuned to detail, and follows
through on its commitments. All of these positive attributes are reflected in KPLC, KenGen and
ACFC approach to implementing ERP. In this regard KPLC, KenGen and ACFC’s centralised
approach for managing ERP adoption and implementation was an asset, since it was well-funded
and deliberately managed. As a result, KPLC and KenGen progressed much faster in the acquisition
of their ERP system and in the early phases of implementation than other case organisations – Bidco
and Bamburi.
While the centralised organisational arrangement at KPLC, KenGen and ACFC ensured a high level
of structure, resources, and follow-through to the ERP adoption and implementation effort, this
also posed some obstacles for achieving many of the changes required to fully exploit the benefits
of ERP at the usage stage.
At Bidco, user buy-in was important because it inferred a sense of ownership by the user community
of the chosen software. In effect, this sense of ownership translated into the solution being more
readily accepted by the users. As for the other case organisations, ERP was a project initiated
by the top management and sold to them. The organisation’s ownership and profit making status
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appeared to influence the way adoption decisions are made. For example, in an ERP implementation
where the business is owned by family, the way decisions are made is more personal. Furthermore,
whether the organisation is a business organisation or public sector would impose major differences
in the way the business operates, thus affecting the ERP implementation decision-making. The
excerpt below confirms this claim:
The ERP project was a recommendation from the French holding company – La-
farge – to implement a good information system following an audit report by PriceWa-
terhouseCoopers. The objective was the existence of common integrated database for
the whole company to facilitate communications and the availability of information to
decision-makers in real time. The holding company wanted to modernise information
systems. However, the decision on which system to implement was entirely left on
Bamburi’s management.
Research findings suggest that many of the founding philosophies and values have become enshrined
in the culture of the organisation in a way that these have become accepted modes of behaviour.
Indeed, the history of paternalism and harmony has influenced the way Bidco has developed in
many respects. For example, the organisation is heavily focused on people rather than systems, with
an attendant desire for encouraging a happy work environment and consensus ‘voteless’ decision
making. One family member confirms this point:
Every branch has a family member who is there as an avuncular, partner and
who shows an interest in the members of staff, knows the supervisors and managers
well and who is there to help on matters relating to business or even personal family
problems. . . we try to ensure that people who work for us are as happy as they can be
(Managing Director).
In addition, consensus was seen as an important aspect decision making in the organisation. Various
interviewees highlighted this issue in different ways. For example:
It is very much a culture of if we want to do something we have to persuade everyone
and if someone really digs their heels in and goes to a member of the family who takes
an interest and says this is an absolutely lousy idea, it is not rejected but it doesn’t
progress. So, until everyone is switched on, nothing goes forward. We have a very
Japanese way of making decisions, but although it takes long to make a decision, by
the time you make the decision, everybody would have signed up to it (Team leader,
Sales and Distribution).
The sales and distribution team leader further linked the company’s approach to communication
and its consensus style of decision making to the history of the firm. As he observed:
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We have a very collective approach to communication and this relies heavily on
trust and constant talking and persuasion. When the business started, it was the
family members running the stores directly and you couldn’t tell a family member
what to do; you had to persuade them. The managers have largely adopted the same
philosophy (Team leader, Sales and Distribution).
Market Area
Market area refers to the geographical market segment in which the organisation operates served
by the organisation. Both BCL and Bidco were found to be operating at regional and international
level. In the case of Bidco, the company went regional in 1998, when it acquired Elianto and
expanded its capacity by 500 per cent to meet increasing demand for the brand in the region.
In addition, Bidco acquired edible oil business from Unilever a move which bolstered its drive to
dominate the regional market after purchasing Kimbo, the oldest brand of cooking fat in the region,
with an estimated turnover US $ 25.9 million and other brands. As part of its extension program,
Bidco entered Tanzanian market in 2001 when it established a refinery in Dares Salaam. In 2004 in
a move aimed at meeting its long-term plan of dominating East and Central Africa, Bidco ventured
into Uganda where it is undertaking an integrated palm oil project involving the development of
palm oil plantations, a state-of-art refinery and a soap plant to utilise the by products.
Despite the sluggish economic growth in Kenya over the past decade, the Bidco group has grown to
become the largest manufacture of edible oils and fats and soaps in East and Central Africa. The
company currently exports its brands to Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan,
Eriteria, Zambia, Malawi, Madagascar, Democratic republic of Congo, Zanzibar and Somalia.
The Bidco’s geographical and financial growth had led to an increasing distributed environment,
resulting in considerable demands for collaboration within the organisation. Bidco purchased ad-
ditional 30 licenses in 2002 in order to facilitate business growth in Kenya and expansion into
Tanzania. Bidco’s also indulged in e-commerce initiative by buying iBaan eBusiness suite with an
aim of creating collaboration amongst its dispersed regional offices, customers, and suppliers.
For BCL, in order to supply the Ugandan market better and also capture the Democratic Republic
of Congo market, the company acquired 100% shareholding of Hima Cement Limited when the
Ugandan government privatised the company. Today, Hima cement is owned by BCL and ulti-
mately Lafarge. BCL has seven sites; three in Kenya and four in Uganda. The seven sites are
linked via a V-sat. In addition, BCL benefits from Lafarge Net, an Internet system that intercon-
nects Lafarge personnel globally and provides secured Internet access. Its export markets include
Reunion, Uganda and Mayotle. In the past, they have also included Mauritius, Sri Lanka, The Co-
moros, Madagascar, Seychelles and the Congo. KenGen and KPLC market is restricted to Kenya.
Electricity produced by KenGen is consumed locally. However, occasionally when the electricity
production deteriorates due to low level of water in the dams during drought to a level that it
cannot meet national demand, KPLC do import electricity from Uganda.
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Organisation IS Resources
This property refers to resources in terms of people, money and time available to the organisa-
tions to determine priority allocations and ,hence, resources available for the ERP project. Two
dimensions of organisation IS resources were identified from the empirical data that influence ERP
implementation. These resources were heterogeneously distributed across case study organisations
and their presence or absence explained the difference in ERP implementation scope and outcome
among the case study organisations. Two dimensions were identified namely: knowledge resources
and IT infrastructure resources.
(i) Knowledge Resources
Knowledge resources refers to the unique skills, expertise, insights, experience, and intellectual
capital that are required during ERP implementation. Two types of knowledge resources emerged
in the data and that are specifically relevant in ERP implementation. These are business process
and computer usage and project management knowledge.
The Business process knowledge refer to know-how associated with a given application domain
which is the target for ERP implementation. Business process knowledge is essential for accurate
elicitation of system requirements and integrating of data. There was widespread lack of knowledge
of business processes amongst the respondents in all the case study organisations. Three of the
case study organisations (KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC) had no documentation of their business
processes. Therefore, this knowledge was difficult to elicit during the business blueprint stage of
ERP implementation. Bamburi and Bidco had documented their business processes.
For example, one important reason for the prolonged ERP system implementation (actually the
longest of 5 years) in ACFC can be attributed to the non-existence of well-qualified employees
within the company to manage the implementation process of the system. The ERP project was
supervised by the Chief Finance officer (the ERP Project Manager) and the heads of departments
(the key users). None of them had any knowledge about how ERP software could support or
improve their business processes.
An IT officer said:
All of the company’s leaders were not qualified to use the computer. Many of them
do not also understand the business processes governing the operations of the company.
They only trained on the beginnings of Windows and DOS. . . Training was internal in
Finance Department for one week. One week was not enough. It was just background
information.
The ERP Project Manager did not have any IT background or prior experience on the project. The
ERP Project Manager managed the project from a managerial perspective not from a technical
perspective. The mistrust for the ERP project manager’s capability and the lack of confidence in his
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leadership were reflected in the comments on his performance. The Purchasing and Procurement
manager said:
The project manager did not know anything about computers and has not got any
training courses. He was responsible for co-ordinating people’s efforts. Understanding
the company’s processes did not mean that he understood the ERP system. He was
one reason for ERP failure. . .
The steering committee members in ACFC also did not know anything about computers. Each head
of a sector or administrative unit was responsible for the co-ordination between the implementing
team from the ERP Company and the company’s employees. However, they were not adequately
qualified to do so. Other ERP users did not have computer culture either. They were not familiar
with computers. The IT officer explained:
Users were in need for upgrading their computer knowledge levels before starting
ERP implementation. They took a lot of time in entering the data of only a month
from a prior year. People were all upset. They always told each other “it was a failed
project”.
The lack of computer knowledge on the part of almost all of organisations employees (ERP Project
Manager, Key Users and End Users) is a missing resource in ACFC. The management accountant
explained the absence of motives to increase the accountants’ knowledge of IT:
Over-staffing, the lack of skills in using computer and the age of employees (ap-
proaching retirement age) hindered the ability to learn.
The average age of employees at ACFC (the respondents interviewed) was 50 years with two-thirds
of the employees being above 45 years. On the other hand, the average age of employees at Bidco
and Bidoc was 45 and 40 respectively with majority of those interviewed being below 35 years.
That this somewhat youthful group was more willing to change is likely influenced by the fact that
they have spent less time in using legacy systems and have lower investment in the status quo –
in either their personal skill portfolios or traditional system practices – than would employees who
have spent more years building up a set of skills and establishing cognitive and behavioural habits
around legacy systems usage. The negative relationship between age and computer skills suggests
that more education and training may be required for the older person if he or she is to master
needed computer skills successfully. Organisations should realise that older employees missed out
on the “personal computer” revolution.
Bidco was at the same level with ACFC before implementing ERP. The IT literacy among users
was low as expressed in the below excerpt.
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Many of the administrative staff had to be introduced to the concepts of a mouse and
a desktop when the company kicked off the ERP implementation (IT officer, ACFC).
However, Bidco’s implementation proved to be most successful. This observation makes a strong
that the manner in which ERP project is managed and delivered have a great influence on the
outcome.
Project Management knowledge refers to expertise, experience, skills, rules, and standards that
are needed to develop applications, manage system development activities, “bind” IT infrastructure
components into reliable services, and manage the ERP implementation life cycle. Amongst the case
study organisations KENGEN, KPLC, ACFC and Bidco had a limited experience in IT projects
and IT management. Only Bamburi had some prior experience with IT project management. For
example at KenGen and KPLC, prior to adoption of the SAP ERP system. Both organisations had
mainframe computer system [IBM 2904 and ME29 of ICL] for data processing (DP) respectively.
Access to computer terminals was limited to IT (DP) technical staff. Information was stored in
magnetic tapes, cassettes, and punch cards and was kept in a library. Data processing depended
on batch processing at particular times of the month. As a result the majority of the users were
computer illiterate since the use of mainframe was confined to data processing staff at KPLC and
KenGen.
In contrast, users at BCL were experienced with IT project management, and the use of comput-
ers. Prior to implementing the ERP system, BCL had just completed implementing a production
planning system and a plant maintenance system.
The organisation was also using several bespoke system in various functional areas mainly in the
Finance and Purchase departments. As a result, BCL had substantial project management knowl-
edge at the start of ERP implementation which could explain the wider ERP capability scope and
better business process outcome. The Information Systems manager said:
Fortunately; the people in Bamburi were very good in their thinking. They were
able to absorb the concept of ERP. Most of them had used information systems and
participated in big IT projects. ERP was as a result of their initiative to improve their
internal satisfaction by having better credit management, more functionality with asset
management and many more. I mean, all of them have good background. Therefore,
the implementation of ERP was easy.
The project management knowledge contributed to the success of ERP implementation and upgrade
at BCL. In fact, the company did not hire consultants during the implementation of ERP system
at their Hima Cement subsidiary.
BCL uses the project management knowledge acquired overtime to offer consultancy services to
other organisations implementing ERP system.
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(ii) IT Infrastructure Resources
Infrastructure resources refer to an organisation’s shared IT assets (e.g., hardware, software tools,
networks, databases, and data centers). They were found to be the foundations of an organisation’s
IT architecture, which is the blueprint or design that supports multiple applications and user
groups across the organisation. IT infrastructure resources constitute the basic prerequisite for
ERP implementation. ERP cuts across several functions, including internal operations of the
organisation and its suppliers, customers, banks, etc. The soundness of the entire infrastructure is
necessary if organisations have to extend the ERP system outside the four walls of the organisation
which is characterised by a complete value chain management enabled by ERP. IT infrastructure
is greatly influenced by the organisation’s size, in that big organisations can afford to spend more
on IT and, hence, put in place a sound IT infrastructure. For example, BCL, KenGen, KPLC,
and Bidco due to their financial strength managed to put in place V-Sat network to connect their
national and regional offices. The cost was prohibitive for ACFC, and therefore, ERP was being
used at the main site only i.e. at the plant site and not at the headquarters in Nairobi.
5.3.6.3 External Environment
This category refers to the environmental setting and associated influences that directly affect
perceptions, decisions, operations, and outcomes. Five properties emerged from the data namely:
competitive environment, government legislation, economic environment, professional culture, and
national IT infrastructure.
Competitive environment
This property refers to peer pressure on using a new technology. In this research, it is defined as
the percentage of competitors in the industry. Competitive pressure has long been recognised as a
driving force for new technology usage; it tends to press companies to seek competitive edge by using
the latest innovations. This explains why BCL and Bidco which were operating in a competitive
environment were more proactive in ERP adoption while KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC which had
a considerable degree of monopoly in their sectors were reluctant and reactive in adopting ERP
system (Gatignon & Robertson, 1989).
The presence of competitive factors also was witnessed in both cases of BCL and Bidco. For
instance, when Bidco Oil refineries made its debut in the edible oils, fat and soaps market in
1985, the market was dominated by multinationals. Unilever was then the largest player in the fast
moving consumer goods (FCMG) sector in the East Africa region at that time with its headquarters
based in Kenya. When Bidco started its business, customer preferences were for Unilever products,
a multinational competitor, which entered the Kenyan market in 1976 making it a family owned
medium sized organisation in a competitive, cost driven market. In order to survive this competitive
environment, the company’s challenge was to provide quality products at affordable prices.
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As mentioned in Bidco’s case study description in Appendix A, the pinnacle of Bidco management
policy is to use technology as a tool for reducing the cost of production as well as penetrating the
emerging African market. The company’s vision is to deliver products to the market at a speed
few of its competitors can match.
Bamburi Cement Limited was founded in 1951 by Felix Mandl – a director of Cementia Holding
A.G. Zurich in conjunction with the Kenyan government. Until 1992, the government of Kenya
was the majority shareholder and BCL operated in a regulated environment. Following successful
privatisation in 1992, under the umbrella of structural adjustment programme initiated by theWorld
Bank and IMF, foreign investors (Cementa, Lafarge, and Blue Circle) increased their shareholding
effectively transforming BCL from being a government corporation to a limited local public company
quoted in the stock market. Cementia later went into partnership with Blue Circle PLC (UK).
Privatisation opened the door for competitors among them being East Africa Portland Cement. The
desire for ERP was inspired by audit report by PricewaterhouseCoopers commissioned by Lafarge,
the principal shareholder. The term of reference for the auditors was to audit the BCL’s business
process and practices and to streamline the processes to common language and best practices
developed by Lafarge for its operational units. The aim was give BCL a competitive advantage of
its competitors.
Service and manufacturing businesses are generally considered to operate in dynamic environments
and are seen to be at the forefront of technological innovation. As commonly argued in the strategic
management literature (for example Rumelt, 1991), sectors in which there is a small degree of
competitive rivalry are less likely to be innovative. Two of the case organisation (KENGEN and
KPLC), experienced relatively stable business conditions wherein the control of the energy sector
rested with the government as it was with other essential services such as telecommunications.
However, control of the energy sector and telecommunications was largely eradicated with the
Structural Adjustment Programmes in the Kenyan economy before and after the recession of the
early 1990s. When the ERP system was implemented in 1997, KPLC and KENGEN were one
company under the umbrella body of KPLC. At that time KPLC solely operated the business
of generating, transmitting and distributing electricity to retailers in Kenya. It was during this
period that the energy market was liberalised which saw the emergence of small independent power
producers to compete with KenGen in electricity generation. ERP was adopted with the aim of
modernising critical activities, as a reaction to these pressures. Indeed, the industry has changed
considerably in recent years. One manager talked of the long-term industry changes:
I think that because of the fact that particularly in the 80s and 90s, we were the
key player in the industry. . . I mean, we didn’t really have competition and we didn’t
modernise.
Thus, the economic recession of the early 1990s heralded changes (discussed in Chapter 4) that
transformed the nature of the sector. Of particular significance was deregulation of market the
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which ushered in competitors. Thus competitive factors were absent in the early stages but became
present in both KenGen and KPLC later. In both organisations Structural Adjustment Programmes
aimed at modernising government corporations to enable them compete in a liberalised market were
the primary driver of IT deployment. The IT manager at KenGen said:
In 1992–1993, we and other similar organizations were instructed by the government
to modernize and introduce computers into our operations.
It was during this period that both KENGEN and KPLC adopted an ERP package and developed
the supporting network infrastructure. The ERP package adopted was similar to the one being used
by the multi-national corporation CALTEX, operating in a different industry. Later in 1998, KPLC
was split into KENGEN and KPLC. KENGEN took the business of generating electricity while
KPLC was left with the business of transmitting and distributing electricity to retail consumers.
During our field work, KENGEN was facing stiff competition from independent power producers
while KPLC had no competitors. The lack of competitors in the case of KPLC can be explained
by the fact that electricity transmission and distribution is capital intensive requiring laying down
of national transmission grids. Due to competition, KENGEN has been continually involved in
post-implementation enhancement. The company conducted two technical upgrades in a span of
two years (i.e. 2002 and 2004) and it is also planning to implement SAP ECC6 which is the latest
product from SAP Germany.
In the case of ACFC, at the start of the ERP project in 2001 competitive factors were absent. ACFC
was the sole company in the entire East Africa manufacturing. However, Spectre International,
came into the lime light after being granted license to operate the same business in 2005. This
brought considerable competition for market niche and raw materials. This was because ACFC
had a long product cycle time, and poor marketing and demand forecasting which forced customers
to wait for long time after purchasing goods for the goods to be delivered.
Government Legislation
This property refers to the influence government has on the organisations either directly by issuing
directives to state-owned organisations or indirectly through legislation. Government legislation
can encourage or remove barriers to adoption and usage of ERP. Government regulation was more
eminent in state-owned corporations which are governed by the State Corporation Act of Kenya.
For private organisations, government taxation policy had an influence on ERP implementation in
that organisations had to ensure that their ERP system complies with taxation policy set by the
government. The ERP functionalities most affected are finance, procurement, and payroll.
For example, Kenyan Revenue Authorities refuse to accept excise returns in formats other than
manual registers. In addition, the government has a predefined format to which all excise returns
must comply. This necessitated customisation of the ERP system in all the case study organisations
in order to comply with Kenya Revenue requirements.
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ACFC presents a perfect showcase of the influence of government legislation on ERP adoption and
usage. The multiplicity of Kenyan taxes, especially on transactions between governmental units
or public sector companies, represented another obstacle to implementing ERP system in ACFC.
When ACFC sells goods to a governmental unit, the governmental customer deducts income tax
from the company and ACFC collects sales tax from the customer. The consultants found strange
that there are more than one tax that has to be collected on the same transaction. They introduced
intermediate accounts to record taxes in non-tax accounts. However, the mediation of tax accounts,
suggested by consultants, in the ERP system were perceived by accountants as tax evasion, which
would lead to legal responsibility when tax officials examine the company’s accounts.
The Financial Accountant pointed out:
Tax officials closely monitor the invoice. I cannot tell them that the computer
software requires another form for the invoice. This would cause a lot of tax problems. . .
Tax officials examine our documents and what we reimbursed. It should be specific
accounts for this purpose. If we used intermediate accounts, it would be tax evasion. . .
I cannot change the state tax system in order to implement the ERP system but my
system can be modified. . . As an international system, Ebizframe should leave this
part for each country. Furthermore, taxes change from year to year.
Government corporations in Kenya are governed by the State Corporation Act which stipulates that
its annual budget must be approved by the Ministry of Energy in consultation with the Treasury
budget by end of February every year. Three of the case study organisations which are government
corporations – ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC – operate under restrictive procurement rules under
(a) individual orders and contracts over Ksh500,000 ($6,750) must go through the central tender
committee, and (b) if any single source procurement of over Ksh300, 000 ($4,050) is desired, prior
approval from the Directorate of Public Procurement at the Treasury must be sought. In addition, a
tender for local procurement must be advertised in the media for 28 days and an international tender
for 42 days, and prior approval of the Directorate of Public Procurement has to be sought to bypass
the limits. Finally, vendors have a right to appeal to the Directorate of Public Procurement over
any alleged malpractice or unfairness in the procurement process, at which time that procurement
activity is set aside pending a hearing.
Given that procurement activities at ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC must comply with the pub-
lic procurement regulations, this had a negative effect on ERP adoption initiatives and benefits,
specifically on purchase lead time and delivery lead time. This effect was more conspicuous at
KPLC where the material management module is implemented and operational, but due to tedious
and rigid procurement legislation led to delay in procurement of important maintenance materials
causing major problems in connection of new customers. The procurement officer had this to say:
Right now, the number of customers who applied for electricity connections several
months ago and are yet to get service has reached an unprecedented level. . . at least
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170,000 applications for new connections, half of them already paid for, are gathering
dust in KPLC’s offices countrywide due to delays in procurement of poles, conductors,
transformers, cables and other materials. . . the procurement of poles for network ex-
pansion has been especially problematic. The tender was floated some time last year
and won by a South African firm, only for it to be disputed by the losers.
Professional Culture
This property refers to the standards which need to be followed in various sectors or professions
and they relate to how tasks should be carried out. However, they are voluntary with a bearing on
the organisation’s reputation if it is to be accredited by a standard organisation or a professional
body. This culture manifested an influence on ERP implementation and use. We noted that SAP
R/3 provides a facility for reconciling wrong postings in the general ledger. However, accounting
standards requires that such corrections be done by posting a journal voucher of the same amount
resulting in a net effect of zero. Most of the end users we observed do not use the reconciliation
tool provided by SAP and instead correct errors in posting by using journal vouchers.
All the organisations displayed various professional culture which adversely affected ERP imple-
mentation. Bidco used two separate, personal computer-based systems for tracking additional lot
tracking information which could be done with the Baan ERP system. In manufacturing, products
with safety requirements face much stricter demands for traceability that the ERP system could
not provide. The following discourse supports the issue of professional culture:
. . . has its own incoming lot number. It’s kind of complicated. It’s the last three
digits of the product number, plus a letter for the month, three digits for the year,
the tooling number, and the quantity. . . [Why do you need a separate lot number?]
It’s different. . . [Why not use the ERP lot number?] The ERP auto assigns. We can’t
change that number
In the case of BCL, the accountants insisted on using journal vouchers to correct wrong postings
instead of using SAP R/3 posting reversal tool. The reason for insistence was that the accounting
convention requires the passing of journal vouchers as a means of correcting wrong transaction
postings. As discussed under the government legislation section, the accounting officials termed the
proposal by consultants of introducing intermediate accounts to record taxes in non-tax accounts
as tax evasion.
National IT Infrastructure
This property is used to refer to the effectiveness of transportation and local telecommunication
in Kenya. Kenyan national infrastructure had an adverse effect on all the case case study organ-
isations. Research findings suggest that poor transportation, telecommunications, internet and
intranet, and mobile coverage affect negatively affected ERP implementation implementation in
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the case study organisations forcing most of them to narrow their ERP implementation scope or to
incurr additional implementation costs. The stage of Kenyan national infrastructure is discussed
in Chapter 4.
Due to poor and unreliable local telecommunication network in Kenya, organisations which were
operating at national (i.e. KenGen and Bamburi) and regional (i.e. Bidco and Bamburi) were
forced to install their own communication backbone for all their sites. As a result, KenGen, KPLC,
Bidco and Bamburi installed private networks with satellite communications, Very Small Aperture
Networks (V-Sat). This was expensive by Kenyan standards, but this was the only way to go
about it. A sample of KenGen backbone is presented on Figure 5.3 However, the drawback with
the V-Sat system as mentioned by the IT manager at KenGen was that “it would support only
batch data transfer (via FTP), which caused significant delays. . . up to one-and-a-half seconds per
keystroke. . . that is not acceptable for online transactions”.
Figure 5.3: KenGen Wide Area Network (Source: Project Document)
Even with current networks communication is quite slow. For example all KenGen sites are con-
nected, however speed and availability seems to be an issue (see Figure5.4). Two main aspects of
ERP system by infrastructure are the system availability and speed as commented by a end-user
at KenGen “The system cannot run full month without breaking” and when the system is available
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it is likely to be slow.
Figure 5.4: ERP system availability and speed at KenGen
In the case of ACFC, the company was forced to completely abandon implementing web-portal in
their ERP due to lack of internet connectivity in Muhoroni. The cost of setting up a private WAN
using V-Sat was exorbitant for the company to afford. Poor internet connectivity is also hindrance
to complete value chain management and customer relationship management.
In addition, KPLC, KenGen, and ACFC (all government corporations) mentioned that corruption
in awarding government tenders immensely contributed cost escalation. To confirm this claim, none
of government corporation case study organisations (KenGen and KPLC) were willing disclose the
cost of their ERP implementation.
Additional environmental factors having influence of ERP implementation in Kenya include lack of
adequate ERP skills, low level of awareness of ERP applications and ICT benefits, and high and
unpredictable tarrifs on software due to lack of national ICT policy. These factors are described in
Section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 of Chapter 4.
5.3.6.4 ERP Delivery Service
This category describes the means by which ERP implementation was supported, managed, and
nurtured. Five dimensions were identified which describes ERP delivery system among the case
study organisations namely: project responsibility, ERP configuration, IT champion, top manage-
ment involvement, and training.
This study’s findings showed that organisations that have better delivery system are expected to
innovate more economically with greater probability of success.
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Project responsibility
This property refers to who is responsible for managing the ERP project. Two dimensions which
are congruent with the literature were identified. These dimensions are: vendor and consultants.
Implementation which were carried out by consultants were more successful amongst our case stud-
ies suggesting that project responsibility influence ERP implementation outcome. Only ACFC used
a third party consultant. The rest of the case study organisations used vendor consultants. Con-
sultants compensate the lack of skills amongst in-house staff in addition to bringing in experiences
from their past implementations. However, the party consultants may lack the in-depth knowledge
of a given ERP system to successfully configure the system to meet an organisation’s business re-
quirements. There are cases where third party consultants have been sued for ERP implementation
failures, the most notable one being the case where Deloitte and Touch was sued by Fox Myer for
the implementation failure of its ERP system.
ERP configuration
This property refers to whether a single ERP package or a combination of selected modules from
different ERP packages are implemented. Configuration of systems implemented by the case study
organisations varied. Some organisations implemented a single ERP package from a single vendor
(enterprise suite) while others selected modules from different ERP packages ( best-of-breed). The
enterprise suite is an implementation that includes a group of modules that has been integrated by
the vendor, a kind of ‘ready to use’ set up for most functions/processes. Best-of-breed or portfolio
implementation, on the other hand involves a mixture of different vendors’ modules. In the case
of the best-of-breed strategy, the modules need to ‘talk’ to each other hence interfaces need to
be developed. The consultant noted that that enterprise suite and best-of-breed approach has a
great influence on: maintenance cost, complexity of integration with new or existing application,
implementation cost, and flexibility to meet business requirements. Therefore, ERP configuration
had an effect on ERP implementation scope and subsequently business and process outcome. These
concepts are covered in section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2.
All the case study organisations adopted the enterprise suite approach during the initial implemen-
tation. However, most organisations which have implemented additional modules have chosen to
implement modules from different vendors. Findings revealed that enterprise suite ERP implemen-
tations have stopped making headlines. One consultant from PricewaterhouseCoopers contended
that:
Throughout the last 12 months, ERP has not been a popular subject. It dropped
off people’s radar screen. Best-of-breed implementations are becoming more common
now, especially in large organisations, which are looking at implementing CRM, data
warehousing and business intelligence systems that sit on top of their ERP systems.
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The above discourse holds in the light of our case study organisations. For example Bamburi
which is running SAP R/3 4.5B implemented Oracle Business Intelligence and PeopleSoft Human
Resource Management in 2007. Another showcase that there is a move towards best-of-breed
strategy is by Bidco which although it runs Baan, it has implemented Siebel CRM and SCM.
Another consultant further stated that “big ERP systems are done. There are more of add-ons and
bolt-on implementations now”.
This was especially true for ERP systems that needed to satisfy specific Kenyan industries such as
Power Generation and Electricity distribution at KENGEN and KPLC. However, in the medium-
size case organisations –ACFC and Bidco –traditional “ERP systems meet most of their business
requirements”. The type of modules in a typical implementation differs depending on the imple-
mentation phase and stage. In general, enterprise suite strategy was found to be common in the
initial ERP adoption and implementation.
IT champion
This property refers to the absence or presence of personnel to advocate for adoption and use of
ERP in a department or in the organisation. In organisations and functional areas where there was
presence of IT champions they encouraged the use of ERP in those particular organisations and
functional areas. Organisations which had presence of IT champions in different functional units
has a wider ERP implementation scope. They directed ERP adoption and implementation efforts,
and encouraged employees to use applications. In addition they interacted with IS managers and
senior managers to identify requirements for resources and end user training.
In both BCL and Bidco, for example, even though there were many semi-skilled employees working
in the factories, production managers encouraged them to use production scheduling applications.
A senior functional manager at Bidco described that:
The senior departmental managers, especially the production managers in the fac-
tories were personally involved in fostering user acceptance.
Top Management Involvement
This property is used to refer to the awareness of the value of IT among the top management and
the level of their involvement in ERP adoption and implementation. Bidco and BCL attracted some
of the best technical and managerial talent in the country. Their CEO’s are prominent members of
industry associations and are well educated. For instance, the CEO of Bidco is a graduate of the
prestigious United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi while the CEO is a renown
manager. They regularly interacted with their peers at other multinational/progressive companies
in Kenya and abroad. The CEO of Bidco had won a number of industry leadership awards. In
2005, the MD of Bidco was awarded the CEO of the year from Kenya Institute of Management.
The CEO of Bamburi has a lot of exposure in management at the International arena having served
Lafarge in various positions in Europe before taking over as the managing director of Bamburi. In
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addition, top management at BCL consisted of a board of directors drawn from prominent members
of banks and financial institutions in Kenya. They considered IT to be critical to their business
success and were keen about maintaining IT leadership in the industry. The IS manager at BCL
mentioned that:
Our CEO considers IT to be a [central] part of [our business]. He knows where
the industry is moving internationally, in terms of the use of IT. He communicates
frequently with the head of IS and exchanges ideas about functions where IT can be
adopted (IS Manager).
At Bidco, the CEO was personally involved in planning and monitoring IT projects and attended
committee meetings. According to a senior manager there:
Our [CEO] sees to it that he is updated on major IT projects. He also attends
some of the committee meetings. When he is touring regional offices, he talks to the
IS people, asks about their plans and makes sure that they have what they need.
Top management at KENGEN and KPLC were political appointees. The ministers appoint the
managing directors who in turn greatly influence employees’ recruitment of middle level managers.
As a result, managers were not professional, did not see the strategic significance of ERP and were
not enthusiastic about IT leadership in their industries.
During the former president’s regime, appointing individuals to government corporations’ board
was a tightly-controlled affair. You need the support of either the Chief Secretary or State House
to the appointed. By and large, the situation under current president government has not changed
in any radical way. It is easy to discern a clear pattern between the ethnic background of a cabinet
minister and the ethnic backgrounds of managing directors and directors of State corporations
under their ministries. Where a minister tried to maintain an ethnic balance in his corporations
under his/her ministry, it is only because he/she had tried to ‘barter’ trade with his/her colleague
in another ministry under an arrangement where the colleague absorbs his/her tribesmen and vice
versa.
According to one of the respondent’s who declined to be named:
In my view, it has been an unmitigated disaster. We have ministers who insist
on micro-managing parastatals and permanent secretaries who meddle in the day-to-
day affairs of parastatals. . . we have ministers writing letters to managing directors
directing them to fire middle-level managers and promote the people they want. . . we
have ministers who write letters to managing directors ordering them to suspend any
procurement of good and services and any dealing with clients until they return from
abroad.
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However, most of the managers at KenGen and KPLC were aware of the operational usefulness of
IT and were willing to follow other organisations in their industries, in adopting ERP systems in
key processes especially after visiting the Ibera Africa installation site in Spain.
The IT head at KPLC explained:
The Managing Director (MD) of the company...is not averse to the use of IT per se,
but his awareness of IT applications [is] limited to traditional payroll and accounting
software. He does not think that we should be investing a lot of money in buying
expensive software unless we can justify the costs.
Top management at KenGen and KPLC were not proactive about ERP adoption. This had influ-
ence of allocation resources for ERP acquisition and implementation. At KenGen and KPLC, the
availability of financial and human resources with regard to ERP adoption was dependent on top
management’s judgment of whether or not a system was required. It also depended on resource
allocation directives and policies of the government, and budgets for the particular financial year.
Top management at KENGEN and KPLC were political appointees. They consisted of public sector
bureaucrats who had functioned in a protected environment for a long time. They did not consider
IS to be important in any way, except in automating financial and accounting transactions.
Training
All the case study organisations had conducted education during ERP implementation. However,
education and training activities took place in different ways and within different time frames.
At ACFC, training was focused simply on how to use the system whereas in the remaining case
studies, training not only involved learning on how to use the system but also learning how the new
processes and new ways of doing things impacted operations in other departments.
From the observation made during the field study, it is evident that sufficient education and train-
ing contribute positively to ERP implementation and use. These finding should underscore the
importance of education and training in order to enable the ERP implementation to go forward.
For instance, the most simple example is that the training teaches the users how to operate with
the new system. The extensive education and training on ERP knowledge and know-how has also
positive influences on the ERP implementation in the long run. The findings in the cases indicate
that sufficient education and training impact the ERP implementation in a positive way.
5.3.6.5 Upgrade and Improvement
This category refers to activities undertaken to by organisation to optimise ERP systems and the
decision leading to ERP system upgrade.
Two properties were identified namely: upgrade cycle and upgrade decisions.
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Upgrade cycle
This refers to the length of period between ERP system upgrade in an organisation. The period
can be short (less than 2 years) or long (more than 3 years). KPLC’s long upgrade cycle can be
explained in terms of the high barrier to entry for competitors (Table 5.6). The sector’s significant
investment requirements preclude much competition at the moment. On the other hand, KenGen
has faced stiff competition from Independent power producers and Uganda Electricity since the
deregulation of electricity generation. As a result, IT in this case ERP, is seen as a ‘must have’ tool
in order to thrive in the free market.
Table 5.6: Business factors influencing upgrade strategies and schedules
Characteristics driving relatively short up-
grade cycles and quick deployment of new
functionality
Characteristics driving relatively long up-
grade cycles and slower adoption of new
functionality
Leading-edge, market-driven environments Mature markets and mature organisations
Low barriers to entry for competitors High barriers to entry for competitors
First-mover advantages Stable product lines and distribution chan-
nels
The research findings reveal that long upgrade cycles are likely to add additional risks. Upgrades
tend to be more difficult, more complex, and have a greater impact on the user environment when
long period of time has elapsed. It is even more troubling when the ERP vendor stops supporting
the version in use because it is out of date like in the case of KPLC. SAP stopped supporting version
2.11G being used by KPLC in 2002. Even though the organisation was not receiving support from
SAP, it still continued paying annual maintenance contract as per the contract agreement with
the vendor. Historically, if a single, functional package needed replacement because it became
unsupportable or obsolete, its impact on the company as a whole was limited. With an integrated
ERP environment, the entire business is at risk if the ERP system becomes de-supported. For
instance, when KPLC decided to upgrade from version 2.11H to the latest version SAP R/3 version
4.7, the organisation was informed that it was impossible to upgrade directly to version 4.7. The
only way out was to first upgrade from to version 4.6 then to version 4.7. When KPLC enquired
if they could upgrade to mySAP.com, it was informed that mySAP.com was a new product and
hence regarded as a new installation.
We have SAP R/3 Licenses, using SAP version 2.11G, and when we planned to
migrate to the newest version, SAP told us that we have R/3 license, and we cant get
the latest version ECC5.0 or ECC6.0 because it is a different product (mySAP ERP),
the only path is to migrate to 4.6 then to 4.7 and stay there or pay extra fee to change
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our R/3 licenses to mySAP ERP licenses and could get the ECC5.0 or ECC6.0. We
are current with the pay of the SAP license maintenance, and have invested on SAP a
lot, how they us that our product only could upgrade to version 4.7? What happened
with our maintenance and all the new versions?
Upgrade decisions
This research identified four main influences on the decision to upgrade ERP systems. These
are business and IT needs, risk mitigation, external dependence on vendor, and internal resource
availability. These factors influence upgrade cycle discussed above. Business needs is a major
influence on the upgrade of ERP systems.
For example, in order to justify ERP system at BCL, the IS manager explained that current SAP
R/3 version had become incapable of delivering some of the functionality that the business needed:
It was working okay for us, and then we started to acquire more businesses and we
were growing. The flexibility that we want to have on our software was not there in
the older release. The newer releases were so much better than the old one.
One of the functional team leaders at BCL further recalled that functionality in SAP R/3 version
4.6C was one of the major reasons that it was adopted:
The bottom line is we need to upgrade because we needed a lot of functionality.
We need a lot more functionality, a lot more flexibility with the system.
To meet these business needs, BCL preferred to receive software functionality from the system
itself than to develop the functionality through additional programming. Besides, modifications to
SAP’s core program were forbidden except in rare circumstances. A technical lead explained:
We prefer to not have a lot of custom coding. So if it’s something that SAP is going
to provide then that’s a definite factor in making the decision to go ahead with the
upgrade.
Thus, the availability of user requested functionalities in later versions of ERP systems as espoused
by the above excerpts can be a strong influence over the upgrade decision. In KPLC’s case,
improvement of business processes which meant introduction of new functionalities in SAP R/3
4.7 was stated as one of the upgrade deliverables. This enforces the notion that availability of new
functions in a later version of an ERP system can be an influencing factor in making an upgrade
decision. Therefore, upgrading was perceived as a means to meeting users’ needs without any new
development effort and with SAP’s support by KPLC, KenGen, and BCL.
Corporate and IT policies to mitigate software risks also emerged from empirical data as a factor
influencing the decision to upgrade ERP systems. Several of the restrictions on software upgrades
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were codified in some of the case study organisations policies designed to mitigate the risks of
using ERP software. In the case of KenGen, one important policy affected all the software used.
Adopting unstable software releases produced unacceptable business risks. To protect KenGen
from implementing unstable software, KenGen had a policy prohibiting any upgrade of software
that was earlier that release ‘c’ in each version. As the MD explained:
We never go before ‘c’ because ‘a’ is the beta, ‘b’ is the fixes, and ‘c’ is the stable
release ... Particularily, we don’t want a beta version.
Indeed, their preference was to wait for the other companies of compatible size to perform the
upgrade first.
We want to make sure [vendors] have it in production and that other customers are
using it before we consider using it.
There were two reasons for this practice: to sort out any known problem in advance, and to learn
from another companies upgrade lesson.
Another corporate policy required all software to be on vendor support to ensure continuous system
operation and timely receipt of vendor support if a problem occurred. Vendor support was impor-
tant in the case of BCL and KenGen because they relied heavily on SAP’s Online Support System
(OSS) to solve their technical problems. OSS was a database which contained SAP native code
solutions that could be downloaded and applied to fix problems. When IT personel encountered
problems, OSS was the firs place they looked for a solution.
Vendor support was also a major influence on the the decision to upgrade ERP systems by the
case study organisations. The organisations are forced to upgrade their ERP systems when ven-
dors impose sunset date afterwhich they cease to support certain versions of their ERP softwares.
According to the project manager, vendor support was the key reason why the upgrade was not
truly a choice of KenGen, but rather an ultimatum from the vendor. According to a functional
team lead:
We were basically up on our contract with SAP. So, were told we needed to upgrade.
However, upgrading an ERP is a costly project requiring intensive resources. In the case of KPLC,
SAP imposed a sunset date on SAP R/3 version 2.11G which the organisation was using in 2001.
This implied that they were to lose SAP’s online technical support system. Due to resource con-
traints, KPLC was not in a position to upgrade their system then. Instead they opted to continue
the de-supported version of SAP R/3 until in 2006 when the organisation decided to upgrade from
version 2.11G to 4.7. Although, SAP continued to provide technical support after the sunset date,
it had to be purchased at an additional charge, and post-sunset customers were given lower priority
than customers with more recent versions.
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Internal resource availability formed an important factor influencing ERP system upgrade. For
example, one of the reasons why KPLC waited for so long to upgrade is lack of resources. These
factors are exhaustively covered in section 6.3.1 of the next chapter.
5.3.6.6 National culture
Power distance
Power distance is not used to denote national culture as used by Hofstede. This study restricts its
use to organisational culture. In this study, case study organisations manifested different power dis-
tance orientation defined by Hofstede despite the fact that they all are located in Kenya. Hofstede
asserts that East Africa region where Kenya is located has a high power distance. Hofstede’s claim
could have been confirmed if all the case study organisations manifested high power distance ori-
entation. However, two of the case study organisations manifested low power distance orientation.
This confirmed that national culture is contestable and hence the decision to use power distance in
the model to denote the power distance between managers and subordinates within an organisation.
High power distance negatively influences ERP implementation decision and consequently the ERP
implementation outcome. This is because ERP projet management requires project teams to work
together. Project teams usually comprise employees from operational, tactical, and strategic level.
The finding presented in Section 5.3.3.2, revealed that managers in high power distance organisa-
tional culture were uncomfortable working with their juniors leading to resentment by managers.
On the other hand, organisations which were oriented towards low power distance achieved better
ERP implementation outcome results. Closely related to power distance is the information sharing
perception. Lastly, basis-of -truth-and-rationality influences ERP delivery service which in turn
moderates ERP implementation outcome.
5.3.6.7 ERP Implementation Outcome
This category refers to success or failure of ERP implementation project. Two properties used
for measuring ERP system implementation success were identified namely project outcome and
business process outcome. Project outcome refers to whether ERP system was implemented on
schedule and on budget whereas business process outcome refers to the business value derived
from ERP system as a result of improved business processes. This category and its properties are
discussed in detail in Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.
5.3.6.8 ERP Implementation Challenges
Analysis of the challenges faced by case study organisations found 19 main challenges to ERP
implementation. These challenges are presented in Table 5.7. These challenges will be further
analysed in Appendix B.
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In this chapter, data analyses and interpretation was carried out. The findings of this chapter
will form the foundation of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The findings will enable the formulation of
propositions which will then be tested in Chapter 6. The categories and properties identified in
this chapter will be used in the development of ERP implementation and ERP upgrade decision





According to Cannon (2001), “a model is an attempt to represent visually or verbally the most
important elements in a real world situation as a basis for achieving greater understanding or
conducting experiments to test the part or the whole”.
This chapter presents two models developed in this study. In line with the above definition, the two
models presented in this chapter represent ERP systems implementation and upgrade phenomena
in a real world situation as a basis for achieving greater understanding.
The chapter starts by introducing the models. Next, the constructs forming each model are dis-
cussed focusing on how the constructs were derived and how the constructs interrelate and interact.
6.2 Empirical ERP Implementation Model (EEIM)
The Empirical ERP Implementation Model (EEIM) presented in Figure 6.1 has its foundation in
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the preliminary conceptual model (Figure 5.1) proposed in



































The categories identified in chapters 5 and Appendix B formed the model constructs. Therefore,
the term construct is used in the EEIM model to refer to category. The identified constructs were
used to extend the preliminary conceptual model presented in Figure 5.1.
The next section describes the model constructs followed by discussion of the interrelationship
among the constructs.
6.2.1 ERP Implementation Outcome
This construct refers to the IT services that are enabled, created, or acquired as a direct result of
ERP implementation. The results can range from total failure to 100% success. In the empirical
model, two dimensions were identified namely: project outcome and business process outcome.
Measuring success in terms of project outcome is controversial. This is because even if ERP system
implementation exceeds contracted delivery time and budget, organisations may still think their
ERP implementation is a success.
Therefore, an appropriate ERP success measure gauges whether an ERP project is completed within
the time and budget schedule, and with the intended functionality; and the extent to which the
intended business performance improvements were realised. This justifies the inclusion of project
outcome and business process outcome in the model. The business process outcome is included in
the model to make success measure of ERP implementation complete.
6.2.1.1 Project Outcome
This dimension is used as a measure of success of ERP implementation based whether or not the
ERP project is on time and on budget.
6.2.1.2 Business Process Outcome
This dimension refers to the actual benefits derived from ERP implementation and usage. The
three dimensions incorporated in the model were derived from empirical data in section B.6.2.5 of
Appendix B. These dimensions are: process efficiency, process effectiveness, and process flexibility.
The process efficiency dimension refers to the extent to which the use of ERP implementation
reduces operational costs and decreases input/output conversion ratio. Research finding identified
some cost related benefits from data analyses which include IT costs, administrative costs, personnel
costs, and sales costs (see section B.6.2.5). The ERP implementation decision dimensions – ERP
implementation scope and ERP implementation strategy – exert significant positive and negative
influences on process efficiency benefits while the ERP delivery moderates these benefits.
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The process effectiveness dimension refers to the the extent to which an ERP system implementa-
tion provides better functionality, enhances the quality of the users’ work in terms of better access
to corporate a data, higher level of enterprisewide data integration, better sales forecasts, and
improved quality of operations. The process improvement benefits identified from the data anal-
yses are improved purchase management, improved warehouse management, improved customer
relations, improved supplier relations, availability of information, and improved decision making.
Process effectiveness benefits is greatly influenced by both dimensions of ERP implementation de-
cision construct – ERP implementation and ERP implementation strategy. For instance, ERP
breadth which is determined by the number and nature of modules implemented; the number of
implementation sites affect the process effectiveness related benefits. The higher the number of
modules the higher number of functionalities covered hence the more process effectiveness related
benefits. In addition, the higher the number of sites the higher the level of data integration hence
the availability of real time data which can improve decision making through providence of timely
information. The nature of modules implemented also determine whether improved decision-making
benefit is achievable. However, decision-making especially at a strategic level, require additional
specialised modules for analytical processing such as Business Intelligence and Data Warehousing
solutions.
The dimension process flexibility refers to the extent to which the ERP implementation provides
organisations with more flexibility in response to changing business environments by providing
new ways to customise business processes and become more agile. The table-driven customisation
allows for rapid changes in business requirements with a common set of source code or programs.
The common programs are coded to focus on settings in specific to make the programs react in
various ways to fit different business needs. This is what makes ERP systems so flexible – there
are well over 10,000 tables in the SAP R/3 database structure. Because table settings instead of
old-fashioned hard-coded program logic are what drive program functionality, new and changed
business requirements can be rapidly implemented and tested in the system. Process flexibility can
be maximised if organisations opt for extensive BPR as opposed to customisation. For instance,
ERP system provide tables for tax brackets used for taxation transactions. In case tax rate changes,
it simply requires organisations to create an additional tax bracket and assign it to the organisation
business object. However, if at the time of implementation an organisation had customised their
ERP system and hard coded the tax rate, then process flexibility is eroded.
6.2.2 ERP Implementation Decisions
The ERP implementation decision construct refers to ERP implementation scope and ERP imple-
mentation strategy decision taken by an organisation implementing ERP system. Some of these
decisions were derived from the literature and presented in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. This construct
is not not included in Table 5.5. The construct was derived by combining ERP implementation
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scope to together with the factors which influence it. The construct has two dimensions namely:
ERP implementation scope and ERP implementation strategy. These properties are discussed next.
6.2.2.1 ERP Implementation Scope
This property refers to the range, reach, and geographic scope of ERP implementation in an organ-
isation. Understanding ERP implementation scope and a better definition and assessment of its
likely measures can help towards better understanding and estimating ERP implementation costs
and benefits.
The ERP implementation scope construct is an important component of the model not only because
it can help deduce the benefits that can be obtained from ERP but also because it defines the
changes to managerial autonomy, task coordination and process integration that needs to be carried
out in order to realise ERP benefits. Statistical analyses in section B.6.2.7 derived three ERP
implementation scope measures incorporated in the model.
ERP implementation scope has direct impact on the ERP implementation outcome. The higher
the number of modules implemented and the number implementation sites (ERP breadth), the
higher the business process outcome and the higher the duration and cost of implementation. The
number of modules implemented determine both the cost and the functionalities covered by the
modules implemented thereby influencing project and business process outcome. ERP depth on
the other hand, influences the business process outcome. ERP depth refers how vertically ERP
is institutionalised within an organisation. Greater benefits is achieved if ERP is institutionalised
throughout an organisation’s hierarchies. ERP which is institutionalised at operational level can
be interpreted as being used for transactional processes. However, if ERP is institutionalised right
to the top of an organisation then it means that ERP system is being used at strategic level
to aid in informed decision making. The nature of modules would greatly influence the vertical
ERP diffusion within an organisation. Top hierarchies in organisations would require analytical
processing bolt-ons such as business intelligence and data warehousing.
6.2.2.2 ERP Implementation Strategy
This property refers to the decisions relating to the level of customisation to be undertaken during
ERP implementation, and the decision of whether to source all the ERP system modules from
a single vendor (enterprise suite) or from multiple vendors (best-of-breed). Suffice is to state
that minimal customisation positively influence ERP implementation outcome. The decision on
which strategy is adopted by an organisation is directly influenced by the organisational context
dimensions discussed in section 5.3.6.2 of Chapter 5, and environmental context dimension (e.g.
government legislation) discussed in section 5.3.6.3 of the same chapter.
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6.2.3 Organisational context
This construct refers to the structural establishment of the organisations as a whole, based on
its management and functional divisions. The dimensions incorporated in the ERP implemen-
tation model were derived from case study analyses (Section 5.3.6.2). Each of these dimensions
have configuration values which either positively or negatively influence ERP implementation and
subsequently ERP implementation outcome. For illustration purpose, we discuss the influence of
organisation and IT strategy, orientation to change, orientation to collaboration, and IS resource
dimensions influence ERP implementation.
Orientation to change profoundly influences ERP implementation decision and ultimately ERP
implementation outcome. The effect can be negative or positive depending on the organisation’s
orientation. It is an indicator of an organisation’s willingness to change its way of doing business by
carrying out BPR. Orientation towards change positively influences ERP implementation in that it
favours higher BPR magnitude. Higher BPR positively effects ERP project outcome and business
process improvement outcome. Organisations which are change-oriented are more willing to carry
out intensive BPR resulting in higher BPR magnitude which ultimately leads to low ERP system
implementation cost and higher business improvement benefits. On the other hand, organisation
which are rigid tend to resist conducting BPR and instead prefer customising ERP.
The external environment (i.e. the competitive environment dimension) influences orientation to
change configuration in an organisation. Organisations which operate in competitive environment
display tendency towards change. This can be explained by dynamic nature of business environment
which requires organisations operating in such environment to be be at the edge to remain compet-
itive. BCL and Bidco case study organisations which we classified as change-oriented organisations
were both operating in competitive environments while the rest of the case study organisations,
which were regarded as rigid, were operating in monopolised market at the time of ERP system
implementation.
Orientation to collaboration facilitates information sharing during implementation among team
members and across functional teams thereby reducing implementation project outcome – time
and cost. Therefore, orientation to collaboration has a positive impact on ERP implementation as
observed in two case study organisations – Bidco and BCL. ERP trajectory encourages teamwork
due to its process-oriented nature. Therefore, it is arguable that orientation towards collaboration
facilitates functional integration within an organisation which leads to improved business process
efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility. Given that orientation towards collaboration encourages
teamwork, collaboration oriented organisations tend cope with ERP project management activities
which require teamwork which often cuts across the functional areas of an organisation. On the other
hand, organisations which are oriented towards isolation may work hard to inculcate collaboration
culture which may lead to additional costs being incurred to cater for change management. For
instance, the public organisations reported in this study had to undertake additional measures
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such as adopting ‘podoville’ structures in order to breakdown isolation culture that was heavily
ingrained in them. Therefore, depending on organisation’s configuration (collaboration vs isolation),
orientation to collaboration can have positive or negative effect on ERP delivery service and ERP
outcome (project outcome and business process outcome).
Organisation IS resource, if available, positively influences ERP implementation decision and sub-
sequently the ERP implementation outcome. Availability of knowledge resources (project manage-
ment and business process) facilitates ERP implementation thereby reducing the implementation
time and cost due to low learning curve. In addition, availability of financial resources positively
influences ERP implementation given the intensive nature of resources required during ERP imple-
mentation.
6.2.4 ERP Delivery Service
This construct describes the means by which ERP system implementation is supported, managed,
and nurtured. The construct has a moderation effect of the ERP implementation outcome. The
outcome of ERP implementation in an organisation is not only a function of the organisation’s
contextual factors but also depends on how the ERP implementation project is supported, and
nurtured. Therefore, this construct is more focused on how the ERP project management is car-
ried out. Based on the case study analyses, four representative dimensions of ERP delivery were
identified. It is noticeable that these dimensions represent the commonly known critical success
factors. Therefore, this construct represent critical success factors, though not exhaustive, which
needs to be observed during ERP implementation in order to achieve successful project and business
process outcome. The importance of top management involvement is widely cited in the literature
and was also evident in the case study analyses as presented in section 5.3.6.4. Top management
involvement is required in order to not only mobilise resources but also to diffuse resistance. Their
involvement assist in aligning IT and business strategy which positively influences ERP imple-
mentation decision and ERP implementation outcome. In a similar manner, the presence of a IT
champion within functional areas greatly affects ERP implementation outcome. The presence of a
IT champion will promote the use of ERP which can help diffuse resistance toward ERP project.
On the other hand, its absence can have a negative influence on the ERP implementation outcome.
The consultant resources dimension was derived from project responsibility discussed in section
5.3.6.4. The use of consultants had a positive influence among the case study organisations in that
they makeup for the lack of project management and business process management knowledge in
organisation. Their involvement thus have positive moderation influence on ERP implementation
outcome. Consultant resources dimension is directly affected by IS resources, mainly the availability
of financial resources because of the high cost involved in hiring ERP consultants.
Another property which was added to ERP delivery service is the the ERP drivers. This property
was not originally identified and included in Table 5.5. This property refers to the reasons for, or
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the justification for ERP implementation in an organisation. The reasons identified from empirical
data were grouped into business drivers and technical drivers. Implementation of ERP system in
any organisation, as observed in the case studies, can justified on the ground of business needs,
technological needs, or both. ERP implementations which are business-needs driven involve higher
BPR magnitude in a bid to improve the old business practices. On the other hand, ERP imple-
mentations which are driven by technical needs tend carry out major customisation with aim of
changing the ERP system to accommodate the old business processes. Therefore, ERP drivers have
profound effect on ERP implementation scope (BPR magnitude) which ultimately impacts on the
project outcome and business process outcome. Business-driven implementations have higher BPR
magnitude. That leads to shorter implementation duration and lowers cost and also yields higher
processes efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility benefits. On the other hand, technical driven ERP
implementation have lower BPR magnitude and thus have higher customisation. As a result, tech-
nical driven ERP implementation are more costly and yield minimal business process improvement
benefits.
Technical justification of ERP project in inclined to technological determinism paradigm and is
often a scenario when the ERP project is too technically focused and IT group is developed around
technical skills. ERP system is seen as a packaged solution to organisation’s all technical and
business problems. This implementation approach often results in high level of resistance and rates
of failure. The IT group handles the implementation process, often paying attention mostly to
delivering the project on time and on budget instead of gaining business benefits. Based on the
research findings, it is important to justify ERP implementation based in business needs and then
use ERP as an enabler to achieving the defined business needs. This ensure that the business and
IT strategy are aligned.
ERP drivers were deduced as being influenced by two constructs namely organisational context and
external environment. For instance, organisations operating regionally and internationally, in this
study, were motivated towards standardising their operations whereas those organisations which
were operating within the country were not necessarily motivated in standardising their opera-
tions but rather they were interested in replacing their legacy systems. The external environment
dimension, which has a profound positive influence on ERP drivers, was presence of competition
(competitive environment). Organisations operating in competitive markets often justify their ERP
systems implementation along quantifiable business cases. These business cases represent business
opportunities expected to be fulfilled by the ERP systems in order to provide business with com-
petitive edge.
6.2.5 External Environment
This construct refers to the environmental setting and associated influences that directly affect per-
ceptions, decisions, operations, and outcomes. The environmental construct influences organisation
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context, ERP delivery service, and ERP implementation decision which ultimately impacts ERP
implementation outcome. For instance, competitive environment dimension influence orientation
to change dimension in that organisation which are operating in competitive markets are influenced
to be change-oriented. In addition, it also influences ERP driver dimension in the ERP delivery
construct.
The national IT infrastructure dimension negatively influences an ERP implementation decision
– more precisely the implementation scope. It limits the scope, thereby significantly affecting the
business process outcome. It also adds to additional cost because companies are forced to set up
their own private Wide Area Networks in order to link multiple sites as was cited in two case study
organisations.
Government legislation also emerged as dimension with negative influence on ERP implementation.
Its effect is more severe in public organisations which are governed by State Corporation Act
which stipulates procurement procedures. The procurement legislation imposes bureaucracy which
negatively influences ERP implementation decision and subsequently the implementation outcome.
Public organisations were forced to carry out heavy customisation in order to conform with the State
Corporation Act which governs them. Private organisations were less affected by the government
legislation. Lack of government policy that facilitates use of IT in general negatively influences
business process outcome. For instance, lack of e-commerce policy and data protection policy
discourages organisations from implementing extending their ERP systems beyond the four walls.
The result is narrow implementation scope and limited business process outcome.
6.2.6 ERP Implementation Challenges
This construct was included in the model to provide organisations with the likely challenges they
need to watch out for in order to put in place appriate mitigation measures. ERP implementation
models in the literature tend to focus on critical success factors while ignoring implementation chal-
lenges. There is need for organisations to be aware of ERP implementation pitfalls so avoid them.
The challenges include those factors which had direct negative effect on ERP project management
from initiation stage to the go-live stage. The dimensions included in the model were statistically
derived in section B.6.2.6 of Appendix B.
6.3 ERP Upgrade Decision Model (UDM)
Based on the analysis of the cases and comparisons between them (see section 5.3.6.5 of Chapter 5),
an empirical Upgrade Decision Model (UDM) was developed as shown in Figure 6.2. The decision
to upgrade is shown to be influenced by factors classified into two main categories: motivating and
contingency forces.
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Figure 6.2: Model of the upgrade decision process
The upgrade decision reflects the interaction between those two factors. Our explanation of the
model begins with motivating forces, which can originate from both internal requirements and from
the organisation’s dependence on the software vendor. This motivating forces would influence the
frequency of ERP system upgrade also described earlier on as upgrade cycles.
6.3.1 Upgrade Decisions: Motivating forces
Motivating forces are considered to be any event, or requirement that triggers the interest to adopt
a newer version of ERP system. From the study, two types of motivating forces were found to
influence both upgrade decisions: internal requirements and external dependence. Three specific
internal requirements were identified as influences on the decision to upgrade business needs, IT
needs, and risk mitigation.
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Business and IT needs
One of the most important factors identified in this study to be influencing ERP upgrade is business
needs. It is understandable that demands from business users can motivate upgrade decisions
because information technology application serve business users. In this study, business needs
prompted BCL to look into a new version of SAP, and the need to integrate business systems
prompted KenGen to upgrade their SAP R/3 from version 3.1H to version 4.5B. Business also
includes the organisations competitive strategy.
Given the function of ERP system to support business objectives, it comes as no surprise that
business needs are a primary influence on upgrade decisions. However, our findings help to clarify
that not all business needs are equally influential. In the case of KenGen, the need for standardisa-
tion can be considered a higher priority business need because it was related to the firms strategic
direction connecting all the power generation plants which were widely scattered throughout the
country. Compared to KenGen, KPLC users’ needs for improved functionality were seen as needs
that could be deferred in the face of more urgent business needs that KPLC had to satisfy until
after the software sunset date. Thus we might think of differences in degree and kind when referring
to business needs. All areas of ERP system upgrade decisions appear to be based on judgements
about the importance of those needs. In this respect, our results are consistent with the soft-
ware maintenance literature’s conclusion that users’ business needs, as indicated by their demands
for enhancements and extensions, is one of the most important reasons to perform maintenance
(Hedelin & Allwood, 2002).
Risk mitigation
In addition to business and IT needs, our model identifies risk mitigation as an important motivation
force. In both cases, upgrade decisions were subject to policies designed to mitigate the risks of
using ERP systems. KenGen had a strict policy that required all its software to stay on vendor
support all times. Although the policy’s influence remained dormant when software was not close
to the end of the vendor’s sunset date, it became a powerful influence when software approached
the sunset date without being upgraded. Another company policy was ‘no beta version’ which both
KPLC and BCL observed. The policy prevented upgrade to untested or unstable versions of ERP
software. These policies mitigated the risks inherent in the packaged software.
Risk mitigation policies affected SAP, which approached its sunset date while other SAP projects
were being pursued. Because further delays would have placed SAP into the unacceptable status of
non-support, vendor dependence became a salient motivating force for the SAP upgrade. Although
covered by the same policies, BCL upgrade was conducted well before the sunset date for the
previous version and was not affected by the policy. However, the corporate policy would have
applied to BCL also if it were getting close to the sunset date. Thus, risk mitigation become a
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stronger motivating force over upgrade decisions as the risks associated with ERP systems increase.
External dependence on software vendor
When organisations adopt an ERP system, they become dependent on the software vendor to pro-
vide them with software functionality and technical support. In essence, they become subject to
‘locked in’ relationships in which the external producers of software determine what their customers
must do. In the case of large producers such as SAP, Baan, Oracle Financials, and JD Edwards,
this dependance becomes a primary influence over upgrade decisions for packaged software. Such
vendors may use pricing and support strategies to exert pressure on their customers to upgrade
earlier than they wish Sawyer (2000), while the vendors reduce their own responsibility for sup-
porting multiple versions of ERP software (Beatty & Williams, 2006a). In brief, consumers of ERP
system who depend on vendors for technical support and functionality do not have much choice
but to comply. Thus, organisations in the environment surrounding a firm using packaged software
exert influence over its software practices (Lederer & Mendelow, 1993).
The creation of internal risk mitigation policies by customers such as KenGen reflects the strong
dependence on vendors, who have the power to remove support for earlier versions and thus force
customers into upgrades even when business needs are not judged to be a priority. Although new
versions offer greater functionality, which might meet business needs, the requirement to upgrade
or lose vendor support becomes a pre-emptive criterion for organisations unwilling to accept the
risks of unsupported ERP system. Thus, vendors can prematurely end the life of a current ERP
system version by setting a sunset date even though customers may still deem current functionality
to be adequate.
In addition, to their dependence on vendors to provide support for the ERP system, organisations
also rely on vendors for software functionality. In both of our cases, the only way for KenGen and
KPLC to receive software features that they wanted was to adopt vendor’s upgrade. Despite large
differences in the functionality of the respective ERP systems, we did not observe much in influences
due to the ERP system’s material characteristics. In both cases, the software was critical to the
organisation and was supplied by a powerful external vendor. Thus, because the consumption of
ERP system is separated from its production by organisation and national boundaries, software
characteristics may become practically irrelevant to the decision to upgrade. Only in cases where
the ERP system is not critical could an implementing organisation decide to abandon an ERP
system rather than upgrade it. Alternatively, an organisation could find another source, such as
different vendor or an open source application, for satisfying its software needs. However, neither of
these situations was evident in our study. Thus, the exact nature of software functionality appear
to play no special role in the decision to upgrade. Although different types of software functionality
were needed, any functionality that is critical to the organisation strengthens the dependence on
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vendors that supply those features. This dependence clearly influences the decision to upgrade
unless the organisation decides to develop new feature in-house.
These findings are consistent with the theory of resource dependence as suggested by Phan (2002).
According to the theory, an organisation’s dependence on any important resource allows external
organisations providing that resource to gain control over the decision processes. According to
resource dependence theory, “It is the fact of the organisation’s dependence on the environment
that makes the external constraint and control of organisational behaviour both possible and almost
inevitable”. The extent to which the organisation complies with external demands depends on the
importance of resources, an external vendor’s discretion over resource allocation and use, and the
availability of alternative resources. In the case of the ERP systems studied, both systems were
extremely important to case studies (KenGen, BCL, KPLC). Thus, the prospect of losing support
and technical assistance was inconceivable. As a result, dependence on vendor became one of the
most important motivating forces in an upgrade decision, reflecting the customer’s dependence on
external resources.
Vendor dependence is a long-term proposition. Once an ERP system is adopted, future upgrades
become almost inevitable unless the organisation decides either to abandon its current version or
to continue using the system without pursuing an upgrade. Prior research suggests that adopters
of ERP systems view migrations to new versions as an unavoidable part of ERP systems life-cycle
Kraemers & Dissel (2000). The choice is no longer between upgrading and not upgrading, but
rather deciding when the upgrade should occur. For this and other reasons, vendor relationships
have assumed greater importance in research on ERP systems (Hirt & Swanson, 2001).
6.3.2 Contingency: Internal resource availability
The availability of internal resources is an important contingency affecting upgrade decisions. As
Mohr (1982) noted, “Motivations may determine behaviours, for example, by only if the relevant
resources are adequate”. Clearly, every organisation faces resource constraints, so resources tend
to be allocated where they are needed most. Although the availability of the resources alone is
unlikely to trigger a decision to upgrade, lack of resources may mean that upgrade initiatives are
postponed. The resource contingency played a definite role in the postponement of SAP upgrade
until after the sunset date at KPLC. Also, despite the attractiveness of SAP 4.5, BCL was not
able to justify the expenditure of resources until other business needs increased the motivation.
Thus, resource availability is contingent on the strength of the motivating forces. Although lack of
resources can defer upgrade decisions where there is no immediate threat to business operations,
resources can often be allocated when business needs to upgrade become more urgent.
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6.3.3 Interaction among motivating forces and resource availabil-
ity
From data analyses presented in section 5.3.4 of Chapter 5, it is apparent that upgrade decisions by
different organisations may be different. Several factors were identified as having influence on the
decision to upgrade ERP system. This pattern bears resemblance to other dynamic organisational
decision processes. According to Mintzberg et al. (1976), stimuli for organisational decisions have
different amplitudes, and a decision is evoked when the cummulative amplitude of stimuli reaches
an action threshold. Decisions, therefore, are not determined by any single motivation and may
vary from case to case. Even within a decision type, such as software upgrade decisions, forces may
be unequally influential, making the general prediction of decisions difficult. The benefit of case
studies of decision processes is a greater explanation of the interaction among motivating forces
and resource contingencies.
In the two cases of upgrades described in this study, amplitudes and action thresholds were not
explicitly assessed as part of the decision process. The threshold level was a subjective reference
point made by managers, and no formal cost/benefit analyses were conducted at both organi-
sations. Nonetheless, it can be inferred from managers’ comments that the upgrade decisions
for both projects were affected by multiple influences, as shown in the model. According to
Bannister & Remeyi (2000), the ‘gut feeling’ approach is in fact quite a common phenomenon
in organisation decision making. Similarly, Mintzberg et al. (1976) found that the favoured mode
chosen to make ‘a choice in his own with procedures that he does not, perhaps cannot, explain’. In
the two cases, the threshold can be inferred as a point at which managers perceived that the need
to upgrade had become a necessity and could justify the expenditure of scarce resources.
Many organisational decisions, including ERP system upgrades, involve commitment of resources
that are in scarce supply. The condition of resource scarcity implied the need to prioritise projects
in order of importance. In the case of delayed upgrade at KPLC, the IT manager’s wish to upgrade
was delayed until complementary business needs arose (the need to integrate regional plants). In
the case of KenGen, the priority of the upgrade project increased as the vendor’s sunset date neared.
Thus, resources are provided contingent upon other motivating factors and external dependencies.
In the study, motivating influences and internal resources interacted to influence decisions depending
on their level of intensity and the availability of internal resources. In the normal situation where
resources are scarce, the lack of resources dominates the interaction, particularly if the need to
upgrade reaches the threshold so that it can no longer be deferred, it dominates the decision to
make resources available. When the decision was made to upgrade SAP, the software was in danger
of losing support and had to be upgraded immediately. In the KenGen case, KenGen was only
able to justify the division-wide upgrade to SAP when the need arose integrate the regionally
distributed power generation plant using SCADA which was not compatible with SAP version
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2.1H. The combination of stimuli provided the needed justification to conduct both upgrades.
While the research findings pertain to decision making under resource scarcity, it is likely that
under conditions of sufficient resources, any legitimate motivation would evoke upgrade decision.
This claim is supported by anecdotal evidence about previous upgrade decisions not included in
our study. According to the Manager, when KenGen department had fewer competing projects,
upgrades were performed according to the director’s preference to upgrade to a new version of SAP
every 18 months.
6.4 Validation of the developed models
Gasson (2004c) asserts that models developed from interpretive research are not and cannot be
totally objective. Therefore, it is important to question whether a model generated in this way is
more or less conformable (and therefore useful) than those generated by deductive, hypothesis-based
research methods. While the weakness of qualitative, inductive approaches to research lies in the
data-analysis stage of the research life-cycle, quantitative, hypothesis-based approaches are weakest
in the initiation and data selection stages. The EEIM and UDM were derived mainly from empirical
data analyses of qualitative research phase of this study. Their validity depends on the rigor of
data analyses of the qualitative data. Where as validity in deductive hypothesis-based research is
ensured by statistically testing correlations between data variables and by ensuring a statistically
significant sample population, validity in interpretive research is more difficult to establish. Such
notions as mathematical proof have no equivalent in qualitative interpretive research because (a)
collected data represent social constructs rather than measurable physical phenomena, and (b) data
analysis is recognised as subjective and inductive rather than deductively objective.
Interpretive research rejects the “universal laws” (positivist) notion of reality in favour of discerning
socially constructed norms and relationships that are located in a particular culture or context.
The claims of transferability and fit between contexts in this study was achieved by identifying
similarities in factors that are the empirical models and that consistent between different contexts
for which the model fits. This claim is supported by the Gasson (2004a) argument that claims for
transferability may be made on the basis that constant comparison between data sets can yield
similar findings or that differences can enable researchers to extend their models.
In summary, the qualitative and situated nature of this research facilitated the internal validity
of the findings, because, as Verschuren (2003) has commented, “internally valid holistic knowledge
means knowledge that takes into account temporal, spatial and functional interconnectedness of
phenomena” (p. 134). The fact that multiple sites were allowed into this research thereby allowing
comparison of data within and across all the sites about the same phenomenon add to the internal
validity of the research findings upon which the two research models were developed. Orlikowski
(1991) argues that multiple field sites allow ‘analytical generalisation’, where the researcher’s aim is
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to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theoretical propositions. The term ‘analytic
generalisation’ is used to distinguish it from generalisations from a sample to a population. Here
the generalisation is of theoretical concepts and patterns.
One of the mechanisms used to enhance internal validity was triangulation. Stake (1994) says
that triangulation serves ‘to clarify meaning by identifying the different ways the phenomenon is
being seen’ (p. 241). The use of different data sources and access to different members in each
of the sites offered possibility to find consistencies but also inconsistencies within and across the
organisations. Thus, triangulation served to identify shared or incongruent elements of practices
across organisations and users. It also helped to understand the different and creative ways in
which ERP systems were constructed. This further lend credibility to the two empirical models
developed in this research.
Triangulation also helps to achieve external validity. However, it does not ensure it. Multiple case
study approach provided an opportunity for analytic induction. This was undertaken not only by
looking inside the sites but also by establishing connections with existing theoretical debates and
looking for resonance with other empirical work addressing similar questions (Yates, 2003). This
contributed to the external validity of the two research models developed in this research and the
entire research findings.
6.4.1 Comparison With Similar and Conflicting Models
Comparing models with other existing similar and contrasting models is another way of ensuring
validity of newly developed models. The EEIM was compared to Somers et al. (2000), Myers
et al. (1997), and Saunders and Jones (1992) models discused in section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2. At
a general level, the conceptualisation by Somers et al. (2000), to some degree, provide support
to the viewpoints espoused by Saunders and Jones (1992), Myers et al. (1997) and the ERP
implementation model developed in this study indicating that an understanding of implementation
and use of IS (in our case ERP systems) or functions can be enhanced whenever contingency factors
or issues are adequately considered.
The model by Somers et al. (2000) is rooted in the contingency approach, which is similar to the
ERP implementation model in this study. Furthermore, the extent to which the ERP implemen-
tation model is similar to their model is that the two models in the context of ERP systems are
characterised by views which indicate that the implementation of such systems can be influenced
by contingencies.
Currently, there is no other model on ERP upgrade decision. Therefore, the UDM could not be
compared with similar or conflicting models.
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6.4.2 Critical Group Discussion
We further conducted critical group discussion in order to validate the two models: EEIM and UDM.
The critical group discussion aimed at gauging the ERP experts – ERP consultants – opinions on
whether the model could be used by organisations that are implementing and/or upgrading their
ERP systems.
A critical group discussion guide was developed (Appendix F). The guide was pre-piloted with two
ERP consultants drawn from Deloitte and Touche.
Five ERP functional consultants participated in the discussion which was held at the Deloitte and
Touche offices in London. Two of the participants were principal consultants while the remaining
three were senior consultants. One participant was a specialist in the Oracle Financials while the
remaining four were SAP R/3 ERP consultants. The four SAP R/3 ERP consultants were drawn
from different SAP R/3 functional solutions – Finance and Controlling, Sales and Distribution,
Business Warehouse, and Materials Management.
For EEIM, four participants opined that the model was highly workable while one rated the model as
workable. The participants reasoned based on their ERP implementation experience that organisa-
tional and environmental factors captured in the model significantly influence ERP implementation
and the ultimate outcome. One principal consultant asserted that organisational and environmen-
tal constructs depicted in the EEIM can hinder or facilitate ERP implementation. This opinion
supports these research findings and the proposition put forward by the EEIM. All the partici-
pants strongly agreed that the model constructs were meaningful. However, one senior consultant
observed that the ERP implementation decisions spans across the entire ERP implementation life-
cycle and may include some additional decisions to those presented in the model. He suggested
explicitly stating that there are other decisions and that the ‘ERP Implementation Decisions’ con-
struct signified only two of those decisions.
All the participants suggested that the operationalisation of the two models can be enhanced
by the development and use of a readiness assessment tool. They observed that determining an
organisation’s ERP readiness for an ERP implementation is often one of the most difficult parts
of moving forward with such a large undertaking. It is easy to get caught up in all the potential
benefits of ERP and forget that there are some fundamental business issues to consider before
proceeding. For example, the participants argued that to determine an organisation’s ERP business
readiness, it is useful to first determine the organisation’s configuration. The participants observed
that the EEIM when operationalised, can effectively address the issue. On how to operationalise
the model, the participants suggested designing a questionnaire addressing the model constructs
and dimensions. The organisations can then complete the questionnaire in order to determine
whether their configurations favour or inhibit ERP implementation and use. Thus the organisational
structure and culture can be reviewed and analysed for suitability to an ERP implementation. The
functions of organisational units and their interrelationships can be analysed to insure that clear
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lines of data and process ownership are defined and understood. Also, with the operationalisation
of the EEIM, organisations can evaluate their cultural attitude toward information sharing and the
degree to which common, customer centric, business views are held.
For UDM, all the participants agreed that the model was highly workable. The participants argued
that although the model may not represent all the factors which influence decision by organisation
to upgrade ERP systems, it nevertheless captured the major factors which influence ERP upgrade
decisions. All the participants strongly agreed that the model constructs of the UDM made sense
them. One of the principal consultants described the model as a perfect representation of how
organisations make decisions to upgrade ERP systems. They observed that vendors would continue
to be a key factor in ERP upgrade decisions. To support the model’s proposition that availability
of resources mediates ERP upgrade decisions, one principal consultant observed that the reason
why many organisations have not upgraded their system to ECC6 version of MySAP, is lack of
resources. He observed that the number of organisations carrying out ERP upgrades have reduced
remarkably since the global recession started taking effect.
It is arguable that the EEIM and UDM are valid in the light of the experts opinion presented above.
6.5 Summary
This chapter presented the two empirical models: EEIM and UDM. These models were derived
from our empirical data. The models depict the contexual factors which impact on the imple-
mentation and/or upgrade of ERP in organisation. From our data analysis, it is clear that the
relative strength of the influences on upgrade decisions is dependent on the internal requirements
of the organisation and the external influence of vendors. Thus, the models provide an empirically
grounded basis for understanding contextual factors and their influence on ERP implementation
decision. Additionally, they show ERP implementation outcomes and understanding of how and





This chapter provides a summary of the key issues that have been addressed. It forms a narrative of
the whole thesis, incorporating ideas which have been constructed over the course of this research.
These include contributions to knowledge, practice, literature and methodology. At the end of this
chapter are the limitations of the research and proposals for future research.
7.2 Summary of the Research Findings
7.2.1 ERP Implementation Practices in Kenya
The first research question was aimed at identifying ERP implementation practices in Kenya. Based
on the case study organisations, the research elicited the current ERP implementation practices in
Kenya. These practices are outlined below.
Kenya, like other countries is ushering in the second-wave of ERP system. This is in line with
the measures being taken by organisations to optimise ERP performance in their organisations.
Some of the measures taken by the case study organisations in this regard, have been discussed in
the previous chapter which include addition of new modules, upgrading to the latest versions, and
entirely replacing the ERP system or some of the modules. The study deduced that while all the case
study organisations have been actively using their systems for five years or more, they are learning
that there is really no “hard-stop” implementation end point: ERP systems continually evolve to
meet demands for additional functionality, capability, and expanded deployments throughout the
organisation. Furthermore business requirements are in a state of continuous change to respond to
the ever dynamic environment.
Given that there is no “hard-stop” implementation end-point, Kenyan organisations are beginning
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to realise that learning from past implementation experiences – from both internal and external
sources – is key to the success of adding ERP capability or functionality.
The average length of time for a “typical” implementation in Kenya is about 24 months and can
employ as many as 30 consultants. The project outcome – cost and duration – is influenced to
a great extent by the ERP implementation scope. The greater the implementation scope, the
longer the total implementation duration. Also, as the scope of implementation grows from a
single business unit to multiple units spread out globally, the duration of implementation increases.
Among the case studies, Bidco had the shortest implementation time of 3 months while ACFC had
the longest implementation time of 4 years.
The success of having the shortest implementation time with required functionality and within
budget at Bidco is attributed to a number of factors stated in Appendix A, which include:
• Adequate user awareness and involvement at all stages of the project;
• Direct control of the CEO and a fully empowered project team;
• A well motivated staff made to fully share the management vision. This enabled the suste-
nance of vital team spirit both during and after the implementation. To this extent the HoD
are referred to as “Team Leaders”;
• Dynamic management style that has inculcated a ‘Family culture’ guiding the “The Bidco
Family”;
• Management that is ready to spend on projects that would be considered as risks as long as
it can enable the realisation of goals.
All the case organisations adopted the enterprise suite approach during the initial implementation.
However, most of the organisations which have implemented additional modules have chosen mod-
ules from different vendors. Findings revealed that enterprise suite ERP implementations have
stopped making headlines. One PricewaterhouseCoopers consultant contended that “throughout
the last 12 months, ERP has not been a popular subject. It dropped off people’s radar screen”.
Best-of-breed implementations are becoming more common now, especially in large organisations,
which are “looking at implementing CRM, data warehousing and business intelligence systems that
sit on top of their ERPs”.
The above discourse holds in the light of our case study organisations. For example Bamburi which
is running SAP R/3 4.5B is considering implementing Oracle Business Intelligence and PeopleSoft
Human Resource Management in 2007. Another showcase that there is a move towards best-of-
breed strategy is by Bidco which although it runs Baan, it has implemented Siebel CRM and
SCM. Another consultant further stated that “Big ERPs are done. There are more of add-ons and
bolt-on implementations now”. This was especially true for ERP systems that needed to satisfy
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Kenyan specific industries such as Power Generation and Electricity distribution at KENGEN and
KPLC. However, in the medium-size case organisations – e.g. Bidco – traditional “ERP systems
meet most of their business requirements”. The type of modules in a typical implementation differs
depending on the implementation phase and stage. In general, enterprise suite strategy was found
to be common in the initial ERP adoption and implementation.
ERP configuration has a profound effect on: maintenance cost, complexity of integration with new
or existing application, implementation cost, and flexibility to meet business requirements.
Whereas some organisations studied provided quantifiable business cases before initiating system
implementation others provided unquantifiable and elusive business cases for implementing their
ERP systems. Some of the reported quantifiable benefits related to business improvements are:
customer response time and improved turnover by maintaining existing customers and by gaining
customers from competition.
There was no evidence in Kenya that ERP reduces headcount since none of the companies which
implemented ERP laid off its workers though there were fears that ERP could lead to loss of jobs
during the project initiation stage. This confirms Mabert et al. (2001b) and Laughlin (1999) who
argue that ERP does not reduce headcount. Although it is reported widely in the literature that
one of the major benefits of ERP deals with eliminating the redundancies associated with legacy
systems, this was not the case with our case study organisations.
A major difference between Kenyan implementations to others elsewhere in the world is that Kenyan
implementations are generally smaller in size in terms of number of modules implemented. How-
ever, ERP implementations in Kenyan share similar complexities to international implementations.
Furthermore, there is less money in Kenyan businesses because of their small margins.
7.2.2 Organisational Context
Our findings suggest that ERP implementation is influenced by, but not necessarily bound by
existing organisational context and culture. The organisational configuration affects all stages of
ERP implementation, including the planning, selection, training, initial and longer term diffusion.
Our research findings further suggest that organisational context makes a difference inline with the
contextual dimensions which were identified in this study, namely, orientation to change, orientation
to collaboration, decision making style, orientation to work. Some cultural configuration favoured
ERP adoption and implementation while others created barriers as discussed in Section 5.3.6.2 of
Chapter 5. Through examining the organisations contextual dimensions it is also apparent that
there are complex interrelationship between dimensions.
In order to illustrate the significance of cultural orientation, four dimensions of organisational
culture unique to the two organisations which exhibited successful ERP implementation outcomes
and as a result reaped more benefits were proposed. These cultural dimensions are orientation to
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change, orientation to collaboration, decision making style, and the basis of truth and rationality.
These dimensions are briefly discussed below.
The findings of this study confirmed the Bingi et al. (1999) assertion that it is inevitable that
business processes need to be modified to fit the new system during ERP implementation. The
findings also concur with the Holland et al. (1999) argument that aligning the business process
to the ERP system is critical. Organisations should be willing to change the business process
to fit the software with minimal customisation (Holland et al., 1999). This study by indicating
that orientation to change as a cultural configuration favours ERP implementation, confirms that
willingness by the organisation to adopt new work practices is an essential requirement in ERP
adoption and implementation. The case study organisations which were oriented towards change
were more willing to change their business practices to conform with the processes embedded in
ERP system. However, being change oriented does not mean adhering to Vanilla implementation
as advocated by the ERP vendors.
The findings of this research show that any typical ERP implementation will involve redesigning
of existing business processes and customisation of the software. However, it is suggested that cus-
tomisation, while only a small percentage of the entire system, can be quite significant in creating
differences between otherwise similar systems. Organisations should only use small-scale customi-
sation to fine-tune their ERP systems to match their own specific strategic and decision-making
needs which can be difficult to imitate. Typical examples of when a system needs to be customised
are illustrated in the Bidco case study (Appendix A). Most case study organisation which carried
out major modifications underestimated the effort required for modifications because of integrative
design of ERP systems increases the complexity involved in source code modifications. Modifica-
tions not only lead to increased costs and implementation times, they also make future upgrades
of the system difficult to implement as seen in KPLC’s case.
While this research determined major customisation to be a highly significant variable with adverse
impact, it also asserts that vanilla implementation advocated by ERP vendors is utopia, especially
in the Kenyan context. Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) and customisation considered
simultaneously had a positive impact on ERP implementation in the case study organisations in
Kenya. Such compromise happens while there is the conflict between the new Western business
conceptions and Kenya business society. The Kenya business society welcomes new, advanced
conceptions or solutions; however they also have to be suitable for the Kenyan.
There is a need to stress that adopting ERP’s best practices is not merely the learning of new
terms and terminology, in the sense of translation. In addition, new concepts that underlie the
best practice routines need to be learned and old (related) concepts need to be changed or forgot-
ten. Although this may seem to be a straightforward process, the adoption of best practices in
particular and ERP systems in general, is likely to require fundamental changes, modifying deep
understandings of many relevant concepts. Over and above this it becomes necessary to learn and
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understand how to interpret new and existing routines and enact them in day-to-day situations.
Our findings indicate that orientation to collaboration has a positive impact on ERP adoption and
implementation as observed in two case study organisations – Bidco and BCL. Orientation to col-
laboration should also be interpreted as a mentality of working as part of a group or working as team
– teamwork – in which there is a shared goal, and different members of the team take on different
roles in order to achieve the goal, which the ERP team member should carry through the whole
project. In this sense, teamwork mentality is one way to reflect an organisation’s culture. Private
organisations in the case study organisations were more inclined to collaboration. Organisations
which were aligned to working with a teamwork (collaborative) mentality were more successful in
achieving ERP outcomes therefore suggesting that teamwork mentality should be encouraged in
Kenyan traditional public organisations, in order to achieve successful outcome.
However, in some organisations especially the public organisations, this mentality is seldom re-
flected. Employees are used to accept the work as the assignment from the managers and in most
cases work in isolation. They are not keen in knowing the reason of doing so. They are not keen
either to work together with other team members. They take it for granted that obedience to the
management to finish their own job is the rule. This cultural configuration is a major barrier to
knowledge sharing among implementation team members and between different functional units,
during ERP adoption and implementation. This requires more effort being put in place to nurture
teamwork culture and it also results in lack of inter-functional integration. One positive tendency is
that as Kenya continues to develop, more and more Western management concepts and solutions are
introduced to Kenya. The traditional business working environment is slowly changing, or merging
with the Western business context. The teamwork mentality might consequently become one of the
Kenyan organisational cultures in the future and be readily accepted in public organisations.
Our findings support earlier literatures which stresses that teamwork is important through all the
ERP life-cycle (Markus & Tanis, 2000), at least in the Western business context. Interestingly the
same argument also applies to the ERP implementation in the Kenyan case study organisations.
Orientation to collaboration has a positive impact in ERP implementation in Kenya, as well as in
the Western countries.
Another organisational cultural configuration is the decision making which is a key determinant on
how implementation decisions are made during implementation. The manner in which decisions are
made within an organisation affects the manner in which steering committees make decisions during
ERP adoption and implementation. The ERP implementation decisions are strategic in nature (see
section 2.5.1) and determine strategies to be adopted by the organisation during the deployment of
ERP system. These include such decisions as to whether to implement using the Big-Bang approach
or the phased-in approach, and the amount of software customisation and re-engineering required.
Our findings on the influence of decision making on ERP adoption and implementation suggest that
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a more ‘modern type’ of management system characterised by majority based or consensus-based
decision making in the organisation and ERP implementation steering committee, and delegation
of decision-making authority to the project team is associated with more satisfactory results. In
contrast, a more ‘traditional’ management system characterised by seniority based decision making
is associated with more negative implementation results. However, the same results show the
seniority based decision making style is required in the early stages of ERP implementation i.e. the
initiation stage.
This finding revealed that steering committee decision making style has a distinct impact upon
the risk of budget overruns while application of a consensus principle reduces it. One possible
interpretation of this finding is that a seniority decision making principle may encourage top man-
agers to unilaterally change crucial project parameters, possibly without being aware of the impact
of these decisions on the budget. In contrast, a consensus principle effectively gives a veto-right
to each steering committee member thus allowing him or her to block decisions which would risk
increasing the project budget. In cases where the steering committee was endowed with sole duty
of making crucial implementation decisions itself lead to the risk of schedule overruns. A possible
interpretation is that the project team will be discouraged from making crucial implementation
decision under such conditions, implying significant delays as it has to wait for steering committee
meetings for these crucial issues to be decided.
However, the study also encountered incidences which are contrary to popular belief that bureau-
cracies have a negative impact on management. A case at hand is at ACFC where this study found
that “seniority-based” management style has actually pushed forward the procedure of the ERP
project. At the beginning, the project was difficult to start because the project manager was at
the relatively junior position although he had a good education background both in accounting
and technology. The business managers did not take him seriously. The situation only changed
when the Financial Controller took over the project controller role. The possible interpretation
is that Financial Controller in high in chain of command, actually second in command, and thus
due to his position, he wielded more power. Employees in the public organisations are used to be
driven by the “seniority-priority” rule. At the end, the business managers accepted and took the
implementation seriously.
However, as Kenya is developing apace, the Kenyan business society is evolving as well. Kenyan
organisations, especially public organisations cannot avoid the changes either. As a result, the
“traditional” “seniority-priority” management style will slowly disappear as the older generations
of managers retire, it is replaced by the “modern type” of management, which is characterised by
“majority-based” or by “consensus-based”management style, brought by the younger generation of
managers.
From the above discussion, it is evident that the role and the decision making style of the steering
committee would foreshadow the decision making style in an organisation; and it would be reflected
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in the organisational culture. From the pattern revealed in the case study organisations, role and
the decision making style of steering committees are important indicators, and possibly cause of
the risk of budget and schedule overruns and thus warrant special attention.
Our findings suggest that organisation configuration relating to coordination and control influ-
ence ERP implementation greatly. ERP tends to favour centralisation. The general structure
defines how control and co-ordination is carried out in an enterprise. The case study organisations
have functional oriented structures. They are built over solid, rigid and isolated organisational
boundaries. More emphasis is put on in-group relationships built over a long time. The in-group
relationships are stable and difficult for outsiders’ access. This inhibits cooperation across different
functional areas entailed by ERP thereby having a adverse effect on ERP adoption and implemen-
tation. Therefore, if an ERP system that was developed in a culture that is highly centralised is to
be implemented in an organisation that is part of highly decentralised culture, implementation and
ultimate outcome could be less than ideal. The implementers should be sensitive to the culture in
which the system is being implemented to make sure that aspects about the system are modified to
fit the culture in which the system is to be implemented. For example, research finding indicates
that decentralisation leads to functional specialisation which makes departments and divisions to
be autonomous. This creates a culture of internal competition making functional units to be pitted
against each other as discussed in Section 5.3.6.2 of Chapter 5.
Culture oriented towards isolation and functional specialisation by the department or divisions
emerged as barriers to achieving inter-functional integration. Most of the case study organisation
were functional based which is against the ERP systems trajectory of process-model. Members
are usually confined to their departments which impair the ability to achieve overall understanding
and coordination, and reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of communicating information across
functions. Second, certain power and political consideration was a major obstacle to inter-functional
integration. This is because ERP requires changes in job descriptions and required skills which give
some employees. For example, some managers might feel that participation in integration activities
could result in reduced resources for their units. Most of the managers were keen on maintaining
their autonomy as head of departments or divisions and were weary of losing their autonomy to IT
and other departments which appeared to be encroaching into their functional niche. Put in other
words, sharing information, which is a prerequisite to integration, might also be seen as a potential
threat to functional territoriality. Those who control information, were not only reluctant to share
it, but they also used it to subbotage integration efforts. Implementation of ERP meant that some
duties and functions which were previously carried out by a department needed to be carried out
by other department.
Reimers (2002), while studying Chinese organisations, found that managers do not trust the system
in terms of data quality and also in terms of appropriateness of suggested decisions. He found that
managers prefer to make the decisions according to their intuition and experience. The findings of
this study are similar to Reimer’s in the case of Kenyan public organisations. This was revealed
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in the cultural dimension concerned with basis of truth and rationality in decision making. This
finding underscores the importance of sharing personal experiences in addition to hard data. This
supports the knowledge-based view of the organisation which asserts that employee knowledge,
experiences, and know-how, are critical resources of the organisation. While these two dimensions
– personal experience and hard data – are necessary, the case study organisations demonstrated that
each dimension must be supportive of the others, forming a cultural configuration that is conducive
to ERP adoption and implementation as discussed in section 5.3.6.2 of Chapter 5. However, reliance
on personal experience as a basis of decision making adversely effects in the appropriation stage
(usage stage) of ERP system. There were cases where managers modify quantities recommended
by the system and request alternative sources of information in order to verify the accuracy of data
provided by the system.
This study’s findings however disputed the long notion of national culture proposed by Hofstede.
In this research, it was expected that the Kenya organisation’s decision making would be less egal-
itarian (high on power distance), more risk averting (high on uncertainty avoidance), less shared
among different levels in the organisation (high individualism), and more in line with employee’s
and family lifestyle concerns (low masculinity). The research findings from the case study organ-
isations disputed these expectation as different organisations exhibited different Hofstede cultural
dimensions. For example, while ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC rated high on power distance (“se-
niority based”), Bidco and BCL rated low on power distance (“consensus based”). The same was
observed with the uncertainty avoidance. ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC were regarded as having
high uncertainty avoidance while BCL and Bidco were perceived to have low uncertainty. However,
all the case study met the expectation of being low in masculinity. Expectation would have been
that all the organisations should have portrayed the same dimensions of national culture prescribed
in Hofstede. Hofstede asserted that East Africa where Kenya is located has a high power distance
and uncertainty avoidance in terms of national culture orientation.
This research findings support the Hower et al. (2002) argument that the very concept of ‘national
culture’ is problematic. The finding validates their argument there is no necessary alignment
between culture and the nation-state. The research therefore propose a more dynamic view of
relationship between culture and IS in a global context – one that sees culture contested, temporal,
and emergent. This preposition is inline with Myers & Tan (2002) and Walsham (2002) who agree
that culture is dynamic and emergent, and that ICTs are appropriated by people in local contexts
to suit themselves.
Other than the cultural configuration, organisation vision has a significant influence according to the
research results. This finding supports ERP literature in which organisation vision has been com-
monly accepted as one of the critical success factor to ERP implementation (Akkermans & van Helden,
2002; Buckhout et al., 1999). Buckhout et al. (1999) asserted that a clear business vision to steer
the direction of the project is needed throughout the ERP life cycle. Organisation vision translates
into a business plan that outlines proposed strategic and tangible benefits, resources, costs, risks
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and time line is critical (Wee, n.d.). This will help keep focus on business benefits (Nah et al., 2001).
The success factor of clear vision will translate later into needs requirement, into measures checks
and balances control, and a means of calculating a return on investment (Gunson & de Blasis,
2001).
The research finding also emphasised the importance of IS resources, especially knowledge and
infrastructure resources. The research finding suggest that knowledge resources are significantly
directly related to organisational support and project management practices. This confirms the
importance of the knowledge of the team, the sponsor, and the project manager (Barki et al., 2001;
Wallace et al., 2004) and suggest that these knowledge resources act as an enabler for project man-
agement practices and organisational support. This result suggests that project managers should
place emphasis in developing a strong team at the beginning of a project and ensure that spon-
sors and clients have a solid understanding of project management. ERP implementation success
is dependent not only on internal project leaders who have “earned their stripes” leading strategic
projects but also on the availability of consultants who can fill gaps ERP knowledge and ERP expe-
rience by function. Kenyan experience supports the finding that consultants often take the project
responsibility role at two to ten times the cost of the ERP software for the initial implementation,
and as much as 80% of the total can go to consulting services. The need for consultant support
increases exponentially with the increase in ERP implementation scope because of the difficulties
associated with configuring a large number of modules and coordination of operations.
In conclusion, the findings from this research suggest that cumulative effect of the various cultural
configurations can result in different implementation outcomes. Thus, while the cumulative effect
of the cultural configuration such as orientation to collaboration and change had a positive effect on
ERP implementation in that the project met all expectations, this was not the case in organisation’s
which were oriented towards isolation and were not oriented towards change, in that the project
had less than a successful outcome.
7.2.3 Project Management and Support
The outcome of ERP implementation in an organisation is not only a function of contextual factors
(national and organisational) but it is also mediated and controlled by the manner in which the
project implementation is nurtured, supported and managed throughout its implementation. Fich-
man’s literature review on identifying the characteristics of effective delivery of systems pointed
to organisational factors (e.g. top management support, technology champion, training, links to
consulting services) and process model factors (i.e., the fit of the process model with the technology
and organisation) that used to guide IT implementation. In the same vein, the factors that were
selected are organisational factors which facilitated assimilation of ERP system in the case study
organisations and are also among the critical success factors for ERP implementation. The factors
identified as ERP deliverable dimension in the EEIM emerged as critical.
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For example, the findings of this study are inline with studies which have widely emphasised the
critical role of top management support in successful ERP implementation. Although formal,
hierarchical authority may not be translated into actual power, top management, nevertheless has
the greatest capacity and social status in influencing the behaviour of other members and in resource
allocation in organisations. With strong support from top management, necessary resources can
be mobilised and the project put on top priority by altering the political agenda. Top priority
encourages the entire organisation to focus on the ERP implementation and motivate users to learn
the new system and truly appreciate the project.
Top management support has always proved to be one of the key factors, which give a positive
impact on ERP implementation. The same phenomenon can also be found in this research. This
research found that support and the attendance from the top management had a positive impact
in ERP implementation in all the case study organisations. No matter if is in the public, or the
private organisation, top management support seems to be one of the essential issues to ensure
the ERP projects to be successful, in terms of designing and controlling the whole implementing
process. In addition, the attendance of the top management during the ERP implementation could
also strength the employees’ confidence in the whole project.
ERP deliverable dimensions, individually and collectively, are not as significant in predicting on-
time and on/under-budget implementations as anticipated. Other the implementation challenges
discussed in section B.6.2.6, external environmental factors and organisational factors discussed in
Sections 5.3.6.2 and 5.3.6.3 respectively also influence the project outcome – on-time and on/under-
budget. In addition to affecting the project outcome, project management is also a determinant of
business process outcome.
This research findings invigorate the importance of training as a means of change management
during ERP transition. For example, all the case study organisations conducted training during
their ERP implementation. However, the training activities took place in different ways and at
different time frames. Sufficient training has positive impact on ERP implementation in Kenya.
Organisations need to realise the importance of the training in order to increase the chances of
successfully implementing ERP systems. Training should go beyond teaching the users how to
operate with the new system.
This study provides valuable insights towards understanding ERP implementations and important
factors influencing success. In particular, it analytically verified the importance of IS resources,
project responsibility, level of customisation, ERP configuration, IT champion, and top management
involvement and support on implementation time and budgets. While the findings have some
common elements with other IT implementation studies, there are many that are unique to ERP
implementations because of the integrative characteristics of ERP systems.
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7.2.4 External environmental factors
Other than organisational culture, this research identified professional / industry culture as another
factor which influenced ERP implementation. In particular, professional culture influenced the BPR
breadth and depth dimensions of implementations. Even though professional culture is voluntary,
interviewees asserted that it had a bearing on the organisation’s reputation. Organisations needs to
conform to the standards laid down by the professional bodies in order to be accredited. Professional
culture also had an influence on ERP appropriation by hindering ERP usage. A good illustration
is the case where SAP R/3 provides a facility for reconciling wrong postings in the general ledger.
However, accounting standards require that such corrections be done by posting a journal voucher
of the same amount resulting to a net effect of zero. Most of the end users observed during field
work do not use the reconciliation tool provided by SAP R/3. Instead they correct errors in posting
by journal vouchers.
Competitive pressure emerged from data analysis as one of the most important factor influencing
ERP adoption decision and ERP implementation scope. This is illustrated by the research’s data in
which case organisations which experienced relatively stable business conditions were implemented
ERP on a smaller scale and had not taken measures to optimise their ERP system performance.
A good example is KPLC whose lack of competitors can be explained by the fact that electricity
transmission and distribution is capital intensive requiring laying down of national transmission
grids. On the other hand organisations which are in highly competitive sectors or industries were
more agile in ERP adoption and implementation. In addition, these organisations are continually
involved in ERP improvement to maximise the benefits derived from ERP and to enable them
gain competitive edge over their competitors. A showcase of the above claim is KenGen which
has been continually involved in post-implementation enhancement. The company conducted two
technical upgrades in a span of two years (i.e. 2002 and 2004) and it is also planning to implement
SAP ECC6 which is the latest product from SAP Germany. Furthermore, due to competition from
multinational corporations, Bidco aggressively pursued ERP making it the first organisation in
Kenya to implement web based ERP and business intelligence.
Retail and manufacturing businesses are generally considered to operate in dynamic environments
and are seen to be at the forefront of technological innovation. As commonly argued in the strate-
gic management literature (for example Rumelt (1991)), sectors in which there is a small degree
of competitive rivalry are less likely to be innovative. Service and manufacturing businesses are
generally considered to operate in dynamic environment and are seen to be at the forefront of
technological innovation. This argument is applicable to Kenyan case study organisations in this
study.
Our research findings indicate that government regulations is one of the most important factors
that influence ERP implementation in public corporations. However, government legislation had
less significant influence in ERP implementation in private organisations, except for taxation policy
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which organisations needed to comply with. In public organisations, the ERP functionalities most
affected are finance, procurement, and payroll.
Given that factors relating to legislation are mandatory requiring organisations to comply, the ERP
caused a lot of tensions in the process of encoding existing institutions into the new rules. According
to Orlikowski (1992), it is likely to be much easier to introduce changes which do not challenge
existing ways of thinking and norms of behaviours. However, change that conflicts with existing
routines and institutions is likely to be much more difficult to implement. In ACFC, the new rules
built into the ERP system were incompatible with the established ways of thinking and norms of
behaviours embedded in the existing routines.
Poor and unreliable local telecommunication network in Kenya negatively impact ERP implemen-
tation in Kenya. It adds cost to ERP implementation and maintenance as organisations are forced
to install their own private networks. The existing private networks installed by individual organi-
sations are still slow and unreliable compromising system availability. National ICT infrastructure
also influences ERP implementation scope as illustrated by a case where ACFC completely aban-
doned implementing the web-portal feature in their ERP due to lack of internet connectivity in
Muhoroni. The cost of setting up a private WAN using V-Sat was exorbitant for the company
to afford. Poor internet connectivity is also hindrance to complete value chain management and
customer relationship management.
7.2.5 ERP Implementation challenges
The unique challenges identified in this study are largely consistent with Huang & Palvia (2001)
findings that ERP projects face additional challenges in developing countries related to economic,
cultural and basic infrastructure issues. This research has derived six composite challenges in ERP
systems implementation in Kenya (see table in Chapter 5 ):
1. Integration and staff turnover issues;
2. High cost further escalated by extensive customisation;
3. Poor change management and failure to realise ERP benefits;
4. Unreliability of vendors and poor quality of some ERP systems;
5. Lack of skills by both users and consultants;
6. Complexity of ERP system further compromising its security.
These challenges are discussed in section B.6.2.6 of Appendix B. This section expounds on some of
these challenges.
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Issues relating to integration have been discussed in section B.6.2.6 of Appendix B. Instances where
incompatibility between the ERP embedded business practices and organisation work practices have
been highlighted in section 5.3.6.5 of Chapter 5 and in the case study descriptions in Appendix A.
These findings illustrate that incompatibility is an issue which is likely to be encountered by organ-
isations in Kenya when carrying out ERP implementation and subsequently during its assimilation
and usage. The new rules built into ERP software were incompatible with the established ways
of thinking and the norms of behaviour embedded in the existing work routines in the case study
organisations. This finding is similar to Janson & Subramanian (1996) who observed that one of
the problems associated with implementing packaged software is the incompatibility of features
with the organization’s information needs and business processes.
The ambivalence towards technology is to a certain degree related to the technology’s ‘openness’.
This ‘openness’ means that ERP system is open to many different interpretations and use pat-
terns (i.e. what Orlikowski (1991) terms interpretive flexibility). The different functionalities are
interpreted according to how the tool is linked to the organisational work routines.
Global ERP vendors have enjoyed world-wide brand-name reputation. However, due to cultural
differences and resource and policy constraints, their ability to ability to simultaneously satisfy the
local business requirements of many countries is limited. In fact, as the big, global ERP vendors,
such as SAP AG and Baan, emphasise universal solutions to enterprise integration by imposing
features, their systems may be too rigid for many organisations operating in a different social and
business context. For example, the majority of organisations in Kenya are small to medium-sized
companies organisations, which are well known for their diverse ways of conducting business; their
sophisticated, adaptive logistic networks; and their flexibility in responding to buyer demands.
High costs exaggerated by extensive customisation is a major challenge for Kenyan organisations.
In fact, cost continues to be a major concern for many organisations. In the case of SAP R/3,
their costing model does not favour Africa. For example, the cost charged per day per consultant
is USD 1,200 plus and an additional hotel and overnight stay allowance of USD 400 charged per
night. This is three times above the amount charged in the Asian continent e.g. in India the cost
is USD 600 per day. Implementation costs were found to be, on average 25% percent over budget.
Organisations under-estimated support costs for the year following initial implementation by an
average of 20%.
Heterogeneity among countries in Africa adds to the cost of implementing in Kenya and Africa as
a whole. ERP vendors especially those in Europe and USA, consider Africa as one homogeneous
region and therefore assumes that what applies in one is applicable to others. This could explain the
reason why there is no SAP R/3 human resource module version for the rest of African countries
except for South Africa. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. The diverse cultural
origins in each country and in each tribe and lack of regional policies conspire against regional
standardisation. Typically, what is true in one African country does not apply to any of its neigh-
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bours. This often makes it mandatory for organisations acquiring ERP to engage in customisation.
Lack of regional standardisation and low budget for IT within Kenya and other African nations
makes it difficult for ERP companies to find markets with enough potential to justify investing
in costly customisations of the products. This problematic especially for organisation which are
implementing ERP within the region (i.e. in more than one country) like in the case of two case
study organisations, Bidco and Bamburi, which operate within the East Africa region.
Poor change management and failure to realise envisaged benefits also presented challenges to or-
ganisations implementation in Kenya. ERP is more than just a software but a way of doing business.
It brings about radical changes in the way business is carried out in an organisation. Implementing
an ERP will bring changes to the way people work within the organisation, processes will change
and there may be job cuts and rationalisation of responsibilities within departments. Currently,
there are no change management experts in Kenya. In all the case study organisation, there was
no evidence of initiative to manage change. This creates a window of opportunity for change man-
agement experts in Kenya. Failure to manage change create resistance which ultimately leads to
sabotage of ERP project during implementation, or low utilisation once it becomes operational.
Lack of skills knowledge relating to ERP and supporting technologies within Kenya of how to
configure, customise, and use the ERP software further reduces the benefits obtainable from adop-
tion of ERP systems by Kenyan organisations. The few who are available are in high demand
which has seen organisations pay them hefty salaries in order to retain them. Even with the hefty
salaries, there is no guarantee of their retention. As a result organisations complained of frequently
losing key personnel experienced with ERP or supporting technologies. Frequently reported prob-
lems were: (1) losing key IT specialists and user representatives working on the project while the
project was going on, often despite handsome retention bonuses, (2) losing experienced people after
the project was complete. Many IT specialists thrive on project work and view assignment as a
‘competence centre’ and springboard to lucrative opportunities. During ERP implementation or-
ganisations train to key users with aim of transferring skills to the in-house staff. Whereas skill
transfer is advantageous in that it helps to: reduce the need for (as much) bought-in resource in the
future similar circumstance, clarify and simplify future discussions with external consultants (due,
in part at least, to an understanding of the terms and principles involved in ERP implementation),
improve staff morale by broadening users’ skills and understanding, respondents reported that it
is also a problem it is pursued because staff members are interested solely for their own sake (that
is, they are succumbing to technical curiosity or believe it will increase their own marketability).
Respondents reported that for many staff, the possibility of deeper understanding and broadening
of their own skills is attractive enough to take precedence over delivering their everyday job, which
may be less fascinating by comparison. This had lead to high staff turnover in most of the case
study organisations.
This research finds complexity to be a challenge for ERP system implementation in Kenya. Or-
ganisations that perceive their adopted ERP to complex business solution diffuse it slowly and in
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limited capacity, thus not realising its full benefits. Because of the complexity of ERP systems,
few organisations by themselves have sufficient in-house skills and knowledge base to implement
one. The technology and business knowledge relevant to ERP implementation was inadequate in
Kenyan among the case studies and therefore called for effective articulation, gathering, and shar-
ing during implementation. The technological know-how and its implementation are tacit and not
easily articulated or transferred. It is for this reason that the service of consultants is necessary.
7.3 Research Contribution
7.3.1 Contribution to Knowledge
The cultural configurations and the proposed models (EEIM and UDM) arising from data collected
during our multi-site case study extend theory about the influence of context in ERP implementa-
tion and upgrade. They provide a theoretically grounded basis upon which future research can be
built. Our findings suggest that ERP implementation is influenced by, but not necessarily bound
by, existing contextual factors – national and organisational. ERP is often result in the funda-
mental structural changes in an organisation. ERP can also require or bring about changes in
the underlying organisational culture to support the integrated, cross-functional nature of an ERP
environment.
EEIM helps to identify why there will be particularly high variance in potential outcomes and
further validates which organisational contexts and ERP implementation configurations create op-
tions during ERP implementation and usage. Organisational context, environmental context, ERP
delivery, and ERP implementation decisions lead to increasing variance in potential ERP imple-
mentation outcomes, and they are also predictive of early ERP adoption. Therefore evaluation of
these constructs and their dimensions can help managers to direct their attention towards more
promising factors and configurations.
The EEIM explains why some organisations implementing ERP systems will have higher return from
ERP implementation than others. Ultimately, the results can help managers to direct their decision
to terminate or redirect troubled ERP implementation projects. The ERP delivery construct and
its underlying dimensions provide a holistic combination of factors that can explain and provide
sufficient conditions to have positive effect on ERP implementation outcomes.
Research research is one of few empirical studies focused on ERP system upgrades. It offers an
in-depth, qualitative view of decisions to upgrade ERP systems. In relationship to the existing lit-
erature on ERP systems, our focus is on activities near the end of an ERP system’s life-cycle. Given
the growing importance of ERP systems, and apparent inevitability of upgrades, it is increasingly
necessary to understand the decision processes for ERP system upgrades.
The research also fills the gap relating to reasons for carrying out ERP upgrades. Our contribution
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to this effort is the UDM portraying the interactions among motivating influences (business needs
and vendor dependence) and contingent resources. The model draws its inspiration from earlier
literature on software maintenance and other related literature. However, a software upgrade is
a unique type of IS project, with characteristics that distinguish it from maintenance, traditional
system development and initial adoption of a commercial system. In ERP system upgrade, the
vendor has substantial control over the development of the system, and the client organisation
becomes vulnerable to vendor’s actions. As our study has shown, sunset dates can have a dominating
influence on an upgrade decision. The study thus draws attention to vendor influence over major
IS projects.
Although our findings in some ways support the conclusions of earlier research on IT adoption and
software maintenance, our UDM makes an original contribution by focusing on the interactions
among motivating forces and contingent resources. Indeed, resource availability has been largely
overlooked in IS research, while it plays an obvious important role in IT practice. Resources
are directly implicated in sourcing decisions for information services, which recently seem to be
affected by resource scarcity, to the extent that most IT decisions, including software upgrades and
maintenance, require resources. We believe that resources should be justified and allocated more
directly. Following Mohr’s (1982) observation that reasons to act require resources to convert them
to behaviour, we have positioned internal resource availability as a contingent influence on upgrade
decisions.
UDM also goes beyond the more obvious rational motivating forces for upgrades, namely busi-
ness needs for functionality. Although business needs are always important, our model suggests
that business needs were not the only or always the most important factor motivating an upgrade
decision. Rather, policies to mitigate the risks of dependence on ERP system placed vendors in
powerful positions to influence upgrade decisions. Thus even where business needs for new func-
tionality were not overwhelming, upgrades occurred to avoid the loss of vendor support for software
in its twilight years. This kind of influence is comparable to the structural exercise of power by IT
professionals over users, identified by Markus & Bjorn-Andersen (1987) in the context of in-house
development. Structural power by IT professionals involves ‘organisational structures and routine
operating procedures that give them formal authority over users or foster user dependence on them
for important resources’. Organisations that adopt ERP systems increasingly find themselves in
similar situations with regard to vendors (Howcroft & Light, 2006). The importance of dependence
on external resources suggests a more political than rational motivation for an upgrade decision
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). By considering the vendor influence directly, our model avoids the
tendency to emphasise rational criteria in IT decision making.
Finally, the upgrade model makes a novel contribution by allowing us to see how different forces
interact to bring an aggregate of influences to a threshold level where a software upgrade becomes
necessary. In other words, influences on upgrade decisions are interdependent. Dependence on ven-
dors generates the need for risk mitigation policies. When motivating forces pass threshold levels,
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resources become important contingencies that must be made available. The case study methodol-
ogy and qualitative data analysis used in this study are the means by which these interactions can
be described and explained.
Our research findings contest the notion of national culture. Therefore, these findings are particu-
larly of interest because they concide with Myers & Tan (2002) view. Myers & Tan (2002) suggest
that the very concept of national culture is problematic. They argue that there is no necessary
alignment between culture and the nation-state, and propose a more dynamic view of the rela-
tionship between culture and information system in a global context – one that sees culture as
contested, temporal and emergent.
By proposing set of decisions which organisations need to make during ERP implementation (Figure
2.1), this research provides a rare view of ERP systems in the literature. These decisions can mapped
into of ERP life-cycle phase and their sequence determined.
This research also makes a contribution to research methodology by adopting Lee (1991) to inform
the research design. In doing so, the research combined quantitative and qualitative research
methods, and allow analysis to be done in three phases.
This research has derived six composite challenges in ERP systems implementation in Kenya. Given
that these challenges were identified locally, Kenyan organisations can be aware of them and put
in place mitigating measures which can increase the chances of successful local ERP implemen-
tations. In addition, this research derived three composite measures of the ERP implementation
scope. Therefore, this research proposed a new conceptualisation and measurement of ERP imple-
mentation scope by suggesting three characteristics of ERP implementations, i.e., breadth, depth,
and magnitude as a means to meaningfully describing the scope of ERP implementations. This
view enables a fine grained categorisation of ERP projects and provides an informative tool that
can be used to better estimate their duration, cost, and business outcomes. The research pro-
vides some answers to the question of how to accurately and reliably measure and categorise ERP
projects. It also opens new research avenues that will hopefully stimulate the interest of scholars
and practitioners working on ERP implementations.
7.3.2 Contribution to Practice
This research contributes to practice in many ways. It calls for recognition of the interaction of local
factors. This can help identify the limits of implementing particular business processes embedded in
ERP systems. The pressure to implement ERP systems will be there due to the pervasive character
of Information Technology, but practitioners should be aware of the need to interpret the project
implementation according to the specific conditions of the organisations and to set appropriate
project goals based on this contextualised understanding.
Organisations can use the examples of cultural barriers to adoption and implementation highlighted
in this research such as limitations to information sharing as a basis to identify their own barriers and
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link those barriers to specific aspects of culture. In addition, they can assess whether the barriers
are externally based, organisationally based or whether they arise from within the team itself. This
assessment is useful so that organisations can also determine the level at which an initiative is
required. It is important that organisations monitor these initiatives and make adjustments as
needed.
This research showed clearly that ERP implementation is influenced by a plethora of factors emanat-
ing from diverse contexts. Understanding how these cultural dimensions influence ERP implemen-
tation is important to practitioners engaged in ERP implementation. It is important to recognise
that the factors included in the two models (EEIM and UDM) influence ERP implementation and
upgrade. All these operate within the broader context of organisational culture. This calls for
actions which promote collaboration like team building activities, team bonus programmes, relo-
cation of team members into ‘podvilles’, and encouragement of members to contribute both ‘hard
data’ and ‘soft knowledge’ to discussions.
We offer a further practical implication from this research: IT managers need to appreciate the
interacting forces surrounding upgrade decisions. A naive view would expect that outdated software
should be updated when new versions with improved functionality are released by the vendor. A
more sophisticated view would require an assessment of the existing version’s functionality, the
value added from new functionality, the power of the vendor to enforce sunset dates, confidence
in the vendor’s ability to build functionality into new releases, and internal resource availability.
Unfortunately, such complex assessments are not easy to incorporate into simple decision models.
Therefore, IT managers and users of ERP systems need to weigh all of the above elements as they
change over time. By limiting the number of decision elements to those found in our study, we
provide practical guidance while not oversimplifying the process of making ERP systems upgrade
decisions.
This study provides some key insights into the implementation and use of ERP systems in the public
and the private sectors in Kenya. Case study findings suggested that the company sector played an
important role in ERP implementations on several key dimensions. This was confirmed through an
extensive survey. While there have been numerous studies conducted in private organisations on
various issues, very little has been done to study public organisations and the impact of sector on
the implementation and utilisation of large-scale enterprise-wide systems. This research shows that
company sector is again a key factor in the implementation approach for ERP systems. This may
have implications for public and private organisations as they move to implement other enterprise
systems such as Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
systems.
Finally, this research makes a vital contribution by providing guidelines on ERP implementation
and upgrade. These guidelines are derived from the experiences of the case study organisations, the
literature reviewed in this research, and the researcher’s experience as a SAP R/3 FICO consultant.
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ERP Implementation Guidelines
Customisation of ERP software should be required rarely if the organisation is committed to chang-
ing business processes to match those inherent to the software package. The effort involved to
re-engineer business processes to fulfill this commitment cannot be understated. There are var-
ious government statutory and regulatory rules which are not accommodated by ERP software,
but this does not have to be a barrier to using the delivered ERP functionality. Sometimes these
regulations can be changed to accomplish the same goal using the delivered software. Blueprinting,
which includes comprehensive pilots on a live system of proposed business processes using deliv-
ered ERP functionality, is key to developing an effective and accurate process. The result of these
rigorous pilots should be a list of valid customisations mainly based upon statutory and regulatory
rules which cannot be changed in the foreseeable future or cannot be accommodated by changing
a current business process.
The first line of defence, if major business requirements cannot be met by delivered ERP software
functionality, is acquisition of a bolt-on whether it’s a product of the same ERP vendor or a third-
party software vendor. Bolt-ons provide similar benefits to ERP software and can provide process
innovations necessary for specialised industry needs. The additional cost of support and mainte-
nance of an additional software license would need to be evaluated versus the magnitude of the
customisation required to meet the necessary business requirements. Historically, if a requirement
is too industry-specific, even bolt-ons may not meet the need. The next priority should be changing
a business process or as a last resort, customisation of ERP software.
There are two potential methods for customising ERP software but only one method should ever
be used. The method which should be prohibited by project leadership is modification of delivered
software code from the vendor. The accepted method is the creation of a new code base, also called
an extension, which is derived from a clone of a delivered software routine. The modified code is
then referenced by core application components. This approach requires all the references to the
delivered code be changed to reference the new code creating a potentially costly modification from
a time and budget perspective. If a major business requirement needs to be met, a bolt-on is the
preferred approach.
An extension retains the delivered vendor’s code in the database but the original code is no longer
used. Subsequent ERP upgrades will update the delivered code and the modified code can be
integrated into the upgraded application if the underlying technology remains the same. The
following must also be considered:
• The upgrade process for a customised ERP implementation is more time consuming than an
upgrade of an ERP implementation with no customisations;
• The timeframe and cost of upgrades increases exponentially with the number of customiza-
tions due to validation and testing;
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• Customisations are not supported by the vendor and must be maintained and updated by
the organisation’s internal staff.
If the organisation’s customisation is one used by multiple clients, there is the possibility that the
ERP vendor can be persuaded to include this customisation in their next product release but this
could require significant negotiating leverage and is uncertain.
Depending upon the magnitude of the required customisation, a bolt-on can be more cost effective,
less susceptible to defects and enable the team to meet project timelines. The measurement of the
level of customisation of a particular installation of an ERP system is difficult to judge. There is
currently no industry measurement baseline or metric for this type of analysis. Objective measure-
ments would ideally involve a determination of the amount of customised code as a percentage of
the vendor’s delivered code. In order for this measurement to be meaningful across industries and
even within the organisations, there would need to be a common metric for delivered code and a
common method for determining the means to parse and quantify the amount of customised code.
These measurements would be further complicated by the fact that implementing an ERP product
often does not include implementing full functionality. Often, ERP modules are implemented over
a period of time in a phased approach leading to the need to further refine the definition of the
baseline delivered code versus customised code. Finally, this analysis also presumes that a common
baseline would be applicable across ERP packages leading to a comparable assessment of the levels
of customisation of an SAP versus an Oracle implementation, for example. This task is not without
merit but will require industry and organisational alignment to reach fruition.
Organisations implementing ERP can achieve package-organisation alignments through careful se-
lection of package, proper configuration and customisation, working around the system, and even-
tually through upgrades or replacements by a better package. It is important that organisations
identify the significant misalignments early to make sound decisions on whether to adopt the pack-
age and, if so, to assess the extent of customisation and organisational change required such that
adequate resources can be provided and proper change management be put in place. Organisa-
tions can structure the evaluation of packages by probing the discrepancies between the practices
embedded in the system and the implementation context – country, industry, and strategic organi-
sational context. Clear analysis would be enabled if implementing organisations continuously work
to improve the transparency of their business rules concerning their key data and processes.
Managers of organisations seeking to implement ERP systems should seek to improve their busi-
ness processes prior to embarking on an ERP project through adoption of international standard
practices such as ISO quality certifications. They should also seek to raise staff skill levels and
change work practices to align more closely with the global practices currently embodied in ERP
software.
The empirical evidence of this research revealed the need for improving the education system in
order to help develop the required IT skills to particularly implement and use ERP software in
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Kenyan organisations. It is also imperative that the top management assume responsibility and
drive change management throughout the implementation life-cycle.
Knowledge management mechanisms with emphasis on knowledge retention should be put in place
by organisations implementing ERP systems. Know-how is tacit and not easily transferred. Or-
ganisations should at the time of negotiating service level agreements consider having knowledge
transfer as one of the deliverables. Metrics can be formulated to measure if the key users and end
users have mastered required knowledge to assist in future implementation and also to support the
ERP system.
Implementing organisations should consider a delayed adoption strategy for new ERP systems to
allow sufficient time for package vendors to localise the package. As these misalignments relate
to country or industry-wide regulations and norms, vendors who wish to increase the adoption of
their packages in a country and/or industry will be motivated to incorporate the missing func-
tionalities over time. Pioneering an enterprise-wide package implementation in a new country is
likely to be risky as observed at ACFC. Alternatively, such organisations can attempt to rally other
organisations facing similar dilemmas in ERP adoption to lobby the vendor for localisation.
For incompatibilities relating the way of doing business (business processes), tight control over such
change requests is likely to be an effective response. Unless these misalignments relate to some
strategic imperatives like in the case of Bidco, they should not be customised. A key ingredient
in this process is to institute sufficient senior management authority in the project team to defray
unreasonable demands from powerful staff or line managers. Organisations should put in place early
and sustain change management to manage user expectations and to provide adequate training to
facilitate adaptation to the package.
There are cases where ERP systems could not cater for functionalities required by individual organ-
isations in order to cope with their external environments. Such a case at hand is at Bidco where the
system could not handle ‘per print’. Lobbying the vendor is less likely to work as the requirements
are organisation specific. There are few mass-market forces that would lead vendors to localise or to
incorporate organisation-specific requirements in future upgrades. Organisations often have to bear
the cost by engaging expertise of local ERP system consultants or specialised vendors for further
customisation and to deal with the subsequent maintenance issues. Hence choosing to be unique
will become increasingly a costly option. Organisations should be mindful of the ‘differentiation
trap’. They should critically evaluate their internal organisational complexity and identify those
aspects that really need to be different, competitively or strategically. Continuous streamlining to
reduce organisational complexity is one way to reduce the number of incompatibilities.
This research recommends that ERP vendors, in advocating embedded processes as ‘best practices’,
should be mindful of the risks of going against institutional forces in a new country/industry,
particulary when it is likely to undermine legislation. Clearly addressing legal and imposed industry
or professional requirements, particularly for sizeable markets like Kenya, will contribute to wider
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adoption of the package, since these mandatory requirements affect all potential implementers in the
country and industry. The large number of incompatibilities arising from work practices that are
persistent in any implementation also suggests that ERP vendors should consider developing flexible
reporting and input capabilities to their packages or spend significant resources on identifying
industry best practices in information presentation and building these into their systems.
Package developers also need to pay more attention during requirements analysis and design to the
specification of business rules that govern the embedded best business practices. More needs to
be done to address the deficiencies in the current approaches to capturing and modelling business
rules. This is particularly critical as the scale of ERP systems continues to expand and more ‘best
practice’ processes (and their business rules, policies, and procedures) are built into the software.
Large ‘process heavy’ systems such as ERP systems demand a careful attention to the modeling
of business rules. It is no longer feasible for ERP system vendors to adopt a passive development
approach and assume that the business rules embedded in their system are always applicable to all
organisations.
In addition, based on the case study of Bidco and interviews with the consultants, this study
proposed an IT strategy framework (Appendix G which can be used by organisations planning
to implement ERP to align their business and IT strategy. The IT strategy framework is
tailored into four-phases: strategic vision, IT assessment, IT architecture, and IT plan. This
four-phase approach can result in an IT strategy that is business-driven, comprehensive and
pragmatic for organisations which are implementing ERP systems.
ERP Upgrade Guidelines
Given the lack of literature on ERP upgrades, this study provides ERP upgrade project
teams’ with proven and practical recommendations for successfully completing an ERP sys-
tem upgrade from planning to implementation based on the empirical findings from three of
the case study organisations.
Organisations should treat an ERP upgrade as a new project. Many organisations underesti-
mate the time and resources required to successfully complete ERP upgrade project because
the perception of an ERP upgrade project initiative seems more to be like a technical mainte-
nance effort than a true system development project. While the total effort to fully complete
an ERP upgrade project varies based on a myriad of technical, organisational, and opera-
tional factors, on average (based on estimation at KPLC, KENGEN and Bamburi) an ERP
upgrade costs 30% of the initial ERP project cost and can take more than a year to complete
as organisations restructure their business processes and update their technology infrastruc-
tures. Organisations that fail to treat the upgrade as a new implementation project invite
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disaster by introducing otherwise avoidable mistakes into the effort. The most common re-
sulting mistakes are limiting project planning time, rushing to implement system changes,
and failing to thoroughly test all facets of the updated ERP environment.
Organisations should strive to keep the ERP implementation team together and should
make every effort to have the same team of key employees who planned and implemented
the organisation’s initial ERP system to also plan and implement the organisations upgrade
project. Though potentially unpopular with the members of the project team who spent
countless hours getting initial ERP set up and running, team continuity is an essential factor
for project success. Assembling a new project team or rotating new members into the team
will serve only to slow progress on the upgrade project since new team members must take
time to become acquainted with all aspects of the initial ERP project. Additionally, no one
in the organisation will be better qualified to evaluate the impact of an ERP system upgrade
will have than the individuals who implemented the existing system. The vast knowledge
and experience team members gain during the initial ERP project will prove invaluable to
reducing the overall cost and time required to complete the ERP upgrade project.
Organisations should treat ERP upgrade project as a business project, not an IT project.
While the majority of the time required for completion of the initial ERP implementation
project is allocated to the IT department, the time required to successfully upgrade the
system shifts to the business units. To illustrate by example, the technical upgrade at
KPLC took only one month whereas functional upgrade took seven months. The reason for
the shift in hours from IT personnel to business personnel is simple: system ownership. Once
all technical and operational issues are resolved by the organisation’s IT staff and technical
consultants on the initial ERP installation, it becomes the responsibility of the business
units to begin maximising the business value from the system. This responsibility carries
over to all ERP upgrade projects which are mainly concerned with business improvement.
The business side is responsible for determining the business case for the ERP upgrade. Only
the business units can readily establish the timetable for planning, installing, and testing the
upgrade to minimise disruption to critical business operations. Also, only the business units
can correctly identify how much training will be required for the employees impacted by the
upgrade. Organisations unable to gain the full support of the business units that are critical
to the success of the project should seriously consider delaying any ERP upgrade initiative.
Organisations should watch for hidden infrastructure costs. Many organisations mistakenly
think the vast majority of their ERP upgrade project costs will be software and labour
related. Organisations may forget that updated software provided by their ERP vendor in-
cludes new system functionality intended to improve the competitive value of the product.
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In order to fully leverage the new capabilities available in an upgraded system, organisa-
tions may be required to make further modifications and additions to their established IT
infrastructure. For example, the SAP R/3 version 3.1H initially installed at KPLC was
running on 2 tier landscape – production and development environments. However, when
they were upgraded to SAP R/3 4.7, the company was forced to adopt a 3 tier landscape
– production, quality assurance and development – which is a prerequisite for running SAP
R/3 4.7. As a result they bought an additional server to use for quality assurance. In ad-
dition, they had to upgrade the hardware and software of the previous servers – production
and development – to recommended specifications to enable them support the new version
of SAP. The IT department also realised that each computer that was to use SAP R/3 4.7
required 87% more CPU speed, 72% more memory, and 33% more storage space. Depending
on an organisation’s current infrastructure, ERP upgrade projects can become an expensive
proposition. Organisations should work closely with their product vendor to uncover any
hidden infrastructure costs prior to the start of their upgrade project.
Before embarking on ERP upgrade project, organisations should ensure that they un-customise
any previous customisations. During the initial implementation of an ERP system, many or-
ganisations choose to customise the standard ERP software modules to meet implementation
dates and to match their unique business requirements. Although most organisations that
implement ERP make some customisations to a vendor’s basic product offering, many make
the mistake of over-customising their application modules in attempt to appease the end
users. For example, each maintenance release requires an organisation to evaluate the effects
of changes in the core application on customisations. Dealing with customisation issues dur-
ing an upgrade, as we were informed by the principal consultant involved in the upgrade at
KPLC, required approximately 80% of a software developer’s and 66% of a business analyst’s
time and effort. An organisation must carefully determine the appropriate customisations
and corrections with third-party software on the new version. Customisations that needs to
be carried over from one version of enterprise software to the next are the biggest technology
headache that organisations will face in upgrades. Therefore, organisations must carefully
review the new functionality added to each new release of their ERP suite to determine if
specific company-developed customisation can be eliminated during the upgrade process.
7.4 Limitations and Future Work
Choices that were made during the course of designing this research brought with them
some limitations. While this study covered all aspects of an ERP implementation, it was
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not designed to study such issues as the rationale for doing things in certain ways or to
determine exact outcome relationships. For example, one key question that our study could
not answer definitely is the cost and benefit relationship. Another issue that needs to be
studied is whether early ERP adopters or late ERP adopters receive the better returns. While
early adopters may receive some competitive advantages, late adopters generally benefit from
upgraded systems and a better implementation knowledge base. This raises the issue of the
optimal time to start an implementation of a large system. This study is an initial step
in answering such questions. ERP systems are here for the long haul and will need to be
studied on an on-going basis.
Future research on ERP systems could profit by taking more of a process view of decision
making. Further development of the models has the potential to capture the dynamic nature
of upgrade decisions. For example, tracking the entire productive life of an ERP system ap-
plication, from implementation to replacement by an upgraded version could provide greater
insights into the dynamics of implementation and yield more subtle temporal interactions
among factors. We also intend to carry out a statistical verification of the models using
statistical techniques such as regression analysis and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).
Additionally, future research will involve designing a ERP readiness tool which as suggested
by the interviewed consultants, will enhance the EEIM.
There are a number of questions still to be addressed. Future studies could look at differences
by size of firms, by industry type, by number of locations, by number of customers and so
on.
The conflict caused by the globalisation and localisation of management work practices is
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Within-Case Study Analyses and
Interpretation
A.1 Bidco Oil Refineries
A.1.1 ERP Implementation Practice
ERP Drivers and Background
Bidco’s market share has grown steadily in Kenya and the rest of east African countries,
especially in the laundry bar soaps and edible oils market since 1998. The year 2000 was
fast approaching and like most organisations, Bidco’s management was faced with the Y2K
compliance problem. The company was also facing problems related to inaccurate costing,
lack of clarity in stockholding and poor quality procedures which were caused by the outdated
systems.
Its rapid growth was a key challenge for the firm leading to an increase in demands for
efficiency. In order to realise its strategic vision of expanding its business in Africa and
enhancing efficiency to be able provide quality products and affordable price, IT was seen as
essential.
An IT strategic plan, initiated by the senior management and launched in 1999, recommended
the implementation of an ERP system throughout all areas of the organisation. The ERP
system was intended to support rapid business growth, address data sharing issues, obtain
a competitive advantage and introduce “best practice” process management techniques.
Bidco’s goal is to be a number one on market share in the edible oils, fats
and soaps market in Africa. As a result it was imperative to harness the IT and
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integrate into our core business strategy. ERP was deemed as most appropriate
for the task (Group team leader, ICT).
A request for quotation was sent to various ERP vendors on their products. After evaluation
of the quotations and vendors carrying out demo on their products, the final choice was
between SAP R/3 and Baan because they offered an enterprise suite which spanned across
the entire Bidco’s operations. Baan was finally chosen over SAP R/3 because of its scalablity
and ease of use, and its strength in handling discrete manufacturing. In addition, its superior
after-sales support modules made it the favourite choice.
Baan’s strategy aimed at transfering ownership of the implementation to the customer also
greatly influenced the selection of Baan. This meant that Bidco could build capabilities to
implement Baan in its multiple locations planned in future. This strategy has proved to be
very effective for Bidco in that it has enabled Bidco staff to solve challenges as they arise
with the help of online Baan support, thus effectively empowering Bidco’s staff to resolve
operating issues by themselves.
Prior to implementation, Bidco took a pre-implementation skills transfer of their core im-
plementation team by taking them for iBaan specialised training at the Baan office in South
Africa. This enhanced their in-house capacity to implement and support the system with
minimal assistance from the consultants. The training though costly and the managements
commitment to the success of the project, enabled the system to be up and running in a
record of 2.5 to 3 months.
Sulfox ltd was chosen as the implementation partner. The initial roll out was confined to
four modules with a team of four from Baan and eight key users from Bidco. Bidco also
chose a team of 20 end-users drawn from different functions like production, planning, sales,
accounting and excise for the purpose of implementation. The team worked full-time on
the implementation of the ERP solution along with Baan implementation consultants. The
group Team leader commented:
We were impressed with how the end-users adjusted so quickly. They were very
dedicated, worked hard and put in long hours on the implementation. The project has
been a phenomenal success (Team leader, ERP project).
An overall aim of the project was to, where possible, adapt to the ERP. This was referred to
as the 80/20 rule, and meant that the company was prepared, most of the time, to re-engineer
business processes to map onto the ERP. The first phase which took about 1.5 months involved
implementation of the Finance, Distribution, Production Planning, Materials Management, and
Sales module. In the second phase, Fixed Assets and Service and Maintenance modules were
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implemented. Change Management was complex since Bidco had to manage the shift from paper-
based systems to ERP.
It was one of the shortest implementation cycles, we used Baan out-of-the-box as
much as possible (Team leader, IT).
ERP driver at Bidco was mainly business driven –need to consolidate its operations across the East
Africa region. The business functions within Bidco and IT department worked in hand-in-hand to
deliver ERP solution.
ERP Post-Implementation Activities
The Bidco’s geographical and financial growth had led to an increasingly distributed environment,
resulting in considerable demands for collaboration within the organisation. Bidco purchased ad-
ditional licenses in 2002 in order to facilitate business growth in Kenya and the expansion into
Tanzania. The organisation launched an e-commerce initiative by buying iBaan eBusiness suite
with the aim of creating collaboration amongst its dispersed regional offices, customers, and sup-
pliers.
In 2002, Bidco went live with Africa’s first iBaan eBusiness implementation in Kenya which included
E-sales, E-procurement and E-collaboration. One of the main reasons mentioned by the respondents
for additional investment in the iBaan solution set is the company’s original successful start-up. In
addition, ERP and IT in general are perceived as an enabler in realising Bidco’s strategic goal as
expressed in the below excerpt:
IT remains central in our operations, as through it we have been able to develop
the capability to foresee and manage changes in both local and global economic envi-
ronments and thus gain an edge over our competitors (Managing Director).
After successful implementation of the iBaan eBusiness suite, Bidco became the first organisation
to venture into e-commerce and the first to network all its multi-location facilities through V-Sat
and Internet.
This study considers the ERP implementation at Bidco to be very successful. Besides being im-
plemented on time and on budget, the system met the initial set objectives. The system is being
used extensively across the organisation reaping enormous benefits to the organisation, some of
which are spelt out in the next section. The probable reasons why Bidco did not experience any
escalations are:
1. they were able to get the system running within a very short period (less than 3 months)
2. they negotiated for a fixed price implementation costs and payments terms based on strict
predefined milestones
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However, respondents confirmed that the cost of Software Annual Maintenance charges is proving
to be an element of considerable cost escalation (ranging between 18-20% of product costs).
ERP Benefits
The use of ERP at Bidco is highly strategic and has brought massive benefits to the organisation.
For example, iBaan’s eBusiness solution effectively eliminated geographic and time barriers to
streamline business processes and reduce costs while, at the same time, creating new ways of
growing the business and delivering value and services to customers:
Thanks to Sulfox and iBaan’s eBusiness solution, real-time access to customers and
suppliers and the ability to transact 24x7 irrespective of location, now forms part of
Bidco’s formidable completive advantage. (Managing Director)
Bidco has realised the benefits of utilising the internet as a business tool, giving the company
opportunity to tap into new markets and venture outside Kenya’s borders. iBaan enables Bidco to
share information and automate processes between the company and its customers.
The system has also enabled the company to make proper sales forecast and monitor warehouse
stock of finished goods. The company has also improved its stock monitoring system, while the
lead-time for raw materials has also been reduced.
The key here is decision-making. We are able to make advance planning and take
strategic control of inventory (Team leader, Sales and Distribution).
ERP has improved Bidco’s efficiency by helping it analyse its market and reduce the time and
expenses involved in running its operations, reduce stockholding and shrinkage, eliminate cost of
loss making products and quality products, and improve accuracy of stock tracking.
It is key for the success of a project to choose the business partner that best meets
your needs. Organisations should choose a good business partner with good track
record. They should be realistic about immediate benefits and focus on added value
such as best practice and quicker implementation
In summary, Bidco has realised significant and quantifiable business benefits achieved from ERP
implementation. The organisation milestones were achieved within reasonable time frames. Upon
completion of its milestones, new objectives were defined such as the acquisition of iBaan Business
Intelligence and entering into partnership with Uchumi supermarket.
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ERP Implementation Scope
Bidco implemented all the iBaaN ERP modules. In addition, the ERP system was adopted in
all the departments (functional units) of the organisation. The organisation’s business practices
were greatly changed to bridge the gap between iBaan functionalities and old organisation business
processes. All basic modules of ERP implemented along with other speciality functions; employing
more advanced technolgies such as even management and workflow technologies and using more
than 70% of functionality in those modules were implemented. Implementation made use of ad-
vanced middleware and integration technologies such as Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). The
organisation also adopted advanced analytical reporting tools. These tools included business intelli-
gence solutions –Enterprise Data Warehouse Performance management –to support enterprise wide
trend analysis and analytical reporting, i.e. historical trends, forecasting. Performace management
solutions and knowledge application provide key metrics and information tailored to the needs of
managers and executives to measure the performance of an organisation and facilitate strategic
vision and planning.
ERP at Bidco was greatly used to redefine the competitive environment through the creation of
strong inter-organisational relationships (joint ventures, long term contracts, licensing agreements).
For example, Bidco formed a joint venture with one of Kenya’s largest retail chains in order to
streamline Uchumi’s distribution network through a product distribution partnership with Bidco
Oil Refineries Ltd. In this partnership, Bidco restocks specific Uchumi’s branches from its Thika
plant without necessarily passing through Uchumi’s central distribution warehouse in Nairobi. A
key benefit of the new system is that Bidco is linked up with all its distributors under a plan that
has gained respect from the region’s highly sceptical corporate sector.
The partnership with Bidco Group and 10 other major suppliers is expected to free
billions of shillings tied up in stocks to restructure other operations and help turn-
around the cash-strapped supermarket chain, which closed ten branches earlier this
year due to lack of profitability. This new venture has been made possible by the
integration of Uchumi’s and Bidco’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programmes
(Consultant, Symphony)
Training
Training was arranged before and after the system was launched. The focus of the training was on
the daily operation of the system, for example, how to input data, and how to import the needed
information into the system. The employees interviewed mentioned that trainers held an active and
eager attitude towards the training. The interviewed staff said, “It is good that I have opportunity
to take part in all kinds of training.” As mentioned above, they see it more as an opportunity to
increase their own working value, than seeing it as a waste. Another respondent mentioned that
“This is also a bonus in working at Bidco.” Thus the positive attitude had a positive influence on
183
training and lead to favourable result of the training. In addition, most of the staff members have a
good educational background and high learning abilities to accept and handle new information and
skills. Therefore, adequate training and time to learn was provided at Bidco. The human resource
team leader also mentioned that the training has been institutionalised and communicated, and
users identify and document training needs. Documentary evidence showed that sufficient budgets,
resources, facilities were provided for the training and education programs.
Level of Integration
Most of the integration enables real time exchange of information between the systems. At Bidco,
batch exchange between the modules is minimal whereas manual intervention is non-existent result-
ing in a seamless integration. In addition to achieving internal integration, Bidco has also managed
to integrate its ERP system with a Kenyan retail supermarket leading to inter-organisational inte-
gration. In this venture, Bidco is able to automatically replenish the supermarkets inventory once
it reaches the re-order level.
A.1.2 Organisation Context
Information Sharing Perception
The ERP implementation team at Bidco exhibited strong information sharing throughout their
implementation. Extensive communication of ERP plans, work process changes, and discussion of
the importance of ERP implementation took place among team members and between the team and
the rest of the organisation. In order to facilitate information sharing, the project team managers
implemented team-based bonuses so the entire team was rewarded upon reaching milestones. This
encouraged knowledge sharing on the team because it minimised benefits usually associated with
knowledge hoarding. Team members were willing to share knowledge with one another, both on
a formal and an informal basis. Both hard data, such as current written policies, reports, and
other analyses were shared along with soft data such as previous experiences or personal insights.
Team members were also encouraged by the project manager and each other to seek out additional
expertise if the requisite knowledge was not in existence within the team. Thus, Bidco exhibited
a considerable amount of information sharing throughout the ERP implementation which had a
positive impact on ERP implementation.
Orientation to Change
Bidco’s objective was to follow the system’s standards as far as possible during implementation of
Baan ERP system. Implementation started with an analysis of the standards provided by the ERP
system. If the existing business processes differed from this standard they were redesigned.
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Therefore, Bidco can be categorised as a change-oriented organisation. The driving principles
for ERP implementation related to the simplicity of its implementation and use of the system.
Although simplicity might be a desired goal, it may not always be achieved without any costs.
More simple processes are necessarily more generic in nature and they may not provide a good
match with specific business requirements. Bidco tried to balance between concern through the
application of a generic 80:20 rule to evaluate the trade-off between increased levels of simplicity
in business processes versus the extent of functionality lost. This rule specified that if simplified
business processes could be implemented that met about 80% of business requirements, then they
would be adopted without any further modification on the system. More simplified processes were
considered to increase system usefulness across business units and geographical areas in addition to
the fact that they were easier (less costly) to maintain and upgrade. However, where a significant
discrepancy existed between the desired and actual levels of business functionality (more than
20% according to the 80:20 rule), the organisation opted to customise the package or implement
“add-ons” to satisfy specialised user needs.
Processes were changed as a result of ERP implementation. “Our business processes have become
much more well-defined and understood” said an end-user interviewed. “A lot more people are
aware of the integration and dependencies among processes” added another end-user. For example,
the purchasing process is now uniform throughout all the plants. To help achieve this, the plants
worked together to change their nomenclature for parts to create a common master file of parts
across plants. This was a major hurdle to cross because of the vast number of parts involved.
Bidco’s organisational culture was explicitly focused on knowledge sharing that helped get the
organization ready for change. “We had never worked so hard on cultural readiness”, a respondent
asserted.
The Bidco willingness to change is also evident in the excerpt below:
. . . our aim was to gradually adopt standard processes and so we have restructured
our management to reflect the Kaizen philosophy, a concept that is behind the trans-
formation of Japanese companies into global brands (Managing Director, Bidco).
Kaizen is process-oriented change, involving operators continuously searching for better ways to do
their jobs. Each employee strives for improvement.
Orientation to Collaboration
At Bidco, the implementation team members were accustomed to working in teams on other
projects. Therefore, they were comfortable sharing knowledge and working with people from di-
verse perspectives and different functional areas from the beginning of the ERP implementation.
In order to facilitate the collaboration, Bidco implemented a “podville” structure for the ERP
implementation team. Working together “was more natural than difficult”.
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We already knew how to work in teams, we just had to get to know each other on
this team (Team leader, IT).
Orientation to Work
Bidco was oriented towards the functional-units rather than processes. This was in contrast to
ERP trajectory which is processes oriented. As a result, the organisation reorganised their entire
approach to work operations after their first implementation in order to provide a system in which
new business processes could be supported –process-based work practices. They followed their
integration partner’s model where they met with key people at each department such as engineers
and“folks who knew the departments processes and were going to make decisions on who was going
to do what”. The users were fully involved through their representatives in the actual discussion of
how the system was going to be, what they were going to see, and what they were going to get. On
completion of the project, users appreciated how the processes worked in iBaan, and they “knew
what the core processes were”. The users did not only know their part of the process but also how
their processes related to other processes.
Basis of Truth and Rationality
Basis of truth and rationality in decision making process emerged as one of the factors that impacts
on ERP implementation. In the case of Bidco, knowledge sharing in terms of personal experience
and opinions was highly encouraged in the organisation. In addition to personal experience, hard
data was considered during the decision making. This is explained by the excerpt below:
If someone said we can’t do it this way, we said, Why can’t you? Is it really unique?
We’d get them to list what they do and to look at what others have listed, and identify
the commonalities (Team leader, Finance).
Therefore, basis of truth and rationality in decision making comprises of both personal experience
and hard data. However, personal experience supercedes hard data in decion making process.
Nature of Time Horizon
Management was well aware that an ERP solution was not a “quick fix”. They were willing to
embark on a multi-year effort to install and successfully implement an ERP system. This helped
in leveraging the ERP system to realise its full potential within the organisation. Due to the long
term perception of ERP project, Bidco has continually been involved in extending its ERP system
beyond its four walls. The company is currently involved in a campaign to convince its suppliers
and customers into integrating their ERP system to create a value chain. However, the IT team
leader commented that the Kenyan market is still skeptical about IT and this may take time.
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A.1.3 ERP Implementation Challenges
Information Technology Infrastructure
Given that Bidco operates regionally, there was need to link the various plants within Kenya and
other plants in East Africa i.e. Uganda and Tanzania. However, the network infrastructure was
so poor that it could not support the business plan. In order to address this inadequacy, the
company had to set up their own Virtual Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT). This vastly added to
the implementation cost.
Local Legislation
Being a private company, the local legislation did not have a great impact on ERP implementation
and usage. However, interviewees mentioned that they had to configure the system to conform
to the taxation policy in Kenya which was cumbersome due to the country’s complex taxation
policy. Lack of legislation to support the use of electronic documents while submitting tax returns
to Kenya Revenue also makes them incur unnecessary printing costs and delay the tax return
submission process. However, internally, the company has dramatically reduced the volume of
printing by eliminating manual signing and approval of documents.
Incompatibility
Bidco refines edible oil and consumer goods. It also design and manufactures its own packaging for
its products. Established customers sometimes buy in large quantities, which give them quite a lot
of leverage. One of the ways Bidco has competed is by excelling in the more customised segments of
the business and by being able to meet the customised needs of some its customers. The customised
needs come in the form of packaging and also product composition. Bidco produces several brands of
edible oil with relatively high variation in specifications and relatively little variation in packaging.
In addition, Bidco allows customers to specify design alterations in packaging.
Clearly, customisation is a key order winner for Bidco’s plant’s market segments; however, delivery
time and price are equally important. High customisation focus has many implications for the
manufacturing environment. Design engineering is a key first-step in the order management process,
and engineering consumes a great deal of allowable lead time. Because customised orders are done
on order basis, many materials are purchased to order. Manufacturing systems must be flexible in
terms of the plant’s ability to produce a wide variety of output and also in terms of allowing design
changes to open orders.
According to business process in-built in Baan, once there is an actual order, the Sales and Engi-
neering reviews the specifications to make sure pricing is correct. They also review any engineering
issues and do preliminary scheduling. The Sales uses a price book for standard orders while central
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pricing staff price the non-standard. Then the order moves on to Production engineering. Produc-
tion engineering checks orders for problems from the design point of view, and they perform another
pricing check. Virtually all orders receive at least some modifications in production engineering due
to the complexity generated by the diverse models and combinations. Corrections in production
engineering often cause adjustments in other areas, for example in accounting or materials man-
agement if parts have already been dispatched. When production engineering releases order (one a
week), materials requirements are processed by the ERP system.
Ability to highly customise and be flexible gave Bidco a competitive advantage. Delivery time was
also essential to win orders. The high degree of customisation means that engineering and pro-
curement can consume a disproportionate amount of allowable lead-time. Over time, the plant had
developed many capabilities and practices (informal systems) for coping with the most challenging
aspects of its business environment. Many of these practices centre on compressing lead-times for
design engineering and procurement work so that adequate manufacturing lead-time is preserved.
Maintaining flexibility in materials and order management systems is another key. Two of the
informal systems that the plant had evolved to facilitate the delivery of high customisation with
short lead times are ‘per print’ system and culture, and procedures that facilitated utilising its
employees’ formidable knowledge-base.
In the ‘per print’ system, because of high customisation, many of the components used at Bidco
are purchased specifically for a given order. To implement a new part (for packages) formally
requires developing engineering drawings, assigning a number to the part, putting it on the item
master file, generating the required routing and sending all that material through costing to get the
price. This requires considerable lead-time (as much as 10 days), before the order can be released
to manufacturing. Historically, as workaround for many parts, the sales engineering group takes a
copy of the drawing for an existing similar part, marks it up, assigns it a special number, and sends
it directly to manufacturing. These parts are called ‘per print’ parts. The ‘per print’ drawings are
kept on file (or ultimately on microfilm), and the ‘per print’ number is associated with the order.
Bidco plant had typically 200 to 300 ‘per print’ parts per week.
These ‘per print’ parts are invisible to Baan, and cause headaches in pricing the open orders;
however, they have allowed Bidco to manufacture what the customer wants very rapidly. This ‘per
print’ system was not viable within Baan: Since the ERP system is so tightly integrated; it is not
feasible to have parts outside the system. Therefore the ERP system, in effect, removed one of
the ways in which Bidco had previously been able to respond quickly to customers’ customisation
requests. Baan imposed some requirements on the plant that conflicted with some of these practices.
In response to this problem, engineering has begun working with sales engineering to screen antic-
ipated orders as early as possible. It identifies previous orders that were similar to orders coming
up. Engineering pulled all the ‘per print’ information from these “old” orders, and entered formal
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part information into the system in advance. This meant that there were relatively few ‘per print’
parts that had to be formally defined and entered on the system when the orders were actually
received. This explains how users re-construct technology based on their previous experiences and
practices.
On the other hand, the software increased alignment between certain processes and the plant’s
competitive strategy. Prior to ERP, Bidco used discrete bills of materials. Order entry personnel
used various selection charts prepared by engineering to develop a bill of materials (BOM) for
each order. The problem with the legacy practice was that tens of thousands of different package
designs were possible, and in fact thousands were produced. Preparing a separate BOM for each
configuration produced was a time-consuming and error prone process. An alternative was made
possible via an application Baan provided: a BOM configurator. This module automates parts of
the order creation process, creating a dynamic BOM based on the specifications for the products.
In addition to saving time, it results in better control of the configuration management process.
One of the important, but less obvious, benefits of this for the company is better protection against
liability due to design defects. The production team leader said:
You put a unit together with the hope that it would all fit and you wouldn’t be hit
with a product liability problem down the line
New processes introduced by the ERP compared to the old processes makes it less likely that a
flawed design will be released. As a result ERP improved the plant’s ability to execute the business
strategy. The BOM configurator sped BOM construction, and also decreased the probability of
mistakes. Since the old process was not particularly appealing to employees (it was cumbersome
and error prone), the necessary shifts in individual roles was met with little resistance. In addition,
because the new process improved strategic alignment without threatening roles, culture and so on,
it was accepted fairly easily.
As mentioned earlier the second practice coping with the business environment was based on em-
ployee experience and judgement on the shop floor and in using material planning. Bidco had the
advantage of long service of their shop floor employees –people with extensive tacit knowledge in
production and with the ability to recognise and avoid problems, even without formal BOMs. The
plant did use bills of materials for each order, but the reality was that many BOMs were inaccurate.
Everyone understood this and compensated for it. Even though material management personnel
complained that without accurate bill of material they could not order for the right material, from
the engineering point of view there was not much emphasis on correcting errors. The shop floor
personnel were good at building correct packages, with or without bill correct bill of materials.
Some of these guys out in the manufacturing plant will just look at an order and say
we know it needs this, and they don’t ever look at the bill of material. Their attitude
is, that’s not my job to check and see if the bill of material is correct. My job is to
build packages (Team leader, Production).
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The management’s liberal attitude toward inventory control facilitated these informal systems as
suggested by this statement:
The guys doing the general ledger accounting would go to the inventory system
and they would see the total [had changed], and we had an inventory adjustment, very
simple. The concept wasn’t that bad, because a lot of the parts that they couldn’t
find, they found the next run. . . so it wasn’t that bad.
When the shop floor uses informal systems, instead of formal bill of material routings, and so on,
it can create problems for departments such as material planning and accounting that rely on shop
floor data. However, the legacy information systems, as well as formal and informal policies, allowed
the company to compensate or adjust in other areas. For example, the legacy systems made it easy
and efficient for buyers/planners to see the shop orders and customer orders that were driving lower
level material requirements. By contrast, the ERP system reduces the opportunities for planners
and others to use their judgement to override the system.
Even though purchasers/planners were able to see the ERP action messages (system-generated
instructions regarding timing and quantities of orders), they were unable to access information
about the nature of the requirements. For example, safety stock information is not displayed with
the action messages, and the system is not configured to support order pegging:
In the Baan system, we don’t know what those items are for. We are driven by
items not by the orders. If we’ve got, say, 50 of a certain material ordered, we don’t
know if 10 of them are used on this order and 40 are used on another. It is not apparent
to the guy buying the parts.” (Assistant Plant Manager).
The BOM’s have become more critical because the system removes many of the opportunities
for planners and purchasers to use their discretion and judgement, getting valid data from the
shop floor. It is not clear whether these other areas are transitioning adequately, as the following
statement attests:
You can change the amount you’re going to order, but most of the buyers are saying
‘this information’s got to be correct. Whatever Baan says, that’s what I’m going to
do.’ And that’s real good, if all the information going into the system is correct. . . but
the problem is we as buyers are almost having to outsmart the system on a regular
basis, because the information coming to us is not correct. It seems harder to me,
although issuing just a purchase order is easier (Purchase clerk)
However, there is movement toward a different mentality on complying with the procedures that
keep the system accurate. Since everyone understands that now the various operations and proce-
dures are linked together, there is a greater spirit of cooperation and people who are open minded
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are ready to say, “Well, what went wrong?” Previous to the Baan system no one wanted to hear
about engineering being behind or not having correct bills of materials or manufacturing is using
wrong materials. Whereas in the past, the departments seemed almost pitted against each other,
an atmosphere of cooperation between departments appears to be developing as ERP embedded
structures are transferred into the organisation.
Another problem surfaced after the system had been operational for a short time. A customer asked
for changes on the specifications of the packages on a very large order after that order had been
released to manufacturing. Always in the past, Bidco had accommodated these requests as long as
that aspect of the package had not already been manufactured. However, in the Baan system, no
changes could be made to order after they were released. The only way Bidco could have changed
this order would have been to cancel the original order, back out all the materials already used,
and re-enter a new order. This was unworkable, so the customer was told that they would not be
able to change the order.
In response, the customer contacted senior management, who directed that the order be modified
per the customer’s request, even if it meant turning off the ERP system. The company worked
with the vendor for one additional month in modifying the system to allow modification of orders
once they had been released.
In this particular instance, Bidco’s Baan eliminated the option (which was feasible under the old
system) of changing customer orders once any production had begun. This technological shift
would result in a strategic shift away from flexibility. However, as the case describes, management
quickly realised that such a shift was not consistent with the plant’s business strategy. Therefore,
they ordered that the ERP package be customised in order to allow changes to re-open orders.
Bidco altered the ERP technology (as opposed to its processes, strategy) in order to maintain
technology-strategy alignment that existed prior to ERP implementation.
The users’ perspective was that the source of incompatibility was located in the in-built ERP
practices which were not flexible. For users, the aim of this strategy was to influence vendors to
change ERP’s ’problematic’ business logic.
Interestingly, we observed that vendors aim was to persuade users to adopt ERP business logic
by locating the source of incompatibility in their users’ practices, which were described as not
conforming to ‘business logic’.
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A.2 Agrochemical and Food Company
A.2.1 implementation practices
ERP Drivers and Background
Prior to the adoption of ERP, ACFC had a section within its finance department which was re-
sponsible for data processing. The section had two employees who were responsible for operating
the payroll and fixed asset management system. Their main work was data entry and payroll pro-
cessing at the end of the month. They were also responsible for updating the fixed assets system
periodically, using the data acquired from management accountant when a new asset is acquired,
or when an asset is disposed, or when an asset depreciates or appreciates in value. In addition, a
third party system developed in Ms Access was in use at the weighbridge.
Most of the operations were manual. The organisation did not have a network in place. All the three
systems mentioned above – payroll, fixed asset management, weighbridge system – were standalone
systems. The payroll system in use prior to ERP, was developed in COBOL with menu-based
interface. The fixed asset management system was outsourced from the neighbouring Muhoroni
Sugar Company. The majority of the users were computer illiterate. Most senior managers had a
low level of education as compared to the mid-level managers.
ERP at ACFC was triggered by the rapid change in technology. This is reflected in the Financial
Controller remarks:
The need for modern information technology system at ACFC was identified as
long as four years ago. . . technology has evolved so much to an extent that in that in
the present world, there is no doubt that our ability to compete will much depend on
how fast and reliable our information processing system is.
In February 2000, ACFC embarked on a search for an ERP system by floating an open tender
or request for quotation. At the start, the exercise was characterised by careful and cautious
selection process that involved several product demonstrations by various vendors offering different
ERP systems. Three major ERP systems –SAP, Oracle and JD Edwards –were ruled out on
the basis of price. This left Baan, Ebizframe, e-factory, Ramco to choose from. After product
demonstrations, ACFC narrowed down on Baan and Ebizframe because they closely matched the
functional requirements specified. In order to affirm demonstration of the two candidate ERP
systems, ACFC decided to send its users to sites where these systems were implemented and in
use. In November 2000, two members of the project committee were sent to New Delhi in India in
order to evaluate the performance of Ebizframe software since there was no local implementation.
The team visited M/s Sterling tools and ADDI Textile Industries. Other members where sent to
Bidco where Baan was in use.
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The report by the team from India advised against its adoption citing that the system was not
being used in the sites as had been claimed by the vendor. The teams report read in part:
Ebizframe is designed to suit the Indian market and will require a lot of customi-
sation. . . to suit ACFC needs. It was not developed for the global market. . . we would
wish to state that based on our site visits, discussions with users, sample reports stud-
ied and the demos that we had at ESS, offices, Ebizframe ERP software is still being
developed and is still not suitable to satisfy ACFC’s information system requirements.
Copies of the demo version reports that we have brought along with us are evidently
incomplete in a number of modules. . . it would be very risky and costly for ACFC to
be a trial site for a software that has no local installation base and support at all in
Africa.
In the same period, another team was sent to Bidco oil refineries to assess Baan ERP system where
it was operational. The team was impressed at the performance of iBaan at Bidco. The two teams
jointly wrote a report and recommended adoption of Baan. The report read in part:
ACFC may go for the Baan solution as the first choice, in spite of the 10% price
difference. This product enjoys the wider user acceptance and the package offer
presents less investment risks. . . the weightier selection criteria of fitness for the pur-
pose/technical features, functional fit, vendor back-up support and user acceptance are
used to arrive at the above recommendation.
However, the recommendation given was not heeded to, instead the company acquired Ebizframe.
This is due to lack of transparency in the tendering process in government corporations where
money exchange hands. Simply expressed, power and politics in information systems played a
major role in the Ebizframe acquisition.
In the initial project team structure, the implementation team included end user representatives,
senior finance employees (i.e., financial controller, financial accountant, and the management ac-
countant) and the CEO. Departmental heads were not involved at the beginning of the project. The
departmental heads were actually fence sitters in the decision process and questioned the project,
which later lead to deterioration of the project. They therefore spent their effort in sabotaging the
project rather than building it. Those interviewed said the initial impression was that the project
belonged to the finance department.
Being a government corporation, ACFC required customised reporting that could not be easily
accomplished without significant customisation to the ERP system. From the start of the project,
therefore, there existed significant idiosyncrasies that hindered process integration and limited the
process re-engineering. The level of operating complexity in ACFC might not have been as high
as that in Bidco, although its specialised reporting needs rendered deployment a difficult task. No
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external consultants were hired to assist users in the implementation process. The project team
lacked both the in-house technical expertise to match business and system requirements, and also
lacked the overall understanding of business processes and how they should be evaluated or re-
engineered to successfully implement the system. As a result, the system was greatly customised to
fix functional and reporting inadequacies to prepare specialised reports required by governmental
reporting requirements.
After 2 years of unsuccessful efforts, in 2003, the implementation team was expanded to include the
departmental heads and additional users from various departments. Furthermore, a deadline set for
the system to be operational in 12 months, including the completion of all necessary customisations.
It is during this period that the researcher was recruited to be in-charge of coordinating ERP
activities, and advise on issues relating to implementation. To meet the deadlines, numerous short
cuts were followed and workarounds were adopted. Configuration management controls were by-
passed and system testing became superficial. The implementation effort was completed and the
system was eventually implemented with significant delays and cost overruns. ACFC bought most
of the modules, except for production planning and plant maintenance modules. However, the
organisation ended up not implementing a number of modules which included: costing module,
fixed asset management, and customer management.
End users did not fully accept the system, especially given that they had advised against Ebizframe,
and training provided was just designed to train users in specific system functionalities, without
learning the system’s capability as a whole. Users who resisted the system implementation were
threatened by sacking.
The lack of an effective implementation team, led to failure even in meeting the basic objective.
For example, system modules were implemented with various degrees of success. The payroll
module, for instance, was not an integral part of the organisation’s enterprise system. Although
billing represented one of the most important modules, it required extensive customisation that
was impossible to achieve given the state of the organisation’s resources and commitment to the
system. Many modules remained as external modules requiring data to be transferred to ERP.
In 2006, the payroll was turned off and the ACFC resorted to the old payroll system. The turning
off of the system was triggered by a letter from Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) penalising the
company for what it termed as tax evasion. Organisations in Kenya are required to collect income
tax on behalf of KRA and then remit tax collected to KRA. It emerged that the figures generated
by ERP were wrong which led to employees underpaying income tax. The company paid the hefty
fine then resorted to recover the fine from employees by deducting an agreed amount from salary
monthly. The move, however, was met with resistance from unionisable employees who vowed to
go on strike if the management dared to deduct their salary, claiming that it was the fault of the
payroll system, therefore, they were not ready to take up the responsibility.
In conclusion, ERP project at ACFC was more internally focused in that ACFC wanted to automate
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its operations in order to cut-down costs.h e employees were less enthusiastic about the project.
The implementation was not completed on schedule (it lasted 4 years rather than the expected one
year) and ended up costing significantly more than expected.
ERP Post-implementation Activities
During the last visit, the management had unanimously agreed to replace Ebizframe ERP system
with a suitable ERP system. The review carried out in 2006 revealed that most employees were
not happy with the Ebizframe ERP system. The system is currently being used in some selected
departments. Even in some of these departments, they have not done away with manual procedures
due to the unreliability of Ebizframe data.
ERP Benefits
ACFC does not carry any formal measurement of business benefits relating to the ERP system.
The project was perceived to be successful on the ‘go-live’ date. There has been no commitment
after the system went ‘live’.
ERP Implementation Scope
The initial plan was to implement all the Ebizframe modules. The company bought all the 12
modules supplied by the Ebizframe ERP package. However, only the Finance, Human Resource,
Sales, Purchasing and Inventory management modules were implemented. Other modules were not
implemented due to lack of time. Other modules have been turned off due unreliablity of data
which can be traced back to data conversion problems experienced during implementation. The IT
manager confirmed that ACFC is utilising less than 50% of functionality in those modules imple-
mented. Due to limited implemented functionality, ERP is mainly used for transaction processing
and most of the reports were transaction based. No effort has been made to adopt tools which
can assist in enhancing the reporting capability of the system in order to improve decision making
within the organisation.
Training
One of the complaints by users regarding ERP implementation at ACFC was about training. Most
of the users claimed that the training was inadequate and mainly concentrated on how to use the
system in carrying out their specific duties. Users interviewed thought that the company tried
to cut costs by cutting user training which later on resulted into a major problem. For example,
the Account Receivable clerks had three options when receiving payments from customers. The
payment can be received against an invoice in which case the payment is matched with the related
invoice thereby the invoice gets ‘knocked out’ of the system. The other option is receiving payments
195
against the customers account in which case the payment would credit the customer’s account.
However, the training did not inform the account clerks which of these options should be used, and
the effect these two payment options had on the entire system. The Account Receivable clerks were
only taught how to receive payments against the customers account, and therefore applied the same
the method for all the incoming payments. The overall effect was that the system ended up with
‘dirty data’ which reduced the reliability of the information from the system. Receiving payments
based on customers accounts when the payments related particular invoices produced inaccurate
reports on the customers balances. The customer ageing report were also inaccurate because the
system showed that the invoices had not been paid yet while in actual fact they were paid for but
not matched with the related payments. Due to inadequate training, most of the end users at
ACFC have low control over ERP system and work processes, and are not comfortable with ERP.
The users were also reluctant to experiment with the system due to the inadequate training given
to them.
Users feel that their expertise is more targeted on the basic handling of the system rather than
on thorough understanding of its embedded processes: “the training was more on how to use
the software, not necessarily how to think through it,” observed one of the interviewees. Users
acknowledged that they were using the ERP in a fairly limited capacity:
There are a lot of things that I need to learn. I know a lot of reports that are out
there, but I don’t know how to read them, or use them. I don’t feel that I know the
system inside out. I feel that I can navigate the system to do what I need to do (Sales
clerk).
The use of the ERP system at ACFC was therefore limited to its basic features. Staff are beginning
to use ERP. Users find it difficult to experiment with the system. Their level of control and comfort
with the system, accordingly, is low. Like initial implementations, ERP initiatives at this level are
mainly system-driven.
Therefore, training at ACFC was relating to basic features on how to use the system. Currently
due to problems relating to the ERP system usage, ACFC has recognised the need for training for
various functional and technical users. Two staff members were sponsored to undertake further
training in Oracle reports to be able to create ad hoc reports from the system. Key users have
also been identified in various department and are earmarked for training. However, there was no
standardised processes in identification of areas where users need to be trained in and who are
eligible for this training. In the absense of an organised programme, users have been identifying
and attending training courses on their own. The overall management approach lacks any cohesion




ACFC bought all the module from the same vendor. The management expectation was that once the
ERP implementation was complete then the three legacy systems – weighbridge system, payroll, and
financial system – would be abandoned. Given that that all the modules were from the same vendor
there was no need to create an interface between functional modules embedded within the ERP.
However, due to incompatibility issues (discussed later in this section), the company was forced
to abandon the ERP payroll module and revert to the legacy payroll system. This necessitated
the creation of interface between the legacy payroll system and Ebizframe ERP financial module to
allow the posting of employees salaries into the ERP system. However, there was no interface which
was created. Instead, users manually post employees salaries into the finance module of the ERP
system using journal vouchers at the end of every month. Therefore, there is a manual transfer
of data between payroll legacy system and the ERP system. Nevertheless, there exists interface
between ERP modules and sub-modules across organisational functions.
A.2.2 Organisational Context
Organisation and IT Strategy Alignment
Document analysis of the business and project reports did not reveal a generally accepted framework
for business strategy at ACFC. The documents were more focused on budget, tactical plans, and
governance rather than strategic direction of the enterprise. The IT strategy document dating back
to 1996, also lacked strategic focus with regard to IT usage in supporting business strategy. Most
of the managers interviewed were unwilling to include IT strategy discussions in their respective
business areas. The ERP system project and the previous IT investments were not in any way
linked to business strategy. The project manager mentioned that due to the short-term view of the
ERP project, most of the senior managers perceived the ERP system as an expense rather than as
an asset or investment. They lacked the understanding that IT has value beyond a method to cut
costs.
Orientation to Change
Some departments within ACFC had experienced more change than others in the past, and these
departments were more willing to embrace changes necessitated by ERP system. The more stable
departments did not respond as readily. For example, human resource was perceived to be rela-
tively stable without external influences. The human resources department was therefore reluctant
to accept the ERP system throughout the project lifetime. On the other hand the purchasing de-
partment was prone to frequent changes relating to directive from the ministry. The ERP system
was enthusiastically accepted by end users given that it simplified procurement processes but was
vehemently resisted by the senior managers within the department as it was perceived to be a
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threat to the source of their livelihood because it provided a platform for promoting transparency
in transactions hence eliminating corruption. As one team member said, “different streams (di-
visions) have adapted differently”. For example, the Ebizframe sales and distribution operations
function was the most complex to implement and the division responsible had experienced the least
change in the past. It had the greatest difficulty in adapting to integrated, common processes. The
implementation team had to spend more time building a business case and working with the people
in reluctant departments than they had originally anticipated. This ultimately had an adverse
effect on the completion schedule of the project which contributed to the project going beyond the
deadline and over the budget. The IT manager said that:
(They) adapted very poorly early on. We’ve worked with them and now, 3 years
later, they are still not doing fine. They still do not believe the data and are uncom-
fortable with it.
This was exacerbated in 2006 when ACFC was fined a huge sum of money for tax evasion. However,
the organisation absolved itself from the blame claiming that the ERP system was responsible for
inaccurate remission of employees pay as you earn tax. On the other hand, the purchasing de-
partment was accustomed to change because it operates in an “acquisition and trade environment”.
It had an easier time adapting except for the few managers. We heard, “upstream is primarily
accounting-based, so with the changing economy they got used to Change”, and have adapted to
Ebizframe more readily.
Orientation to change stood out as an important influence on the acquisition process, especially in
the case of ACFC, where users had “a lot of power in determining their functionality”. Although
ACFC had included business process re-engineering (BPR) as a criterion for the ERP solution
they wanted, it would have been very difficult for ACFC’s management to implement organisa-
tional change through process redesign. If ACFC had selected SAP as their primary choice, the
acquisition team admitted that it would have been very difficult sell to its users. Therefore, the
choice of Ebizframe augured well with the organisation because they were able to carry out mass
customisation on the system which would have been otherwise impossible or would have lead to
additional cost with SAP. According to the IT officer:
SAP is sold as is. You do not change SAP. The organisation has to change its
processes to accommodate SAP. If you do not want to change your processes, then
you do not buy SAP. If you want the best practices as per SAP and you want a new
software, then you buy SAP.
Management’s feeling is that it is harder to change a process than a software, and users at ACFC
wanted to change the software because they did not want to change their processes. Hence, the
final recommendation of ACFC’s adoption team was influenced by this factor. It also influenced




Before, the ERP implementation, the ACFC organisational structure could be described as de-
centralised. Most of ACFC’s business departments were operating as highly autonomous silos
optimising their own goals, resulting in internal competition as espoused in the extract below:
we’re really good at competing with each other, but we haven’t been as good at com-
peting with external competitors. For example, ACFC alcohol competes with ACFC
bakery and yeast for resources (Marketing Manager).
The culture was one in which departments were essentially pitted against each other. They each
sought to optimise their own goals, with little awareness of whether they were accomplishing overall
organisational goals. Autonomous decision making not only abounded, but was viewed by the de-
partments as necessary for their own survival. Therefore, the cross-divisional collaboration required
in an ERP implementation was quite counter to the mindset of those on the team. This culture of
internal competition had a negative effect on the requirement elicitation stage of implementation
in that it discouraged team members from sharing business process knowledge. Each department
viewed information as power and they were not willing to share information across organisational
functions. More effort in form of change management had to be put in place to change this attitude.
Managers who felt that they were losing their autonomy and control of the departments, tried to
sabotage the project.
Information Sharing Perception
Information at ACFC was regarded as a valuable resource by individuals and by the department.
For individuals, it was seen as job security guarantee. For the department, it provided a competitive
advantage against other departments due to internal competition mentioned above. The project
functional teams had difficulty in dealing with this perception among project team members from
different functional areas. There was a tendency of information hoarding. This had a negative
impact on the ERP implementation. There was suspicion as to the true intent of the project. The
majority of the employees had worked in the organisation for more than 20 years. They saw ERP
as a threat to their work.
Orientation to Collaboration
Prior to Ebizframe, working in a project team had a negative connotation and, consequently, people
did not like to work in teams. “Once someone is on a project, they are always destined to be a
project person”. It is difficult for a person to go back to their old job once they are pulled out
for a project. Teams sometimes, although not always, were used as a dumping ground for weak
employees. The culture was one where isolation was more valued than collaboration. Although they
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were able to successfully facilitate knowledge sharing in the implementation team at first, they were
not able to overcome the culture of isolation and in the long run knowledge sharing required by
the ERP team eventually broke down. When the researcher joined the organisation in 2003, he
initiated team-bonus as a measure to build collaboration and boost information sharing.
Power Distance
Being a government corporation, ACFC was strictly conforming to the organisational structures and
its hierarchies. Seniority and functional distinctions were highly upheld. There was a clear chain
of command which had to be followed in carrying out certain duties. ERP project management
required senior people to work alongside junior staff on the functional implementation teams, and
if the lower level employees had an idea or wanted to try something, the senior people listened to
them, and in some cases took direction from them. “In the old culture a lower level person wouldn’t
say what they thought in front of a more senior person”. This worked well in the beginning, but as
the project progressed, senior people began to resent the fact that junior people knew more than
they did about both the processes and the Ebizframe software. Eventually, the attitudes of the
senior people created an environment in which the freedom to express ideas was inhibited and this
had an adverse effect on the ERP system implementation.
Basis of Truth and Rationality
The organisation valued personal experience which had been accumulated by long serving employ-
ees. Hard data was hardly used as the basis of truth or in making major decisions.
A.2.3 ERP Implementation Challenges
Incompatibility
ACFC at the time of implementing ERP in 2003 was the sole producer of alcohol and methylated
spirit in the East Africa region. As a result, its products were in high demand nationally and
across the East African region. To add to the high demand, some of its products were consumed in
Europe. The demand was so high that customers had to pay for the products in advance when the
goods were still in production. This was unique in the sense that the business process embedded
in the Ebizframe ERP system assumed the standard practice in which sales invoice needs to be
raised once the goods had been dispatched and payment made against the invoice. This inherent
assumption was against ACFC business practice of receiving payments from customers whose goods
were yet to be supplied. The purchasing manager said:
Our case is very unique. . .most of our products are paid for before being supplied;
actually 100% of our sales are paid for in advance.
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In order to a raise sales invoice in the system, the system required a dispatch note to be raised
first. A dispatch note is an accounting document specifying items being supplied, and the quanti-
ties. However, given that customers at ACFC were paying for good waiting to be supplied it was
impossible to raise the dispatch note and consequently the sales invoice. Theoretically speaking the
system was unable to accommodate advance payments from customers. This is consistent with the
idea of ‘best practice’ being situated. The assistant purchasing manager exclaimed that:
Given our unique requirement, Ebizframe could not meet our need. The system
could not accept advance payments. It required us to raise DN [Delivery Note] first
then raise sales invoice and they receive payment against the invoice. We don’t work
that way.
For ACFC, the value of the ‘missing’ feature was grounded in its financial effectiveness, and was
not reflecting on the reality of the business. The main expectation was that Ebizframe would be
‘flexible’ as their previous system so that they would be able to adapt it to fit their organisations
sales and procurement policies and practices. Once users started interacting with it, Ebizframe was
no longer interpreted as ‘flexible’ since the software had very ‘rigid’ and ‘limited’ features. The
above excerpt is in line with Orlikowski’s (2002) argument about technology affordance. Affordances
are the functions and operations which are provided by a technology. A particular technology may
be very limited in scope providing only a single function. On the other hand a technology may
provide many and varied functionalities being multi-faceted in nature.
In order to make up for the lacking functionality in Ebizframe, users resorted to strategies aimed
at restoring the missing functionality in the system. A cost account accountant explained that:
We noted that we could accomplish the same task in a way that was provided by
the system by working around it. Something we call workaround which means that
something the system does not normally do, you turn around the system because you
know functions in the system that can handle this thing.
The cost accountant gave description of the workaround:
We realised that the system could accept advance payment based on customers
accounts. . . we therefore instructed all the accounts clerks to receive advance payment
based on the customers accounts
The creative use of accepting payments based on customers account to cater for missing functionality
or to address incompatibility with the work practice is one of the elements coded as coping strategies.
In this case the coping strategy is workaround.
Due to the integrated nature of ERP system, despite all the actions and events reported in this
case, advance payment continued to be an issue affecting ERP use. Receiving payments based on
customers accounts meant that once the goods had been dispatched and sales invoice raised, there
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was no way of ‘knocking-out’ the sales invoice. They remained in the system as pending or not yet
paid for. Usually payments are received against the sales invoice thereby changing their status as
having been paid for. A management accountant said:
The system shows that all the sale invoices which were raised since we went live in
2003 are still pending [not yet paid for]. This is because customer paid for the goods in
advance and by the time we raise DN and sales invoice, we have no way of knocking-out
the sales invoice.
The result is that that management accounts get wrong customer ageing report. The management
accountant further commented that:
Because advance payments are received based on customer accounts leaving the
associated sale invoice pending, our customer ageing report is inaccurate. This report
is very important in accounting practice.
By the user restoring the functionality of ERP system through“workaround” is an acknowledgement
that while users can use technologies as they were designed, they also circumvent prescribed ways
of using the technologies –either ignoring certain properties of the technology, working around
them, or inventing new ones that may go beyond or even contradict designer’s expectations and
inscriptions.
One of the major motivations for implementation of the Human resource suite of modules at ACFC
was to achieve a higher degree of integration between the HR and other functions especially the
finance and purchasing modules. The reason for this is because ACFC provides fuel to its employees
up to a certain limit depending with their position (grade). When an employee goes above his/her
limit per month, the quantity above the limit is billed and gets deducted from the employees’ salary
for that month. This transaction had an effect on the purchasing module (issuer of the good) and
the financial modules (for billing purposes).
The implementation of HR provided an opportunity to extend the functionality beyond that tra-
ditionally provided by the ACFC’s existing legacy systems. For example, the organisation had
its own, custom-designed system for payroll administration. As the payroll clerk we interviewed
explained, the move to Ebizframe HR promised a more comprehensive system with integrated func-
tions for performance management, leave administration, recruitment, separations etc. It would
also assist in extending the self-service approach to the delivery of HR functions. For example,
leave application and administration were traditionally fully manual and paper-based. The ERP
offered a fully online, automated computer-based system for staff leave. In short, the Ebizframe
HR application represented an opportunity for ACFC to do things smarter than previously and to
gain efficiency as a result.
In the case of the payroll module ACFC persevered with it for nine months until a decision was made
to turn it off and resort to the old payroll administration module. The decision to disable the payroll
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module and revert to the old system in its place provides one example of where the anticipated
efficiency gains could not be realised. Rather than leading to a reduction in the amount of labour
devoted to processing payroll, a new system of manually posting salaries using journal vouchers into
the Ebizframe was established. The decision to customise where necessary was a pragmatic move on
the organisation’s part and indicated a belief that it should not have to change business practices
and processes simply to fit the requirements of the ERP. Had they not effected customisations,
users would have lacked confidence in the system and perhaps would have been unable to develop
skills necessary to operate it to the benefit of the organisation and in many instances would, where
possible, have resisted using it. In addition, it confirms that use of technology is not a choice
among predefined possibilities, but a situated and recursive process of constitution which –while
may often invoke intended activities or replicate familiar uses –may also and at any time ignore
such conventional uses or invent new ones.
Users while interacting with the payroll system at ACFC drew from its inscribed properties and
embedded information content, their own experiences with technology, as well as their understand-
ing of their rights and obligations as tax payers, to enact set of tax reporting rules and resources
with the software.
Another issue which rose at ACFC is that staff did not like the fact that data entry rules determined
by the system were inconsistent with traditional company terminology, processes and procedures
and were thus unfamiliar to ACFC users. For example, the system used the term ‘Challan’ to
refer to an invoice. This did not augur well with users who termed the system ‘reflecting business
scenario in India’ where the system was developed. As a result many customisations occurred as a
result of negative employee feedback about the new system once it was operationalised.
A.3 KenGen and KPLC
Discussion on Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) and Kenya Electricity Generating
Company (KenGen) is provided under one section because at the time of ERP implementation in
1996, KPLC and KenGen were one company. The company’s name at the time of ERP implemen-
tation was KPLC and was operating electricity generation, transmission, and distribution business.
KPLC was later split in 1997 and two organisations formed out of it, namely: KPLC and KenGen.
As a result, the drivers to ERP adoption and the methodology of ERP implementation is the same
for both companies. KenGen took over the business of electricity generation while KPLC remained
with the business of transmission and distribution of electricity. In the same year, Electricity Reg-
ulatory Board (ERB) was formed to oversee the functioning of the two companies and the entire
energy sector in Kenya.
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A.3.1 ERP implementation practice
ERP Drivers and Background
Structural Adjustment Programmes discussed in the previous chapter was a major influence towards
ERP adoption and implementation at KPLC and KenGen. Privatisation of energy was included
amongst these conditions during the structural adjustment Programme. Substantial amount of
concession loan funding –including eligibility for debt relief –was pegged on achieving privatisation
targets. Therefore, privatisations were hastily implemented, with extensive concessions offered to
attract investors as governments’ bargaining position is weakened. It was during this period that
the government was forced to reduce its shareholding at KPLC effectively transforming it to public
limited company. Since then the company shares became listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange
(NSF). In addition, it was required to foster domestic and external competition by liberalising the
market. This was another major blow to KPLC which had enjoyed monopoly since its inception in
1955.
Streamlining of the company’s processes coupled with tight control and monitoring was deemed
as being essential if KPLC had to survive in the liberalised market and also to comply with the
tight budgetary control measures. A programme dubbed Institutional Strengthening Programme
(ISP) was formed with the mandate of looking for ways and means of strengthening the company’s
operations and management. The ISP commenced in 1995. Its objective was to prepare the KPLC
for successful entry into the emerging liberalised market where private sector power companies
would play a more significant role. This was to be realised through harnessing and improving its
competitive advantages thus allowing them to achieve survival, growth, profitability and stability
leading to their eventual dominance in line with their respective corporate missions.
The main objective was to re-engineer existing operational norms and procedures and undertake
training and retraining of the human resources of the company which was aimed at dramatic change
in corporate culture. The re-engineered operations were to be supported by new tools including
computer systems. Members from various functional (departments) units were seconded to the ISP
project committee.
ISP targeted the core business areas of generation, transmission, distribution, and generation, as
well as support areas of finance, human resource, logistics and transport. The necessary tech-
nical infrastructure covering a new computer centre and telecommunications network was to be
established. ISP took a strong initiative to automate most of the business activities at KPLC by
using relatively latest the ICT technology in order to be effective and efficient in delivery of energy
services to the public and remain competitive in the Kenyan market.
A group comprising of the then Managing Director made a site visit to UNION FENOSA, a Spanish-
based company operating power generation and distribution business in Spain. UNION FENOSA
is involved in electricity trading in Spain and in the European Union. The team was impressed by
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ICT installation at UNION FENOSA. Among the application systems that had been implemented
at UNION FENOSA was SAP R/3 that was mainly for its support and core services. The visit
acted as an eye opener to what IT can do in transforming an utility organisation practices by
providing an opportunity for reengineering major organizational processes and for achieving better
business outcomes over time as a result of more informed managerial decision making processes.
In addition to structural adjustment programme, Y2K compliance problem facilitate the need for a
system which was compliant with the millennium bug. ERP was perceived as a long term solution
to the Y2K problem.
Because of the perceived technical and organizational benefits of ERP, the MD and the ERP
committee began to view the turn of the millennium as an opportunity rather than a threat. They
thus proposed to top management of KPLC to avoid a Y2K conversion altogether and implement
instead a Y2K-compliant ERP system that would facilitate:
1. Renewing the hardware at KPLC, from host-centric to network-centric and the software
infrastructure at KPLC, from outdated to modern;
2. Supporting the transition of KPLC from single-firm to multi-firm structure and from local
to regional operations; and
3. Using the ERP implementation project at KPLC as a pilot from which other members in the
government corporations in Kenya can learn.
Once top management approved the ERP implementation, a decision was made to abandon all
upgrading of existing systems and to put on hold plans for developing new applications. For exam-
ple, the company had a billing system known as CUSTIMA. This system was implemented on ICL
DRS6000 mini-computer which was not very stable. The application CUSTIMA was maintained
by a consulting firm stationed in South Africa. It was realised that this system was not stable and
reliable in many ways as far as company business was concerned. Some of the problems mentioned
by the interviewees regarding the system were that: it was not performing as expected; it was
very slow in processing; it was not stable due to database indexing failing all the time; it had a
poor security controls, thus open to fraud; concept of billing was not in line with corporate billing
procedures; it could not be integrated; the source code was maintained by the vendor and was quite
expensive; it had no cash collection module; and it was hard to interface with hand held sets for
electricity meter reading.
The search process that followed, for software and hardware, ended in choosing the SAP R/3 ERP
software package from SAP AG, the Oracle DMBS software from Oracle, and the server hardware
from HP. The fit between SAP R/3 and KPLC’s needs was excellent for the following reasons:
• SAP met the main functional requirements of KPLC because its utility-industry version of
R/3 had already quite a number of installations worldwide among them in Spain where the
MD and ERP committee visited;
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• SAP was holding the biggest market share in the world, in general, and in Kenya with most
implementation being by multinationals like Caltex, in particular;
• SAP was investing more in R&D than competitors;
• R/3 was localized in terms of language, currency, and regulations of many countries, including
Kenya, where SAP partnered with the SOLUZIONA, an experienced SAP consultancy vendor
with whom KPLC has had good relations.
Toward the end of 1995, the resolutions made by top management at KPLC guided the imple-
mentation project so as to increase the prospects of reaching successful completion of the SAP
R/3 implementation by December, 1997. Oriented towards thorough project and risk management,
these resolutions aimed at carefully controlling project size, technology, and structure.
In order to put an upper lid on project size, KPLC chose to concentrate on implementing the
functions which were already automated at KPLC (financial accounting, material management
(inventory, purchasing and MRP), controlling, treasury and human resources, rather than imple-
menting all SAP R/3 modules. The only exception was plant maintenance and production system.
The reason for not implementing production and plant maintenance modules is because they were
running specialised softwares for those purposes and they were widely used in utility sector/industry.
The finance module had an in-built billing sub-module which even though was implemented, was
not used by KPLC because the company felt that billing is such a crucial process that they can not
experiment with something which is unknown. KPLC therefore still uses a legacy system which is
interfaced with ERP system to carry out billing. In addition, KPLC is not using transport manage-
ment system despite being one of the modules that was bought and the organisation having large
fleet being managed by an old system.
Another critical decision was to avoid parallel implementation and its associated interfacing efforts,
opting instead for the more risky “big-bang” transition to SAP R/3. Since IS professionals within
KPLC were unfamiliar with SAP R/3 technology, management realized that outsourcing the big-
bang implementation project could reduce project risk.
ERP project team prepared a report that recommended contracting SOLUZIONA International
and its subsidiary UNION FENOSA to carry out restructuring of the business processes and suggest
information systems which could meet KPLC needs. SOLUZIONA International is a Spanish con-
sulting company with vast experience in the field of utility and energy, Infrastructure and transport,
telecommunications, and a leading position as a multi-sector information technology consultant.
The report was presented before the board of directors for approval. UNION FENOSA (UF) was
to be aid in the business re-engineering. UF subcontracted IBERA AFRICA, a power generation
company in Spain to carry out the business process re-engineering of power generation, while UF
re-engineered the transmission and distribution business processes. By contracting SOLUZIONA
and as the implementing vendor, KPLC was able to overcome the pressing need for unique SAP R/3
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skills and knowledge. Even thought it was resolved that customization of SAP R/3 to KPLC needs
should be avoided as much as possible, customization became inevitable due to the fact that KPLC
was operating under state corporation act and therefore it had to abide by the regulation stipulated
in the Act while conducting business. Project policy discouraged process reengineering and there
was willingness on the part of management to reengineer new SAP R/3-supported processes and
replace the old unsupportable ones.
Once the implementation commenced, the MD reported once a month to the board of directors
about progress made. The CEO was committed to the implementation project and regularly briefed
managers at all levels about his vision and expectations. Members of top management became very
involved in the implementation project and each was asked to assume responsibility, as a top user,
for implementing modules within their functional area. To make sure that implementation ended
on time and within budget, the project was broken up into milestones. Since meeting milestone
goals and target dates was deemed critical, any delay needed top management approval.
Measures were taken to facilitate prompt decisive action. A steering committee was formed to
set priorities, to handle conflict resolution throughout the project, and to promptly respond to
problems. For each functional area, a joint team of three, composed of the respective top user, an
SAP R/3 expert from IBERA AFRICA, and a systems analyst from KPLC, was created. The team,
assigned with responsibility for part of the implementation project, was put in charge of choosing
among SAP R/3 processes and reports and setting priorities. Since a significant portion of top-user
time was allotted to the implementation, they developed familiarity with the new environment
and, later on, became very effective in providing the initial response to problems that emerged. IS
professionals were constantly briefed with respect to progress as well as with respect to difficulties
and ways to get around them. They were encouraged to report any concern to the respective top
manager to insure a fast solution.
As planned, SAP R/3 modifications were limited to the minimum and permitted under exceptional
conditions and only with formal CEO approval. The formal procedure, instituted to discourage
R/3 modifications, was practiced throughout the project, despite a number of unsuccessful attempts
to eliminate it, especially given that KPLC was a government corporation with unique reporting
requirements and business practices. Inconsistent with the initial intention to limit customisation
to a minimum, a significant processes were customised. Significant reengineering also took place.
The reengineered service entry process, for example, was perceived by users to be “the right thing
to do” because it was dictated by SAP R/3. They thus willingly adopted it before noticing that,
because the new more reliable service entry process was 50% to 60% faster, a few jobs had to be
eliminated. In any case, none of the employees whose jobs were eliminated was asked to leave
KPLC. Instead, they were transferred to other departments that were hiring at the time.
KPLC was willing to abandon customisation as much as it could, putting a lid on modifications and
willing to force modification avoidance except under special circumstances. In an organizational
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culture that values labour relations, a threat of labour unrest in the form of a strike presents such
special circumstances. The union was therefore consulted whenever avoiding SAP R/3 modifications
impacted compensation. In at least one case, the union’s disapproval of modification avoidance
forced an SAP R/3 modification and labor relations were not hurt. It is noteworthy however that
the union was willing, in most cases, to go along with and accept the implications of modification
avoidance.
The ERP motivation and implementation discussed above applied to KenGen until 1998, when
KPLC was split into two as mentioned earlier. When KenGen was inaugurated in 1998, the company
continued with the Institutional Strengthening Project which began in 1995 at KPLC. KPLC, as
the manager of KenGen facilities before the split in 1998, implemented ISP activities related to the
generation until 1997/98. Under the minute number JISP.16/98, the KenGen Board approved
the establishment of a computer centre and implementation of relevant computer applications
recommended by the ISP. The product developed by ISP in KPLC for the generation did suffer
any alterations but were instead wholly transferred to KenGen. The segregation affected all the
support areas of business – finance, human resources, and logistics. Given that these services were
being supported by SAP ERP the system needed to be reconfigured in both organisations. Others
areas affected by segregation included organisation, hardware/software and telecommunication, and
generation.
Because the emerging business was previously managed by KPLC, the implementation of infor-
mation systems had an effect on both companies as both companies were required to undertake
particular tasks for a smooth transition to take place. For example, in the finance area there was
need to identify suppliers to be transferred from the accounts receivable module, and need to delete
cost centres which were transferred to KenGen in the controlling module. On the other hand there
was need for auditing the balance on accounts payable transferred from KPLC, and definition of
the new structure of KenGen and its relevant cost centres. The assets were also to be split calling
for transferring of assets and adjusting the relevant accounts in the fixed asset module. The norms
and procedures, and the company policies had to be defined for KenGen. This required that all
forms and internal documents and information had to be defined from the scratch at KenGen. On
the other hand, some of the norms and procedures needed to be modified inside KPLC to reflect the
new situation calling for users retraining. Given that some staffs were transferred, some positions
inside KPLC needed to be filled by new users who needed to be trained. Therefore, SAP ERP adop-
tion at KenGen had mainly to do with system reconfiguration. The company carried on with the
consultancy services of SOLUZIONA and IBERA AFRICA in reengineering and implementation
of ERP.
The main motivation for ERP system at KenGen and KPLC was the structural adjustment pro-
grammes which were sweeping across the entire globe. ERP was seen as a preparation for KenGen
and KPLC to enter a competitive environment which was to result from deregulation of sectors
formerly controlled by the government. Other main drive for ERP adoption mentioned by the in-
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terviewees was the Y2K problem. Problems posed bespoke systems formerly used such redundancy
of data and high maintenance costs were also cited as the drivers of ERP adoption at KPLC. The
focus of installing SAP R/3 at KenGen and KPLC was to cut costs and improve operations by
leveraging common processes within the organisation. ERP system was installed in multiple sites
within Kenya.
ERP Post-implementation Activities
Soon after completing ERP reconfiguration in 1999, KenGen embarked on SAP R/3 upgrade pro-
gram. The upgrade was from version 3.1H, which was inherited from KPLC to version 4.5B. The
scope of the upgrade limited to technical. SAP vendor, SAP AG, had discontinued online support
for version 3.1H. In addition, the vendor was charging additional 2 per cent on annual maintenance
to support the old version of SAP R/3. Even though the upgrade was carried out, majority of the
end users were not aware about it. No training was carried for the upgrade. The only noticeable
change was on the ‘front end’ i.e. the SAP user interface. An interviewee made this comment:
. . .most of us don’t know about the upgrade. In fact I am hearing it from you
for the first time. May be the technical team were involved but for us the (users) we
weren’t.
IT manager commented that the upgrade served as a test ground for the company for two reasons
1) no other company had done an upgrade in Kenya, 2) the consultants had no previous experience
with SAP upgrade. The upgrade project ended up being expensive with too many resources being
used. The company had very few SAP certified employees at that time prompting the company to
hire many consultants. The learning curve was high for the team. In 2001 the company carried out
a second upgrade, this time upgrading from 4.3i to 4.5B. Like the second upgrade, end users were
not involved. Most of them remained unaware of the upgrade. This could be attributed to the fact
that the scope was narrow targeting only technical upgrade, leaving out business improvement and
knowledge transfer. While carrying out the second upgrade, the company reaped from the previous
experience and avoided the pitfalls of the previous upgrade.
ERP upgrade at KPLC was carried out in 2006, nine years after the initial implementation. The first
ERP upgrade project began in June 2006, with December 2006 set as the ‘going-live’ target date.
Unlike the initial implementation project, all the business managers were not actively involved and
they remained as fence sitters in the project. In addition, outsourcing of ERP functional consultants
was ruled out and, instead, the internal IS team was put in charge. The technical upgrade was
done offshore by Global solution consultants based in Bangalore, India. The upgrade project was
perceived by both business and IS management as a pure IS project, requiring minimal involvement
of business management. Thus, the IS Division formed three steering committees, comprised mainly
of IS personnel, who met once a week, and the IT manager reported to the top management about
progress of the upgrade project once a month.
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The message conveyed to employees was that the benefits of the first ERP upgrade project to
Version 4.7, being technical in nature, would be limited mainly to improvements in the human
computer interface without necessarily solving problems encountered in Version 3.1. Based on the
success of dedicated module teams in the initial implementation project, KPLC formed upgrade
teams for each module composed of a top user and a system analyst. Yet, unlike in the initial
implementation project, it was also pretty clear from the start that the involvement of users in the
ERP upgrade project would be minimal and would be required in addition to, and not instead of,
their regular duties. Therefore, top users assigned to the joint upgrade teams were reluctant to put
in extra effort when required. For example, two testing rounds were required for each upgraded
business process. First, according to SAP documentation, even though top users were supposed
to scan for each object in Version 3.1 and its respective object in Version 4.7, the IS professionals
themselves ended up doing this scanning process prior to installation of Version 4.7. Second, after
installation, upgrade teams were supposed to test each module. Middle-management, however,
ignored requests from IS management to free top users for testing in both rounds, thus forcing IS
professionals to do the testing with the help of an external testing firm, the cost of which was not
initially budgeted.
In the absence of top-user involvement, these two testing phases discovered only 30% of the prob-
lems, with most of the problems not surfacing during testing but emerging after the upgraded
Version 4.7 was up and running. Consequently, the first few days after going live turned out to be
traumatic. For example, most users were unable to access the system due to comprehensive changes
in authorization procedures. Similarly, users refrained from attending training classes since their
managers did not enforce full attendance as they did in the initial implementation project. Version
4.7 went live at KPLC in a somewhat incomplete manner in April 2007, about four months later
and at a higher cost than originally planned, for a number of reasons.
First, KPLC ended up spending more than anticipated on training. Second, some of the testing had
to be outsourced. Third, despite the pre-emptive actions taken with regard to the IS infrastructure
before commencing the first ERP upgrade project, the existing workstations provided poor response
time. This difficulty, not previously mentioned by any SAP expert, came as a total surprise to IS
management and caused dissatisfaction among users. Since replacing the workstations would have
caused a major budget overrun, the solution was to run 3-tier architecture that was novel to KPLC,
reducing the workstations to thin clients by purchasing Citrix licenses and servers. It is notable
that this three-tier architecture was not widely used before at SAP installations, thus posing a
considerable risk to KPLC. In fact, only in 2004 did SAP and Citrix publish a joint manual on
these strategies (Haendly, Koopman, & Roberts, 2004). Fourth, employees who refrained from
attending the training classes did not know how to operate the new user interface. Fifth, KPLC
had developed 300 add-on programs to cater for needs which could not be fulfilled by R/3 which
needed to be incorporated into the new version.
Although the upgraded version functioned quite smoothly after solving these and other problems,
210
management felt that they were much less prepared for the first upgrade project than for the initial
implementation project. To them, a supposedly simple and technical upgrade project turned out
to be rather complex and resource consuming.
ERP Implementation Scope
ERP implementation at KPLC was more inclined to optimising the support services within the
organisation. In the case of KenGen, the key process involves electricity generation and transmis-
sion while in the case of KPLC the key process is customer billing. However, both organisations
implemented less than the fundamental basics of ERP modules which included Finance, Materials
Management, and Human Resource and Payroll. None of the two organisations are using ERP sys-
tem to support their key processes despite the fact that SAP R/3 has modules which support their
key processes. The ERP systems are limited to three departments namely the finance, purchasing
and procurement, and human resource departments. Given both KenGen and KPLC have offices
nationally, ERP was first implemented at the head office in Nairobi. Subsequent implementation
was carried out in major towns in Kenya. KenGen faced major hurdles in the venture of rolling out
ERP in regional plants due the fact that electricity generating plants are located in remote areas
with poor telecommunication infrastructure and network. Of the modules implemented in both
organisations, we estimated that they are using less than 50% of functionality. For instance, the
SAP R/3 module has a billing module which is not being used instead the company is still the old
legacy system. In both companies, transport management system embedded in the system is not
being used and instead a legacy system is being used. The researcher went through the predefined
reports available on the system and asked the interviewees (users) whether they were using the
reports. Most of them reported that they were not using the reports.
KenGen and KPLC were more concerned with consolidating their internal data rather than ex-
tending beyond their four walls. Therefore, in regard to ERP adoption and implementation, it can
be concluded that they had an internal focus.
ERP Benefits
Business benefits are measured and some quantifiable gains have been achieved but significant
additional opportunities exist for further payback. SAP R/3 has also provided KPLC and KenGen
with some tangible savings: the number of pages printed per month was reduced by 80% from
about 25000 to about 5000, because of the better ability to query online instead of printing reports.
The number of shifts for server operations has gone down from 3 to 1.5 per day. With all batch
processes substituted by online ones, information provision has improved in the sense that the raw
data is now more up to date. Thus, for example, it is now possible to know in real time (as opposed
to twice a week before ERP) what the real inventory levels are and, therefore, KPLC is saving
money on inventory without hurting production in any way. Because of the uniformity of screens
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for different modules, it is now possible to easily carry a transaction from one module to another
(e.g., from a costing screen to a contractor screen). Another improvement has to do with the
way materials are ordered from the warehouse. Until the ERP implementation, precious time was
wasted when workers came to pick up materials without verifying availability beforehand. Under
SAP R/3, pickup from the warehouse is permitted only after availability is verified through remote
inquiry.
Training
Training at KenGen and KPLC was carried out before and after ERP implementation. The ini-
tial training targeted key users. Key users were employees who were regarded to have sufficient
knowledge in their respective functional units. The training was focused on the overall integration
of ERP modules and how to use the system in accomplishing tasks. Therefore, training provided
for both work processes and IT features. There was awareness of the need for training and educa-
tion for associated modules throughout the ERP project cycle within the organisation. After the
implementation, the company sponsored a number of employees to pursue further training leading
to certification their respective functional areas. Given that there is no local SAP offices in Kenya,
the employees sponsored had to undertake their training in South Africa. Training initiative was
well planned. The organisations first identified individual performance plans of each user. Both
companies have consistent communication of the overall training needs and issues and mechanisms
of how to address them. Budgets, resources, facilities and trainers are being established to support
the training and education program. This is because the companies have realised that in order to
optimise the system, there is need have competent users, and also that ERP implementation is not
a one-time off event but it is rather continuous process.
A.3.2 Organisational contextual influences
Orientation to Change
KPLC was able to make a number of changes as a result of SAP R/3 implementation, even though
it had been largely stable in the past. Prior to SAP R/3, each area was judged based on its own
success within its own area of responsibility. However, after the implementation of ERP system, the
focus shifted from optimizing each unit’s success to optimizing overall corporate success through
collaboration and common processes. As one person said,
SAP made my job harder because I came out of a world where I controlled a
relatively small team and every aspect of that system. . . . You had control over your
own silo. You didn’t have a consolidated customer master file, for example.
Thus, the above discourse suggests that managers at KPLC were forced to change from manag-
ing autonomous silos to managing pieces that fit into an integrated whole. Given that KPLC
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embraced the changes and the fact that KPLC indulged in business process re-engineering before
ERP implementation was coded manifestation of being focused in continuous improvement. Change
was widely accepted at KPLC because organizational member became accustomed to change and
viewed it positively. However, there are some areas which the organisation had to keep unchanged.
The reason being that they contradicted the guidelines provided by State Corporation Act which
governs KPLC operations. Another area where KPLC users wanted to maintain status quo was in
the human resource and payroll practices. Again the reason for this is the fact that SAP R/3 in-
built taxation policies did not match the Kenyan Taxation policies as stipulated by Kenya Revenue
Authority. The human resource manager mentioned that:
Sometimes you’re going to have to bend, but we bent too much. . . In our payroll
module, we’ve sort of modified our system immensely to match custom and practice
and my best example of not going vanilla is we took our payroll system which was
developed in Cobol and we’ve tried to copy the exact thoughts and exact processes
into SAP, but then extend it to be a fully integrated is an absolute nightmare.
Rigidity as expressed in the above discourse can have a negative impact on ERP adoption, im-
plementation and upgrade. The effect of focusing on organisational processes and trying to copy
them into the SAP was quite disappointing, largely because the existing functional structure was
retained. As a result, when ERP was being implemented the tensions between the process and the
functional forms of organisation had to be confronted. As an interviewee pointed out
SAP is a process system, and fundamentally we were a functional organisation,
despite what we’ve said about processes and the like. And we were structured as a
functional organisation, and we put this process on the top of the function –and it
didn’t work. . . That’s how I think it developed. . . One of our problems was that we
didn’t understand what it wanted from us.
Organisational Structure
KPLC is characterized by autonomous decision making best described as “a loosely organized,
decentralized company”, where “individual divisions could make their own decisions”. Top man-
agement doesn’t dictate unilaterally how things are done in various divisions. The below discourse
demonstrates the above claim:
I think we’re fairly autonomous, because if we’re not happy with what the top
management is telling us, we use our knowledge and experience to argue our case.
(Marketing Manager, KPLC).
Managers in charge of various divisions had flexibility to pursue ideas and make decisions on their
own. Although this facilitated collaboration within units, it also led to autonomous, silo behavior
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among business units where common processes and consistent data across the organisation were
hard to obtain. However, the procurement process is strictly governed by procurement act given
that KPLC is a state corporation.
Orientation to Collaboration
Before ERP was implemented at KPLC, a great deal of emphasis was placed working in isolation
and information was viewed as a propriety asset within each unit. It was therefore common for
employees to hoard information. For example, one team member stated, “We have a whole lot
of individuals contributing or working on their own”, and how well employees work alone, is a
performance measure.
The fact that KPLC valued isolation as a way in which work is best achieved contributed nega-
tively to ERP system implementation. Much effort and resources had to be employed to change the
employees mindset about collaboration as a way of working. Therefore, ERP implementation team
members were encouraged to share ideas and knowledge in all the stages of ERP implementation.
When the organisation was carrying business process re-engineering, just before ERP adoption
began, an open sitting structure was used, removing walls and partitions, with team members
working in small groups in one large open area. This structure helped people to promote collabora-
tion and sharing of knowledge because “sometimes you could learn something just by hearing what
the person next to you was talking about”. Proximity encouraged them to share knowledge on the
business processes in areas other than their own silos that they otherwise may not have shared if
they had had to make the effort to find someone to share it with. Therefore, at the start of ERP
implementation, KPLC was inclined to collaboration as a work practice.
Basis of Truth and Rationality
Our observation of how work is done and work processes suggest that decision making in the
organisation was not focused on quantification but was linked to the qualitative experience and
hunches of long-serving managers. As the director explained:
We like to talk to people. . . I mean data is one thing but nothing beats experience.
We have people here who are born entrepreneurs and who would be running other
businesses if they were not here. They give us a feel for the market and this helps us. . .
(Financial controller)
The above discourse suggests that rationality for decision making is mainly drawn from personal
experience. During ERP implementation, teams were structured so that knowledge sharing of




Based on how the ERP implementation was carried out, KPLC is regarded as process oriented. The
organisation’s focus during ERP implementation was on achieving the outcomes deemed important
to stakeholders by the most effective methods. Given that ERP implementation was conducted after
BPR, the organisation was more concerned with improving their work practices. The interview with
the ERP implementation team revealed that they knew about widely publicized failures of other
firms’ implementation, and their mantra became “keep us out of the papers”. They were more
process than deadline/results oriented. They delayed some of the implementations when something
was not working. For example, they delayed going into production on one module by 3 months
because of poor invoice data and engaged in intensive knowledge sharing across the team to find
a solution to the problem. In other cases, they had underestimated the scope of processes, and
“shuﬄed the schedule” so they could gather enough knowledge from each other and others in the
organization to implement the necessary functionality. “Until we reached the target, we didn’t
go live”. Thus, their focus was on gathering the right knowledge in order to achieve a positive
outcome. Their view espouses that “organizations should focus only on process improvement and
that by doing so results would follow.
A.3.3 ERP Implementation Challenges
Incompatibility
In another showcase of incompatibility issues, managers at KPLC felt that features incorporated in
the ERP such as process-oriented task integration, and removal of reconciliation checks undermined
the management control. The organisations were more geared to securing greater control whereas
ERP was geared toward empowerment of the employees. The empowerment and control seemed like
they are fundamentally incompatible because the exercise of empowerment implies the exclusion
of deliberate control over the behaviours of others, since it requires employees to be trusted to
perform in ways that serve the organisation’s interest. Little was done by the KPLC to change the
job scope, reporting structure, or rewarding system. Indeed, the empowering spirit of ERP was
consciously resisted. Managers were generally not ready to empower users, as illustrated by a few
incidents during ERP usage.
Whereas one could mandate a specific screen flow in the old system, the ERP
system now has many drop-down menus and icons and is all up to the user to call up
the screen which he wants to see by mastering the transaction codes. But the enhanced
flexibility means that we have to rely on the users’ discretion to ensure data accuracy
(IT manager KPLC).
The flexible screen flow was deemed unacceptable after a series of meetings, and a subsequent
software customisation had to be made to restrict the screen flow options, adding to the potential
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for future maintenance and upgrading problems. In other instances where such costs were deemed
to be too high, e.g. the inability of ERP to accommodate specific rules and procedures to be
defaulted as system checks, “we have to rely on the empowered roles of purchase personnel”
We have to convince them (the purchase clerk) that they play a value added role
and high light the importance of what they do to ensure that they will carry their tasks
well.
Simultaneously, supervisors were instructed to check the users’ work more often and counsel errant
users. Thus, rather than leveraging the empowerment features of ERP to expand the users’ roles
and responsibilities organisation-wide, the organisation was reproducing what had been done previ-
ously through manual workarounds. Even though the role expansions were limited, some employees
perceived them as extra work, rather than an opportunity for empowerment. It is clear that ERP
empowerment features were consciously suppressed. A possible explanation stems from the struc-
turation model perspective. Human agency chooses to appropriate the aspects of ERP technology
that seem to best fit the pre-existing structure or institutional arrangements. These pre-existing
structures shape the way people understand and adapt to technology. For KPLC, there were strong
structural forces that pre-disposed it to resist ERP-driven empowerment.
SAP R/3 system at KPLC enabled the management to monitor and control the activities of employ-
ees. For example the finance manager explained that he was able to view report of all transactions
carried out in a particular day. In addition, SAP had an in-built security feature where approval
of purchases could be done at different levels using electronic signatures. Purchases not exceeding
Kshs. 5,000 could be approved by the head of departments. Purchase not above Kshs. 5,000 and
not exceeding Kshs. 20, 000 needed approval of both the head of department and the chief finance
manager. Any purchase exceeding Kshs. 20,000 required approvals of the head of department,
Chief finance manager, and the managing director. All these approval also referred to as ‘release’
–release 1, release 2, release 3 –were done electronically.
Apparently this feature was readily acceptable to KPLC management. The fact that KPLC is
government funded organisations with its historical context of strong public accountability, could
explain the apparent legitimacy of greater control exertion. The control measure imposed by ERP
seemed to evolve naturally as management/users discovered, learned, and eventually instituted the
use of such information formally.
A.3.4 ERP Upgrade Decision Factors
Vendor support was also a major influence on the the decision to upgrade ERP systems by the
case study organisations. The organisations are forced to upgrade their ERP systems when ven-
dors impose sunset date afterwhich they cease to support certain versions of their ERP softwares.
According to the project manager, vendor support was the key reason why the upgrade was not
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truly a choice of KenGen, but rather an ultimatum from the vendor. According to a functional
team lead:
We were basically up on our contract with SAP. So, were told we needed to upgrade.
However, upgrading an ERP is a costly project requiring intensive resources. In the case of KPLC,
SAP imposed a sunset date on SAP R/3 version 2.11G which the organisation was using in 2001.
This implied that they were to lose SAP’s online support system for technical support. Due to
resource contraints, KPLC was not in a position to upgrade their system then. Instead they opted
to continue the de-supported version of SAP R/3 until in 2006 when the organisation decided to
upgrade from version 2.11G to 4.7. Although, SAP continued to provide technical support after
the sunset date, it had to be purchased at an additional charge, and post-sunset customers were
given lower priority than customers with more recent versions. The resource availability formed
an important factor influencing ERP system upgrade. For example, one of the reasons why KPLC
waited for so long to upgrade is lack of resources.
A.4 Bamburi Cement Limited (BCL)
A.4.1 ERP Implementation Practices
ERP Drivers and Background
Before the implementation of SAP R/3, BCL operated several independent systems. Data had
to be collated, re-processed and then combined for management reporting purposes. This was
tedious and prone to many reporting errors. The desire for ERP was inspired by audit report by
PricewaterhouseCoopers commissioned by Lafarge, the principal shareholder. The term of reference
for the auditors was to audit the BCL’s business process and practices and to streamline the
processes to common language and best practices developed by Lafarge for its operational units.
The audit reported problem with the current systems. The systems could not be integrated with the
specific systems developed by Lafarge to support particular needs, especially in the manufacturing
domain namely PRODIS for Kiln management and MAXIMO for concrete plant management. It
highly recommended need for better control, reduction of headcount due to bloated workforce,
need for better decision making. The report recommended three initiatives needed to integrate
the various functional units and streamline the business operations by using ERP to enable data
sharing for day-to-day needs, data analysis, decision support and information delivery in the area of
Finance, Sales and Distribution, and manufacturing. In addition, enterprise application integration
(EAI) system was recommended to facilitate the transfer of information between applications.
Even though the ERP initiative came from Lafarge, the choice of which ERP system to implement
was entirely left for the BCL management to decide. However, in order to improve and facilitate
implementation and use of ERP, BCL was required to carry out business process re-engineering
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to align the business practices to the common language and best practices developed by Lafarge
for its operational units. The main objective of implementing SAP R/3 was to have in place an
Information System that would provide BCL with the functionality, integration and potential for
future improvements that the company was looking for. It was expected that SAP would help
BCL to reduce its headcount, improve sales, purchasing, and inventory management and to provide
better business information for decision-making.
BCL contracted PricewaterhouseCoopers as their implementation partner who in turn sub-contracted
Siemens Nixdiff Inf. Systems from South Africa and Soluziona, a local consulting firm.
The company requested for quotation from various ERP vendors on their products. After the
vendors conducted demos on their products, the choice narrowed down to three standard business
application software systems (JD Edwards, Oracle Financials and SAP R/3). Both JD Edwards
and Oracle Financials had no local sites or agents with experience on the package. These made
it risky implementing any of these two systems, narrowing down the choice to SAP R/3, which
was already the leading client server business application software in the world. Locally Caltex was
“Live”on SAP R/3 and they were getting support from SNI (Siemens Nixdiff Inf. Systems) of South
Africa. Even though Caltex was using its magnitude was regarded as small by BCL. The company
needed to evaluate an implementation of a large magnitude which was not available locally. As
a result, a team was dispatched to South Africa to visit SAP sites with characteristics and issues
comparable to their business (this included a visit to Alpha Cement, owned by the Holderbank
Group). Based on the findings from these visits, the company conducted additional research and
discussions with SNI who were committed to supporting SAP R/3 in Eastern Africa, BCL decided
to implement the system.
The ERP project team was set up. Members were drawn from all the functional areas within
the organization. Project manager, was a consultant from SNI. Each module was headed by two
functional consultants (external) and two key users who were mainly senior individuals within the
department. Key users were those who had an in depth understanding of the business processes
within their department. They helped the functional consultants to define the current business
processes – ‘AS-IS’ – in addition to assisting in configuring new business processes – ‘TO-BE’. In
addition, key users received training from the functional consultants and were responsible for train-
ing the end users. Top management was actively involved and the Managing Director’s background
greatly boosted the implementation since he is an expert in Information Systems.
The implementation commenced in early 1997 and ended in late 1998. The company went live
with the implementation in October 1998. However, the users noted that the system stabilized
in 1999. Implementation was marred with lack of skills which led to cost overrun. In addition,
SAP R/3 is not Lafarge standard system (endnote: JD Edwards and PeopleSoft are Lafarge’s
standard systems for support functions) which resulted to customisation of SAP in order to align it
Lafarge best practice and common language. BCL implemented three modules: Financial, Material
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Management, and Sales and Distribution. Phased out implementation plan was used to avoid high
risk, and also because it is less costly and easy to implement. By using an EAI system developed
by Lafarge, the ERP BCL system was integrated with the PRODIS, MAXIMO, and Smart (i.e.
human resource and payroll system) although this is proving to be expensive as disclosed in the
below excerpt:
Due to a number of factors, not all business operations have been integrated. This
has necessitated the implementation of interfaces between SAP R/3 and the other
systems installed. These have proved to be costly and difficult to manage. On the
other hand SAP is not a Lafarge Cement Division recommended system and this has
made it difficult to maximise on the potential of the system. (Systems manager, BCL).
The key users initially faced the hard challenge of training and supporting most users who were
initially sceptical and very reluctant to accept the new system. They have successfully managed to
get the buy-in from the users who have now embraced the system fully.
Following acquisition of Hima cement in 1999, the management decided to roll out SAP R/3 at
Hima Cement in 2000. The project began in June 2000 and was carried out by BCL SAP team,
Hima key Users and the SAP consultants. SAP R/3 went “Live” in Hima on the 25th of October
2000, after being implemented in a record of three months.
The transportation sub-module of sales and distribution was not configured and therefore is not in
use. The company developed workaround to cater for sell-deliver service (i.e., when cement is sold
and transported to customer premise) which needs transport module to be configured. In most
cases, customers buy and pick up cement from the warehouse.
Generally users interviewed were satisfied with the system except for few missing functionalities.
For example, users in the procurement department noted that the vendor evaluation tool provided
by SAP is very basic with emphasis mainly on price, cost, and quality.
The vendor evaluation at Bamburi is very complicated and structured. Vital in-
formation such as time taken to deliver, background information of the bidding sup-
pliers, previous dealing with the bidders. . . .The vendor evaluation tool in SAP does
not represent the reality of the business. All this information needs to be captured for
presentation to the tender committee.
ERP Post-implementation Activities
On completion of implementation, BCL carried out continuous user surveys to gauge the extent to
which end users are utilizing the system and work out ways of enhancing this utilization. This was
aimed at achieving what the IS manager termed as acceptable user level. In 2003, BCL decided
to upgrade their SAP R/3 release 3.1 I to a release that supports E-business in order to have a
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competitive edge as far as information technology is concerned. Therefore, BCL carried out an
upgrade from 3.1i to 4.6 C.
The users’ maturity in using information system was a major driver for the need to upgrade ERP
system and acquire additional modules.
Our users are well versed with technology and know what is out there in the
market. . . they needed additional functionality like better credit management, more
functionality asset management. Users were the one who requested for acquisition of
treasury module.
BCL is in the process of replacing smart pay payroll system with PeopleSoft which is a Lafarge
standard system.
BCL is currently in the process of harnessing the information in its database to aid it decision
making. The IT manager mentioned the need to be able to know at any given time, customer
by regions, key distributors, and market patterns. As a result, BCL implemented SAP Business
warehouse. Although users interviewed agreed that SAP business warehouse is very user friendly,
they were unanimous it does not provide dynamic information and that the system was too basic
to meet the complex reporting needs of the organisation. For example, “they can just answer basic
questions like what order, how many orders, how much sales” a user exclaimed.
In order to cater for deficiency in reporting requirement by SAP business warehouse, BCL is set to
begin implementing Oracle Business Intelligence. In the pipeline is also the plan to replace PRODIS
system with Production Planning module of SAP.
. . . it became apparent to us that if we were going to do our job right, we had to have
the ability to do it. So, we requested that for acquisition of treasury module, strategic
management module and business intelligence. Our request has been granted. So far
treasury module has been implemented and we are happy with it. Strategic manage-
ment and business intelligence are on the pipeline and will certainly be implemented
early next year.
ERP Benefits
One of the major benefits mentioned by respondents at BCL is reduction of financial closing cycle:
One of the big benefits of this implementation is the timeliness of financial reporting.
Whereas we used to take up to three weeks to prepare our financial reports before SAP




We can today control all costs that are charged to cost centres under out control
and participate in the reporting cycle albeit in the background
Improved efficiency in inventory management was mentioned repeatedly by those interviewed:
SAP has made our stores requisitioning processes very easy as we can see in advance
the position of required spares.
Other benefits the system mentioned by the respondents include:
• Single point of data entry and cross functional integration
• Significantly enhanced accuracy
• Better control and understanding of business
• Easily customizable for unique business requirements like medical invoice processing
• Reduced headcount and automated credit control
• Availability of on-time information which helps decision making
ERP Implementation Scope
The scope of ERP implementation at BCL is regarded in this study as wide spanning across several
departments and two nations—Kenya and Uganda. The company has implemented four modules
namely Finance, Materials Management, Sales and Distribution, and Business Warehouse. When
researcher was on site in 2006, plans were at an advanced stage to implement human resource and
payroll module, and production planning module. BCL has also implemented SAP R/3 in multiple
sites which includes its plants in Mombasa, Nairobi, and at its regional plant in Hima located in
Uganda. The SAP R/3 is also interfaced with Lafarge’s information system to enable production
of consolidated accounts.
Level of Integration
Given that BCL retained some of its legacy systems, effort were put in place to integrate the
SAP R/3 and the legacy systems. The legacy systems in operation include Smart, PRODIS, and
MAXIMA which are used for human resource and payroll management, production planning and
plant maintenance respectively. There is a periodical batch exchange of data between the legacy
system and SAP R/3. The use of interface between the legacy system and the SAP R/3 helps
in keeping the system synchronised on daily basis, weekly, or monthly basis. However, no of the
systems at BCL are still standalone.
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Training
The training at BCL took place in the organisation’s training facilities, with representatives of the
vendor company conducting the process with support from the organisation’s IT unit. The training
lasted a week and was conducted on part-time basis during work hours, with trainees taking turns
in the training while still conducting their regular duties. During the training, employees were
told that the project would result in higher profitability for the company but not necessarily a
lighter load for them, because of improved processes, workloads would be reduced and the quality
of life at work for employees would improve. However, it was also expected that as a result of
implementation, the company would downsize, and, consequently, at least some of the employees
who were involved in the implementation would not be there to enjoy the benefits from the new
system.
The training covered an overview of the entire SAP R/3 and business processes embedded in SAP
R/3. Users were not only trained on how to carry out their activities in system but they were also
trained on how their tasks mapped on to achieving particular business process goals. The training
was beyond knowing ‘how to do it’. As a result most of the users were very comfortable using the
system. In fact, some of them even felt comfortable enough to assist users in their own struggles
with the system. A user commented that:
We have become trainers in a way. We want to help them get to a point where they
can do it themselves.
Users interviewed and observed, experiment and use the system beyond its basic capabilities. They
experiment with the system, creating their own ad hoc reports or exploring the content of many
of the tables. Generally staffs use ERP as a normal work activity. User modifications of work
processes were also typical at BCL. Users mentioned that they had to ‘weak’ the system. Such
“tweaking” also called “workarounds,” allowed them to use the system in a slightly different way
than it was intended to work, so that they would get things processed in the way wanted them.
Another user commented:
Something we call workaround which means that something the system does not
normally do, you turn around the system because you know functions in the system
that can handle this thing.
A.4.2 Organisational contextual influences
Organisation and IT Strategy Alignment
BCL has a comprehensive IT strategy which spelt the role of IT in realising organisation business
strategy. The IT strategy spelt its current and future IT infrastructure. IT was considered central
to realising organisations business strategy. In addition, the IT strategy was aligned to Lafarge’s IT
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strategy which is focused on globalisation and standardisation of business practices across all the
regions of its operation. Even though there is no stiff competition in cement production in Kenya
at the time this research was being carried out, BCL’s IT strategy factored in the possibility of
entrance of new competitors and spelt IT as a mitigating solution. In general, BCL’s IT strategy
was aligned with business strategy, and SAP R/3 investment are linked to corporate strategy of
mitigating risk of entrance of new competitors and to the parent company (Lafarge) vision of
globalising and standardising operations across the globe.
Orientation to Change
BCL strategy was to avoid customisation as much as possible. They had to follow the system logic
to adjust their process of the transactions. Since the analysis and testing was done before the
ERP project start, the BCL’s business requests had to be considered along with Lafarge’s global
business strategy by the project team. Processes were changed as a result of ERP implementation.
Nevertheless, the BCL still had to adapt into the new system. The interviewed BCL staff said, “It
took some time before we learned to use the system. And it takes a little bit more time to input
one transaction record than before. The work load has increased. But we are all trying to manage
it.” As stated by the BCL manager, negative attitude was seldom found in the BCL.
Basis of Truth and Rationality
Team members often felt they could not express ideas without hard data to back them up. Part
of this was because the integration partner “was a lot more rigid on things than we were. We
were jointly managing the project, but (the partner) took a very hard line in a lot of things”. The
integration partner’s culture did not match the company’s culture. One team member indicated that
they felt like there were issues that would keep them from making the final implementation date,
yet did not express that because “they weren’t my issues-they were process team things, and I was
technical”. One such area was invoicing, which had process oriented post-implementation problems.
Even though the integration partner was hired by the company, and was therefore working for the
company, it was still able to influence the culture of the project team to the point that experiential
knowledge sharing was inhibited. It was able to gain this influence largely because it held more
knowledge and had more experience about the software and the process of implementation than the
organizational team members. Thus, in spite of a strong organizational orientation toward listening
to others ideas, the project team orientation became one of relying on knowledge that consisted of
hard data because that was how the group with the most ERP knowledge did things. This suggests
that even when organizational culture is one that encourages certain behaviors, the culture of the
project team may be quite different when an external integration partner is involved.
Although this is a useful tool for knowledge sharing, BCL’s requirement to codify knowledge before
any analysis was done may have reduced the sharing of knowledge that was difficult to codify
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or back up with hard data. The rigid requirement for hard data may have also inhibited people
from expressing ideas based on experience about what might or might not work, thereby limiting
knowledge sharing.
Orientation to Work
The company was more process oriented than results oriented. For example, they had two imple-
mentations, yet had only planned for one “big bang” implementation when they started the project.
Soon after the project began, they began to see that the sales and distribution configuration was
far more complex, taking more time and resources than estimated. The team felt that it could not
implement that part effectively in the original time frame. So, they postponed it for 1 year in order
to be sure they had time to gather enough knowledge to implement that piece of the system so
that the organization could effectively use it. Thus, although time was important, the focus was
on ensuring that the goals for SAP were met, not on simply getting something implemented. A lot
of effort was put to ensure that the business processes were aligned to other Lafarge’s subsidiaries
abroad. Therefore, time and work were not given priority but rather the business processes.
Orientation to Collaboration
Prior to SAP R/3, efforts were in place to create a culture that promoted teamwork, where “people
are encouraged to share their ideas across functions”. BCL manager specifically emphasized the
teamwork mentality inside the company as one of the critical success factors towards ERP imple-
mentation at BCL. He said that, “People here work together as a team. Everybody is clear with
their own responsibility. We have the same target to work to. Everybody keeps the time schedule,
so that the work is done in time. This teamwork mentality is a strong driving force in the ERP
project.” To help foster this culture, many facilities moved away from the use of traditional titles
that imply a hierarchy. Because no one person on the ERP team knew all the things it took to
do the project, “everyone on the team had to rely on everyone else”. Thus, extensive knowledge
sharing occurred.
Organisational Structure
BCL decision making style could be described as a blend of decentralised and centralised. The
decision to implement ERP was taken by Lafarge which is the principal shareholder in the organi-
sation. However, Lafarge delegated the authority to BCL management to decide which system to
implement. This brings out two aspects of decision making. In the steering committee meetings,
the decision making style was highly consultative. The decisions regarding the implementation
strategies was made centrally by the steering committee. While the decision to adopt ERP was
highly concentrated i.e. made by Lafarge, it also enabled BCL to have extensive knowledge sharing,
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which is counter to what theory predicts about the role of concentrated decision making in times
of extensive organizational change. Theory indicates that autonomous decision making provides
the freedom of thinking and idea generation necessary for extensive change to occur. ERP tends
to consolidate decision making by integrating processes across intra-organizational boundaries. Be-
cause BCL decision making style more closely matched that required by ERP, perhaps this match
was more conducive to the knowledge sharing required for ERP implementation.
A.4.3 ERP Upgrade Decision Factors
In order to justify ERP system at BCL, IS manager explained that current SAP R/3 version had
become incapable of delivering some of the functionality that business needed:
It was working okay for us, and then we started to acquire more businesses and we
were growing. The flexibility that we want to have on our software was not there in
the older release. The newer releases were so much better than the old one.
One of the functional team leaders at BCL further recalled that functionality in 4.6C was one of
the major reasons that it was adopted:
The bottom line is we need to upgrade because we needed a lot of functionality.
We need a lot more functionality, a lot more flexibility with the system.
To meet these business needs, BCL preferred to receive software functionality from the software
itself that to develop the functionality through additional programming. Besides, modifications to
SAP’s core program were forbidden except in rare circumstances. A technical lead explained:
We prefer to not have a lot of custom coding. So if it’s something that SAP is going
to provide then that’s a definite factor in making the decision to go ahead with the
upgrade
Thus, the availability of user requested functionalities in later versions of ERP systems as espoused
by the above excerpts can be a strong influence over the upgrade decision. Upgrading allowed
KPLC, KenGen, and BCL to meet users’ needs without any new development effort, and with
SAP’s support.
Corporate and IT policies to mitigate software risks also emerged from empirical data as a factor
influencing decision to upgrade ERP systems. Several of the restrictions on software upgrades
were codified in some of the case study organisations policies designed to mitigate the risks of
using ERP software. In the case of KenGen, one important policy affected all the softwares used.
Adopting unstable software releases produced unacceptable business risks. To protect KenGen
from implementing unstable software, KenGen had a policy prohibiting any upgrade of software
that was earlier that release ‘c’ in each version. As the MD explained:
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We never go before ‘c’ because ‘a’ is the beta, ‘b’ is the fixes, and ‘c’ is the stable
release...Particularily, we don’t want a beta version.
Indeed, their preference was to wait for the other companies of compatible size to perform the
upgrade first.
We want to make sure [vendors] have it in production and that other customers are
using it before we consider using it.
There were two reasons for this practice: to sort out any known problem in advance, and to learn
from another companies upgrade lesson.
Another corporate policy required all softwares to be on vendor support to ensure continuous
system operation and timely receipt of vendor support if a problem occurred. Vendor support was
important in the case of BCL and KenGen because they relied heavily on SAP’s Online Support
System (OSS) to solve their technical problems. OSS was a database which contained SAP native
code solutions that could be downloaded and applied to fix problems. When IT personel encountered
problems, OSS was the firs place they looked for a solution.
226
Appendix B
Quantitative Data Presentation and
Analysis
B.1 Introduction
Data analyses and interpretations presented in Chapter 5 provided the foundation for the phase 3
of this research – quantitative research phase. As stated in Section 3.4.3, methods associated with
positivism lend credibility to an assertion that insights obtained in one context might be usefully
generalised or transferred, thus increasing the relevancy of those research findings to the practi-
tioner community. Therefore, quantitative research phase was aimed at generalising the research
findings. This phase of research corresponds to understanding at the third level in Lee’s frame-
work which requires formulation of testable propositions and then subjecting them to conventional
statistical analyses techniques. This phase consisted of five steps namely: formulation of propo-
sitions, questionnaire design, sample selection, administration of questionnaire, and data analysis
and interpretation. The activities undertaken in each step is discussed in the following Sections.
B.2 Formulation of Propositions
Based on the research findings discussed in Chapter 5, eight propositions were developed in order
to enable statistical analyses to be carried out in the phase three of this research.
Research findings from the case study component of this research revealed a distinct difference in
ERP implementation practices and outcome amongst public and private organisations in Kenya
as discussed in Chapter 5. For example, the case study organisations adopted ERP systems for a
variety of reasons. These included the Y2K problem, replacing legacy systems, system simplification
and improvement, process and operation improvement, reducing costs of information systems, and
structural adjustment programmes.
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While there were similarities regarding some aspects of implementation, there were distinct con-
trasts among the private (BCL and Bidco) and public (KPLC, KenGen, and ACFC) sector case
study organisations with regard to motives for implementing ERP systems. ERP adoption at
KPLC and KenGen was triggered by the structural adjustment programmes, changes initiated by
the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1990s as earlier stated, whereas ERP adoption at ACFC
was mainly influenced by inefficiency of manual activities which called for measures to cut down
operational costs. On the other hand, ERP adoption at Bidco and BCL was triggered by well de-
fined business needs resulting from continued growth and the need to streamline global operations.
ERP was perceived as a ‘must have’ system if the organisations had to thrive in the competitive
environment which Bidco was operating.
In order to further investigate these findings, seven propositions relating to the differences between
public and private organisations were formulated. These propositions are stated below:
Proposition 1: Implementation of ERP systems by public organisations is motivated
by tactical considerations whereas strategic needs are more important for private or-
ganisations
Research finding revealed the difference in the magnitude of customisation between public and
private organisations. Results show that private organisations are more likely to change their
processes to fit the ERP sytems as was the case with Bidco and BCL, whereas public organisations
are more likely to customise the ERP system as was witnessed in ACFC, KenGen, and KPLC.
In other words, private organisations were more inclined to change than public organisations. To
further explore this finding, we formulated a proposition stating that:
Proposition 2: Public organisations customise ERP software more while private or-
ganisations adopt business processes within ERP systems more
Research finding showed that public organisations have a narrow ERP scope – they employ less
ERP functionality – than public organisations. Case study organisations in private and public
sectors varied greatly in the number and nature of ERP modules adopted. Among the case study
organisations, KPLC and KenGen implemented only two SAP R/3 core modules i.e. the Finance
and Material Management Module compared to BCL which besides implementing the two SAP
R/3 mentioned above also implemented Sales and Distribution, Treasury, and Production Planning
modules. Whereas ACFC bought all the Ebizframe modules, they only managed to successfully
configure and run three modules – Finance, Inventory, and Sales modules. The rest of the modules
are not being used. Bidco on the other hand has successful implemented all the modules offered
by Baan ERP system. In addition, public organisations seem to favour SAP R/3 while private
organisations seem to favour mixing modules from different vendors. Among the case study organ-
isations, the only public organisation which did not implement SAP R/3 is ACFC, probable reason
being its small size. We thus propose that:
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Proposition 3: Public organisations employ less ERP functionality than private or-
ganisations
Another finding showed distinct differences in module implementation strategy between the public
and private sector case study organisations. Therefore, the proposition below was formulated:
Proposition 4: Public organisations use an incremental implementation approach by
phasing in systems while private organisations adopt more radical implementation
approaches such as implementing the entire system or several major modules at the
same time (big-bang or the Modular approach).
Lastly, given the disparity between the public and private sector case study organisations in re-
lation to cost and benefits derived from ERP systems, we formulate the below proposition to be
investigated further :
Proposition 5: Public organisation report greater benefits than private organisations
Based on the interviews with the respondents, 19 factors were identified which were considered as
important indicators of the challenges of ERP implementation in Kenya. These factors are listed
in B.11.
To further explore these challenges, we formulated the proposition below:
Proposition 6: The ERP implementation challenges in Kenya can be best represented
in higher-order categories that is comprised of at least three dimensions
Five sub-dimensions of ERP implementation scope were derived from this research findings namely:
ERP breadth, ERP depth, BPR breadth, and BPR depth, BPR magnitude. These measures are
briefly discussed next.
ERP Breadth refers to the extent to which the implementation of an ERP system is diffused
horizontally across an organisation. It describes (1) the locations that the ERP system can reach
(link), such as departments, divisions, entire company, multiple companies, and so on, and (2)the
range of business processes that are shared by ERP implementation. Data on ERP breadth is
important as it represents the willingness of an organisation to link or integrate its different func-
tional units within or across different geographic regions. The number of sites across which an ERP
is implemented indicates how horizontally widespread that implementation is: an implementation
spanning multiple, and geographically dispersed sites can be viewed as having greater breadth than
one which is confined to a single site.
ERP Depth refers to the extent to which the implementation of an ERP system is vertically dif-
fused within an organisation. One indication of how deeply an ERP implementation has permeated
an organisation is the number of employees it affects at various hierarchical levels. ERP system
which is used at all organisational levels (operational, tactical, and strategic level) There was a
varied level of vertical diffusion of ERP system within the case study organisations.
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BPR Breadth refers to the dispersion of the business process reengineering entailed by an ERP
implementation across different departments and sites.
BPR Depth refers to the extent to which the business process re-engineering activities associated
with an ERP implementation are vertically diffused in an organisation. Similar to ERP depth, an
indicant of BPR depth would be the number of employees affected by BPR in an ERP implemen-
tation.
BPR Magnitude refers to the extent to which the business processes of an organisation become
more automated via an ERP implementation. BPR exercises are usually undertaken to better
rationalise business processes and to render them more efficient through greater integration and
automation. Research noted that BPR breadth and depth only reflect how widespread and deep
a BPR exercise associated with an ERP implementation affects an organization in terms of the
number of different departments, sites and the number of people it affects. However, BPR exercises
typically involve major modifications to how people do their work, and as such represent consid-
erable implementation challenges as well as being an important factor influencing the scope of an
ERP project. BPR magnitude is supposed to reflect how much change the BPR associated with
an ERP implementation brings to employees’ work.
In addition to the above discussed ERP implementation scope measures, we included the business
automation increase and ERP customisation indicators for ERP implementation scope for factor
analysis. This was based on consultants suggestion the business automation increase and ERP
customisation can be used as measures of ERP implementation scope. In order to confirm the
validity of these measures for their incorporation onto the empirical model, we formulated the
proposition below:
Proposition 7: The seven ERP implementation scope measures (ERP breadth, ERP
depth, BPR breadth, BPR depth, BPR magnitude, Business automation increase, and
ERP customisation) represent at least three dimensions
These propositions will be subject to conventional statistical analyses in this chapter.
B.3 Questionnaire Design
Special emphasis was given to the design and development of the questionnaire in order to obtain
a reliable and valid scale. The adopted process was similar to that proposed by Churchill (1979).
Figure B.1 illustrates the adopted scale development paradigm. The questionnaire (Appendix
E) included questions on organisation and respondent demographics, adoption and selection of a
system, implementation, costs and benefits, and post-implementation plans. This questionnaire
was designed as an exploratory instrument to collect data to aid statistical generalisation of the
case studies findings.
230
The responses were encoded using a mix of check boxes, open-ended answers, and a Likert scale
with measures from 1 to 5. The case studies provided the guidance for the encoding scheme in terms
of what type of questions required what responses. For example, the total cost was segmented into
buckets because the interviews showed that respondents were more comfortable with providing
approximate figures instead of exact values. The ERP motivational, benefits, challenges, and
organisational characteristics were encoded using the Likert scale because they were based on factors
identified during qualitative data analysis and need to be confirmed. After initial development of
the survey questionnaire, it was thoroughly tested by two ERP project leaders from our case study
organisations and two consultants, and fine-tuned.
Figure B.1: The adapted measurement development paradigm
B.4 Sample Selection
The study’s population sample was organisations which had implemented ERP system and the
implemented ERP system had been operational for at least one year. In each organisation, the
respondents were drawn across different organisational hierarchies and departments. There is no
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documentation of how many organisations have implemented ERP systems in Kenya. However, a
list of companies which had implemented ERP systems was obtained from PricewaterhouseCoopers
and Symphony consultants. Given the reputation of these two consultancy companies in ERP
implementation, the 30 sampled organisations are likely to be representative of organisations which
have implemented ERP in Kenya.
B.5 Administration of Questionnaires—Field Study 2
The questionnaires were administered by email and by hand. 30 Kenyan organisations were sur-
veyed. 10 questionnaires were emailed to each IT manager of 25 Kenyan organisations. The IT
managers requested to distribute the questionnaires to the staff members within their organisations.
The researcher also administered 50 questionnaires by hand within the 5 case study organisations
during the second field study. This approach was chosen because the researcher was familiar with
most of the staff members having carried out first field study.
In total, 300 questionnaires were distributed. A total of 185 people responded.
B.6 Data Analysis
B.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
A total of 185 out of 300 (61%) questionnaires distributed to companies that have implemented
ERP were received. The response rate of 61% was much higher than for some studies published in
top journals (e.g. response rate for Law & Ngai (2007) was 10.6%). The case study organisations
were grouped into two main categories private and limited companies. 35% of the respondents were
from the public companies while the remaining 65% were drawn from the private sector. 65% of the
companies were locally owned while 45% were either fully owned by foreigners or were subsidiaries
of foreign companies as a result of majority shareholding. This underscores the fact that companies
which had implemented ERP systems were both locally and foreign owned implying that the need
for the ERP systems was not only felt by foreign companies but local ones as well. A total of 30
organisations participated in the survey. Table B.1 gives a summary of the responses as per the
two major categories.
The ERP systems implemented by participating companies are presented in Figure B.2.
The study found out that 40% of the ERP systems in Kenya were implemented between 1999
and 2000. 20% were implemented between 1997 and 1998 while 40% were implemented between
2001 and 2004. There seems a marked growth in implementations over the years as organisations
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Table B.1: Summary of response rate
Category Responses No of Question-
naires distributed
Per sector Across sector
Public 90 65 72% 35%
Private 210 120 58% 65%
Total 300 185
may be realising the benefits of ERP systems hence the continued growth in number of companies
implementing the systems.
Of the 30 companies surveyed, the most common of the ERP solutions implemented was found
to be from SAP. 38% of the ERP solutions implemented indicated that they use SAP followed
by 17% who use Oracle financials. Baan represented 13%, Navision 8% and Ebizframe 4%. 21%
of the companies also use other ERP solutions that were slowly entering the Kenyan market, for
example, Sage line 500, Impact Encore, ORION, Lawson, and Job Definition Format (JDF) systems
a product of ScenicSoft inc., USA.
73% (i.e. 21 out of 30) of ERP implementations were carried out by vendors whereas 27% were
done by the 3rd party implementers.
B.6.2 Testing of the Propositions
B.6.2.1 Motivation of ERP
Proposition 1: Implementation of ERP systems by public organisations is motivated by tactical
considerations whereas strategic needs are more important for private organisations
The questions relating to motivational factors employed a five-point Likert scale (five being very
important and one being unimportant) to compare and contrast the ERP implementation between
public and private sector organisations. These motivation factors are a mix of IT factors and
business identified during the qualitative data analysis stage in the Chapter 5. The responses were
analysed as follows: a response of 4 or 5 was considered positive, a 1 or 2 as negative as a 3 as
neutral. The neutral responses were not included in the analysis.
Table B.2 presents the summary of the respondents’ answers to these questions. The percentages
reflect only the positive responses. That is, the percentages indicate the percentage of firms who
listed that motivational factor as either important or very important. For example, 85.9% of all
organisations listed “Replace Legacy Systems” as either important or very important.
When analysed across organisational sectors, the results show several similarities and differences.
The importance of these factors by organization sector was tested using a One-Factor ANOVA on
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Figure B.2: Frequency distribution graph of ERP solutions implemented
the data from the survey questions. The p-values in Table B.2 are from this ANOVA test. The
factors “Replace Legacy Systems” and “Simplify and Standardize Systems” are important to all
organisations. These two reasons were important to all of the case study organisations as well.
All of them had been operating with a patchwork of legacy systems that were becoming harder to
maintain and upgrade. Additionally, the competitive pressures on them increasingly required more
responsive systems with real-time integrated information that the legacy systems could not provide
easily. Thus, it is not surprising that these two factors are important to all organisations.
However, there is a significant difference (p-value = 0.001) on the importance of the factor “Sim-
plify and Standardise Systems” by organisation sector. Almost all private organisations considered
this as an important. In addition to the ANOVA test, pair-wise comparisons were analysed us-
ing categorical analysis. The significant p-values reported are from the resulting Chi-square test.
These pair-wise comparisons show significant differences between private and public organisations
(p-value=0.001). One possible explanation is that private organisations are likely to have a number
of legacy systems in place so simplification and standardisation becomes a more important issue.
The factor, “Gain Strategic Advantage”, also shows a significant difference by organisation sector.
The pair-wise comparisons show a significant difference (p-value=0.008) between private and public
organisations. This is surprising because having an ERP system by itself is not likely to give an
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Replace legacy systems 85.9 86.8 89.5 No difference
Solve the Y2K problem 56.5 63.1 42.3 0.04
Ease of upgrading systems 44.5 35.3 54.3 0.09
Simplify and standardise systems 83.3 72.4 94.7 0.001
Pressure to keep with competitors 49.2 41.7 59.6 No difference
Improve interactions and communi-
cations with suppliers and customers
75.2 70.6 76.1 No difference
Restructure company organisatiion 32.0 27.0 34.6 No difference
Gain strategic advantage 79.6 70.0 91.8 0.008
Link to global activities 55.5 35.6 73.6 0.0001
organisation any significant strategic advantage since their competitors are likely to have imple-
mented similar systems. For example, over 300 pharmaceutical organisations around the world
have implemented ERP systems (www.sap.com, Accessed August 2008). Thus, the ERP system
by itself is not likely to provide any significant competitive or strategic advantages. Our case study
organisations expected their strategic advantage to come from how they leveraged the vast amounts
of operational data generated by their ERP systems. One key use of this operational data is in
financial analysis. Both private case study organisations (Bidco and BCL) reported increased ef-
ficiencies in budgeting, financial controls and financial close cycles as a result of the information
availability from their ERP system. Another area of strategic importance is the use of decision
support models and data mining tools. These systems are generally not part of an ERP system but
separate systems known as “bolt-ons”. Finally, strategic and competitive advantages can also come
from how organisations integrate and manage their specialised strategic systems, such as supply
chain management, customer management and e-business systems, with their ERP system.
ERP systems are also important to private organisations for linking their global activities. There is
a significant difference (p-value < 0.0001) between private and public organisations. That is to be
expected since private organisations are more likely to have global activities. Linking to suppliers
and customers was a key objective of both the public and private case study organisations. However,
the survey results show that this is of equal importance to all organisations. A surprising result
from the survey is that the Y2K issue was ranked very low among motivational factors. Much
of the literature cites Y2K as the reason in the upsurge of ERP in the mid-1990s. Solving the
Y2K problem was more important to public organisations. One key difference between the private
and public case study organisations was that managers in the private organisations expressed more
confidence in solving the Y2K problem since they had large number of IT staff whereas the public
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Table B.3: Degree of customisation
Overall customisation All firms (%) Public (%) Private (%)
Minor 61.11 46.67 72.86
Significant 29.44 41.67 22.86
Major 7.78 10.00 2.86
Others 1.68 1.67 1.43
organisations did not have such dedicated resources and looked more at the ERP system to solve
that problem.
B.6.2.2 Extent of customisation
Proposition 2: Public organisations customise ERP software more while private organisations adopt
business processes within ERP systems more
The common hypothesis is that organisations are generally more willing to change their operating
processes than customise their ERP packages. Research survey results, however, indicate that
almost all organisations went through some form of customisation, as shown in Table B.3. The
survey results confirm the case study findings that the degree of customisation varies significantly
across sector of organisation. Public organisations customise more. There is significant difference
between public and private organisations (Chi-square p-value < 0.001). The survey results show
that over 40% of the public organisations did either significant or major modifications whereas most
private organisations only made minor modifications. For the public organisations, it may not be
possible to avoid customisation.
This observation was attributed to the control government exerts on public organisations and the
fact that they are inclined to maintaining the status quo in the way they operate. In addition, their
complex operations and organisational structure tend to increase the pressure for more custom-build
processes and reports. An interesting observation from the case studies was that organisations that
started their implementations earlier (in 1990s) tended to customise more. Some of the managers
have hypothesised that the evolution of ERP systems through the late 1990s had “improved” the
systems to a point where it was no longer necessary to customise as much, while others think
that the knowledge base among consultants and vendors had improved significantly over time,
minimising the need for customisation. Human resource is the most customised module as shown
in Table B.4.
Human resource modules had the second highest degree of customisation, followed by production
planning modules. One out of every five implementations is customised to some degree for medium
and large organisations in these two categories. Multiple plants, geographical dispersion (at times
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Table B.4: Module Customisation
Overall customisation All firms (%) Public (%) Private (%)
Payroll 33.86 33.85 31.58
Human resource 21.36 23.08 11.58
Production planning 16.15 21.54 5.26
globally) and different production processes for multiple product lines could be attributed to this
finding.
B.6.2.3 ERP Implementation Scope
Proposition 3: Public organisations employ less ERP functionality than public organisations
We listed 24 generic modules of ERP, spanning all functional areas within the survey organisations.
B.5 depicts the percentage of respondents using each of these modules.
Further analysis indicates that on average our participants use 10.51% ERP modules, which repre-
sents an un-weighted average of 43.8% of the full range of 24 generic Modules. Of course
some ERP vendors do not offer this full breadth of functionality and some organisations do not
require all modules. Project Management, Product Configuration and Distribution Requirements
Planning are good examples of modules where there was very limited penetration with only a few
manufacturing organisations. However, if ERP is implemented and the General Ledger module is
not being used, chances are General Ledger is being done either by a corporate system or a stand-
alone “best of breed” application. For core functionality required by any business (those modules
shown in bold letters in table B.5) –core financial applications, purchasing, order management, in-
ventory control and payroll –only ACFC (which is a small-sized organisation) was able to function
without automating some of these functions. Our survey then delved a bit deeper in quantifying
the average use of ERP. Recognising that the implementation of a module does not necessarily
indicate full usage of its functionality, we asked what percentage of the functionality was used of
those modules implemented. On average our respondents indicated they used about 63%. When
we apply this percentage to our un-weighted average usage, we find participants use on average
27.6% of the available ERP functionality, higher than the generally accepted view, but still
a relatively low level of use.
The issue of which ERP package to implement is an important decision for any organisation not
only for functionality and ease of implementation but also for future upgrades and for using other
specialised packages with the ERP system. Tables B.6 and B.7 present organisation based data
for adoption of different ERP packages. Table B.6 also includes the global market shares of each
package. Overall, the penetration of ERP packages in Kenyan organisations appears to be very
dissimilar to overall global market shares reported (a Chi-Square test was insignificant). The only
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Table B.5: ERP Module Adoption Rates





MRP (Materials Management Planning) 79%
DRP (Distribution Requirement Planning 23%
MPS (Master Production Scheduling 19%
Forecasting and Demand Planning 37%
Human Resource Management 49%
Order Management 80%
Project Management 3%
Shop Floor Control 7%
Purchasing 94%
Inventory control 92%
After Market Service 2%
Engineering Change Management 18%
Enterprise Asset Management 1%
Supplier Collaboration/Scheduling 4%
Workflow Technologies 18%




Table B.6: Summary responses for package adoption
ERP package Overall (%) Public (%) Private (%) Market Shares
SAP 25.0 41.5 10.5 32.7
Oracle 14.6 13.8 11.8 13
Baan 9.4 6.2 14.5 7
JDE 6.8 0.0 10.5 7
Ebizframe 3.6 1.5 0.0 3
Orion 2.6 0.0 1.3 9
PeopleSoft 2.1 6.2 2.6 2
Navision 1.6 0.0 3.9 1
Other/Multiple 34.4 23.1 44.6 26
Table B.7: Summary of responses for package implementation
Overall customisation All firms (%) Public (%) Private (%)
Single ERP Package 40.6 56.6 27.7
Best-of-Breed from different packages 4.2 1.3 9.2
Single ERP with other systems 48.4 36.8 52.8
Multiple ERP with other systems 5.2 3.9 9.2
exception is Peoplesoft, which has only an 8.6% share in Kenyan organisations versus an overall
market share of 9%. That is to be expected since its traditional strengths are in human resources
hence the likely reason for large adoption. There are clear differences across the different sectors
on the packages they adopt. The Chi-Square test between private and public organisations was
significant (p-values < 0.001).
Survey findings confirmed case study findings indicating that public organisations favour SAP R/3
more than private organisations (41.5% vs. 10.5%). Over 72% of the public organisations use just
five different packages (SAP, Oracle, Baan, JD Edwards and SSA) as compared to 27% for the
private organisations. Everdingen et al. (2000b) in his survey found that “best fit” with “current
business practices” and “package flexibility” were the key criteria in the package adoption decision.
Since many of the “smaller” ERP systems, such as MAPICS and QAD, have evolved directly from
MRP II packages, organisations looking for a good fit with their current business practices are more
likely to adopt ERP systems that have evolved from their MRP II systems. Even though none of
our two private case studies implemented SAP R/3 and Baan, some of the private organisations
in the survey chose to go with ERP systems from the vendors of their original MRP II system for
precisely that reason.
There are also key differences (shown in Table B.7) among organisations on the configuration of the
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Table B.8: Implementation strategies
Motivation factors All firms (%) Public (%) Private (%)
Big-Bang 32.32 47.37 14.06
Mini big-bang 17.37 23.68 9.38
Phased-In-By-Module 17.37 19.74 20.31
Phased-In-By-Site 25.79 7.39 48.44
Others 3.16 1.32 7.81
ERP system implemented. Over 56% of public organisations use only a single ERP package whereas
only 28% of the private organisations use this approach whereas 71% of the private organisations
use multiple systems compared to only 42% of the public organisations. One clear distinction
driving this is the complexity of the organisation. Private organisations are more likely to have
more global operations, more sites and generally more complex operations. Even though ERP
systems by themselves may not be able to provide the functionality required to manage these
complex enterprises. To remedy such shortcomings, organisations are increasingly using either self-
contained add-on ERP modules or extension systems, called bolt-ons, for such functions as demand
planning, order tracking, warehouse management, supply chain management, customer relationship
management, on-line collaboration, e-procurement and online business-to-business transactions.
Not every ERP system can support these specialised add-ons. Thus, the use of these specialised
packages then becomes a key decision factor for not only which system is adopted, but also for how
the package is implemented, and future enhancements and upgrades.
B.6.2.4 Implementation Strategy
Proposition 4: Public organisations use an incremental implementation approach by phasing in
systems while private organisations adopt more radical implementation approaches such as imple-
menting the entire system or several major modules at the same time (big-bang or the Mini big-bang
approach).
For both the case study and the survey, approximately half the implementations used one of the
two big-bang approaches and half used one of the Phased-In approaches. However, as Table B.8
shows, there are very clear differences in the implementation strategies by sector of organisation.
Over two-thirds (69%) of implementations in public organisations were phased in either by module
or by site whereas over 70% of private one of the big-bang approaches. The difference in strategies
between both private and public organisations was statistically significant (Chi-square p-values <
0.0001).
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Table B.9: Summary responses for performance measures
Outcomes All firms (%) Public (%) Private (%)
Reduced direct operating costs 85.9 86.8 89.5
Quickened information response time 56.5 63.1 42.3
Improved order management/order cycle 44.5 35.3 54.3
Lowered inventory levels 83.3 72.4 94.7
Increase interaction across enterprise 49.2 41.7 59.6
Decreased financial close cycle 75.2 70.6 76.1
Improved on-time delivery 32.0 27.0 34.6
Improved cash management 79.6 70.0 91.8
Improved interaction with suppliers 55.5 35.6 73.6
Improved interaction with customers 55.5 35.6 73.6
B.6.2.5 ERP Benefits
Proposition 5: Public organisation report greater benefits than private organisations
Getting a measure of success and contribution for an ERP implementation is difficult, given the
scope, complexity and timing of this type of project. Many of these systems have been implemented
only recently so it may be too early to judge the full impact of an ERP package at this stage.
Table B.9 summarises the impact of ERP systems on the performance measures of key operating
areas. The most improvements are in “Increased Interaction across the Enterprise”, and “Quicker
Response Times for Information”. There are also improvements in order management, on-time
deliveries, customer interaction and financial close cycles.
The least improvements are in traditional cost measures such as direct operating costs, inventory
levels and cash management. The ANOVA test across survey sample organisations showed no signif-
icant differences. However, there are key differences between private and public sector organisations
on several metrics. These pair-wise comparisons were analysed using categorical analysis. Public or-
ganisations report better improvements in the financial close cycle (p-value = 0.023). On the other
hand, private organisations have more improvements in order management (p-value=0.08), on-time
deliveries (p-value = 0.026) and customer interactions (p-value= 0.057). Table B.10 summarises
the areas benefiting the most from ERP systems.
As expected, integration of business processes, availability of information and quality of information
are the areas most positively impacted. The areas benefiting the least are the costs of information
technology and personnel management. There are also several differences here between public and
private organisations. More public organisations report benefits in financial management (p-value
= 0.06) and personnel management (p-value = 0.08) than private organisations. On the other hand,
private organisations report higher benefits than large in inventory management (p-value = 0.04)
and procurement (p-value = 0.08). Overall, both the case study and the surveyed organisations
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Table B.10: Summary responses for areas benefiting in percentage
Benefit areas All firms Public Private
Integration of business operations/processes 85.9 86.8 89.5
Availability of information 56.5 63.1 42.3
Quality of information 44.5 35.3 54.3
Customer responsiveness/flexibility 83.3 72.4 94.7
Financial management 49.2 41.7 59.6
Personnel management 75.2 70.6 76.1
Decrease information technology costs 32.0 27.0 34.6
Inventory management 79.6 70.0 91.8
Supplier management/procurement 55.5 35.6 73.6
reported very similar trends on the impact of ERP systems on performance.
None of the case study organisations had done some form of ROI or economic value added analysis
to justify their ERP system. Surprisingly, approximately 30% of the survey organisations reported
doing an ROI or any form of capital investment analysis. An approximate weighted ROI for those
organisations who responded is approximately 20%. There were no statistical differences across
the public and private organisations on this dimension. This ROI is different from what has been
reported in several publications. For example, the Meta Group Wheatley (June 2000) reported the
NPV of an implementation is a negative $1.5 million. Most organisations view their ERP system
to be a long-term investment. The expected life of an ERP system is just over 8 years, a value
considered very high for a software system. Over 80% of all organisations indicted an expected life
of over 5 years. Approximately a third expects the life of their ERP system to be longer than 10
years.
Additional interviews was carried out to ascertain the benefits of ERP systems to the case study
organisations during the second field study. These results support the case study and survey find-
ings. The benefits across the case study organisations was analysed. The summary of results
which lighten the differences discussed is summarised below. The benefits were grouped into three
cost saving benefits (IT costs, administrative costs, personnel costs, and sales costs), process im-
provement benefits (purchase management, warehouse management, customer relations, supplier
relations, availability of information, and decision making) and process flexibility benefits (pro-
duction and order management flexibility). These benefits are compared across the case study
organisations.
IT Costs
Four organisations namely KPLC, KenGen, ACFC, and BCL expected information technology
costs to decrease as a result of implementing ERP system. BCL justified this expectation with the
fact that it would be cheaper to maintain one system instead of many different systems. However,
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information costs were not affected in this case. This is mainly because the case study organisations
did not get rid of the legacy systems they were using before ERP implementation. KPLC, KenGen,
and BCL were all using plant maintenance and production systems MAXIMA and PRODIS respec-
tively which they retained after implementing ERP. BCL in addition retained a human resource
management system called SMART whereas KenGen and KPLC retained additional bespoke sys-
tems. Bidco experienced a positive unexpected effect derived from the fact that maintenance of of
the system is much simpler today having discarded all the bespoke systems which were operational
before ERP implementation. ACFC on the other hand experienced negative unexpected results.
The total cost of the implementation project turned out to be much higher than what was budgeted
for.
Administrative costs
Four case study organisations –Bidco, BCL, KenGen, and KPLC –expected administrative cost
to decrease. These expectation were based on the assumption that administrative work would
be more effective and streamlined using an ERP system. Two of these organisations –Bidco and
BCL –did experience decreased administrative costs to a great extent. Bidco believed that better
co-ordination between order, warehouse and delivery due to the ERP system was the reason for
diminished administrative costs. On the other hand, KenGen and KPLC did not realise reduced
administrative costs. They attributed this to the influence the government had on their operations
such as procurement. ACFC experienced increased administrative costs due to the ERP implemen-
tation. They claimed this was due to the fact that project implementation was poorly managed.
The Ebizframe was heavily customised to fit old processes, and almost no process were changed.
This resulted in more complicated processes and to the need for more adminstrative personnel,
which resulted in increased administrative costs. The fact that the system need to use pre-print
papers increased paper usage thereby resulting increased administrative costs. This was the same
case with KenGen and KPLC which are government corporations operating in an environment
where electronic records are still not acceptable. However, there was a considerable reduction in
the usage of paper at both Bidco and BCL where electronic records are acceptable, which lead to
reduction costs for paper.
Paperless operation was achieved at 30% cost savings in 2005 compared to 40 %
expectation (Finance manager, BCL)
Personnel costs
Only Bidco did not have any expectation of realising cost reduction on personnel. Cost reduction
were not the main motives for implementing the system, therefore they did not consider that
possibility. The remaining case study organisations saw the possibility to reduce personnel costs
due to the expectation that fewer people would be needed for administrative work. Only BCL
realised these expectation to a certain extent. Fewer people were needed to perform the same
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tasks. However, the main reason for the personnel reduction was the fact that when an employee
retired no one was hired do his/her job and saving on salary allocation. This was also the case for
Bidco that did not expect a cost reduction but experienced one.
Salary allocation savings in 2005 was only 5% compared to 30% expectation. The
reason for this limited savings is that ERP is does not actually lessen job positions but
it only improves business and resource management (Sales Team Leader, Bidco)
The remaining three organisations –KenGen, KPLC, and ACFC –did not meet their expectation
regarding personnel cost reduction due to different market condtions. KenGen was carved out of
KPLC in the eve of the new millennium and thereafter experienced a considerable growth, which
makes it difficult for them to connect personnel costs with their ERP system. ACFC expected
reduced personnel costs, but experienced the opposite. Costs increased because of a great need
for hiring additional people after implementing the system. Purchase, sales and administrative
departments had problems with the system and had to be reinforced.
Sales costs
BCL and Bidco expected the system to help them reduce sales costs. This was due to the real time
data, which would facilitate decision-making due to more updated facts and actual information.
With this information as a base, they believed that they would be able to plan their sales more
accurately and thereby decrease expenses. This expectation was met at Bidco but was not met
BCL. The primary reason for not realising sales cost reduction outcome at BCL was due to lack of
business intelligence system. Respondents mentioned lack of personnel training and understanding
of the system as an obstacle to meeting sales cost reductions. As a result, BCL embarked on
installing Oracle Business Intelligence in the year 2006 when the researcher was carrying out the
second field study. Bidco success in reducing sales cost could also be attributed to its ambitious
project of creating joint ventures by connecting its ERP system with that of retail supermarkets in
Kenya to allow automatic replenishing of the supermarkets when they reach reorder level. This is
the first ever venture of this nature to be carried out in Kenya indicating that many organisations
may follow suite which in turn will lead to a value-chain creation.
Sales cost savings reached 80%. This is because some business transactions re-
quire personal appearance were eliminated, and the middlemen in sales chain were also
eliminated. (Sales team leader, Bidco)
The remaining case study organisations did not experience this effect for various reasons. KenGen
is not involved with selling electricity because it only sells electricity to one customer which is
KPLC. On the other hand KPLC did not adopt the sales and distribution module of SAP R/3 and
therefore could not comment on the effect. ACFC experienced increased costs in the area as well,
because of management problems when implementing the system.
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Purchase management
All the case study organisations expected positive effects on purchase management due to simplifi-
cation and increased visibility of the purchasing process. Only Bidco considered these expectations
to be completely fulfilled. Bidco justified their satisfaction with increased efficiency due to automa-
tion. Everything from purchase requests to supplier invoices changed to electronic format after the
implementation of Baan.
BCL partly realised the expected outcome on purchase management. For one of these, expectations
were fulfilled regarding purchase management of material used for manufacturing, but not regarding
purchase management of other materials such as office materials. The reason for this was according
to the respondent, lack of adequate user training. In the case of KenGen, KPLC, and KenGen, the
ERP system was not able to meet the strict procurement procedures set out by the directorate of
state corporations. They therefore in some cases were forced to go back to a paper based variant.
ACFC did not have any expectation on purchase management but experienced negative effects they
did not count on. They argued that it is easier to make serious mistakes than they had anticipated
as expressed in the discourse below:
If the wrong price is entered in the system during the purchasing process, the
conssequences can be enormous. The inventory value become incorrect, and then you
try to correct it in the wrong way.
However, they admitted that this problem is due to lack of employee training, nonetheless the
problem was greater than expected.
Warehouse Management
All the case study organisations had expectations from warehouse management. These expectations
included the ability to consolidate the amount of warehouses, increase inventory turnover velocity,
routine simplification and increase quality of inventory inspections. All the case study organisations
considered their expectations fulfilled. In addition, Bidco and BCL reported that they were able to
standardise entire document flows and achieve better inventory quality inspections.
This was derived from discourses which suggested that ERP enables easy and comprehensive re-
porting, access to real-time information, visibility into cross-departmental information, and the
ability to gauge the impact of business decisions.
Customer relations
BCL and Baan expected their ERP systems to improve customer relations with the belief that
ERP is more flexible than legacy systems and would enable sales personnel to handle discounts
and price agreements more easily. They both met these expectations. KenGen and KPLC stated
non-expected positive effects which have contribute to improved customer service such as fewer
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price errors, higher quality of data and higher quality of order flow. ACFC also experienced a non-
expected positive effect due to the ERP system. It indicated that Ebizframe supports electronic
suborders and electronic invoicing, which simplified order management for customers. All the case
study organisations stated that customer relations had improved due to faster order management,
faster delivery, more accurate information to customers and more effective routines. All the case
study organisations expected to improve customer service primarily regarding the compilation of
reports and statistics that customers demand. All the organisations stated that customer service
improvement was also realised due easier access to information by all employees that resulted in
the fact that all employees were able to answer questions about prices, not only sales personnel.
In general, customers have become less dependent on specific sales persons since information is
accessible to all employees in the ERP system.
Supplier Relations
None of the case study organisations had any expectations regarding supplier relations. However,
Bidco has experienced enormous positive effects on supplier relations in the same way as regarding
customer relations, as noted above. This is attributed to the fact that Bidco implemented a supplier
chain management (SCM) system which is an extension of ERP system.
Availability of Information
All the case study organisations saw the opportunity of being able to increase the availability of
information to employees, and also experienced this positive effect. The information in the systems
is always available for anyone who has got access rights to it. This fact has made it easier when doing
business, because the necessary information is always available in your system. Organisations also
admitted experiencing negative outcome, due to the fact that mistakes are easily spread throughout
the system and result in misleading data.
Decision Making
Only Bidco had expectations on receiving better basic data for decision making. The time required
for this process is unchanged, but the information available is more accurate, even though the
organisation refers to difficulties finding the right information.
“Before we implemented our ERP system, the worst part was reporting. We were
responding months if not years after data input. Now, I can get information to the
executives: ‘here’s what you are going to do next year based on deposits we have
now. It allows us to be more proactive in terms of decisions we make in marketing,
employment levels, cost, operations. . . we are now looking at today and tomorrow
because we have real-time data, not data that is a year old. Everything is coming
together” (MD, Bidco).
BCL experienced non-expected outcome in this area which refers to improved data quality leading
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in turn to improved decision-making. Additionally, KenGen and KPLC claimed to have better data
for decision making nowdays, but “that did not derive from the ERP system, but the process...”
Production and order management flexibility
Only Bidco implemented the production module of Baan and therefore could comment on the
production flexibility. One of the expected effects was, due to shorter lead times, the ability to
adjust to quickly adjust the production to changed demand. Other planned effects were increased
visibility, which would result in increased production flexibility, simplified order management due
to integration between sales offices, online order confirmation, and the benefit of working in only
one system.
This section has answered the research question which is interested in finding out if there is a
difference between public and private organisations. The survey results support the case study
results that public and private organisations in Kenya approach ERP implementation differently.
B.6.2.6 ERP Implementation Challenges
Proposition 6: The ERP implementation challenges in Kenya can be best represented in higher-order
categories that is comprised of at least three dimensions
The factors identified in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.7) were included in the questionnaire and respon-
dents were asked to state the extent to which they disagreed or agreed with the statements in a
likert scale of 1-strongly disagree, 2- Disagree, 3- Indifferent, 4-Agree and 5-Strongly agree. The
factors were analysed using SPSS.
In an attempt to reduce the number of items (challenges), and to understand their underlying
structure, a factor analysis (FA) was performed using principal component analysis. Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) was performed on the respondents’ scores. FA is a data reduction
technique that uses correlations between data variables. The underlying assumption of FA is that a
number of factors exist to explain the correlations or inter-relationships among observed variables.
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was performed on the respondents’ scores. The goal of this
method is to extract maximum variance from the data set within each factor. It is basically used
to reduce a large number of variables down to a smaller number of components. The measure
of sampling adequacy for the twenty items was 0.87 indicating that the items were suitable for
factoring (Kaiser, 1974).
A three-stage factor analysis was conducted with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation to obtain a stable
factor structure, resulting in easily interpretable factors. Under this three-round factor analysis,
items were omitted according to the following two criteria: (1) no loading greater than 0.45, or (2)
loading greater than 0.45 on two or more factors.
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Table B.11 shows the results of this analysis. A first factor analysis was conducted and produced
five factors. According to the two criteria, two items were dropped. A second factor analysis on
the remaining 17 items resulted in six factors and the dropping of one item. Finally, a three-factor
structure was derived which kept a total of 16 items after three iterations. The minimum eigenvalue
from a varimax rotation for which a factor was to be retained was set at 1.0 in order to satisfy the
minimum eigenvalue criterion Nunnally (1987).
Cronbach alpha coefficients were calculated to test the reliability of these challenges, as shown in
the last row of Table B.11. The reliability of coefficients obtained ranges from 0.58 (factor 6) to
0.76 (factor 1). Srinivasan (1985) proposed that a coefficient of 0.7 or higher is acceptable, while a
coefficient of 0.5 or higher is considered sufficient when dealing with exploratory research combined
with unvalidated data. Thus, the reliability coefficients in this study are deemed acceptable. The
strength of factor analysis is that it provides a basis for data reduction. Therefore rather than
looking at all nineteen items, just six factors can be examined. That simplifies the rankings and
clarifies the most important items. Rather than focusing on individual items, practitioners and
researchers can focus on the broad set of items represented by the essential factors.
Factor 1, named “Integration and incompatibility issues”, comprises three items relating to integra-
tion related issues such as data and file conversion, and work practices incompatibility: incompat-
ibility with work, data conversation problems, and integration problems.
Benefits of an ERP application are limited unless it is seamlessly integrated with other information
systems. Organisations face many challenges relating to ERP integration: (1) the challenges of
integrating various functional ERP modules, (2) the challenge of integration with other e-business
software applications, (3) the challenge of integration with legacy systems. Organisations noted
that legacy systems have accumulated vast amount of data vital to the survival and operations.
Integration of ERP systems with legacy systems is more complex than the integration of ERP
modules and integration of e-business applications. It routinely requires the installation of third-
party interface software for communication between ERP software systems and legacy systems.
Second generation ERP systems use relational database management system (RDBMS) to store
enterprise data. Data conversion from legacy systems to RDBMS is often a time-consuming and
tedious process. Integration of the business processes also faced additional challenges related to
new rules built into ERP software being incompatible with the established ways of thinking and the
norms of behaviour embedded in the existing work routines. This incompatibility was so pronounced
that it warranted a discussion on a separate section. As such incompatibility issues identified in
the case studies is presented in the next section. This finding is consistent with the idea of ‘best
practice’ being situated and supports that ERP systems face additional challenges in developing
countries. The assistant purchasing manager in one of the organisations while explaining that ERP
could not accommodate their work practice said that:
Given our unique requirement, Ebizframe could not meet our need. The system
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Table B.11: Results of factor analysis
Challenge Mean F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
Lack of skills 4.99 .792
Insufficient training 4.94 .682
Incompatibility with work 4.83 .689
Data conversion problems 4.81 .610
High system cost 4.71 .500
Long customization period 4.68 .733
Integration problems 4.67 .651
Benefits not recognised 4.61 .591
High user resistance 4.56 .912
Inadequate preparation by employees 4.50 .792
High staff turnover 4.34 .792
Organisational changes 4.33 .699
Complexity of ERP 4.29 .815
System insecure 4.23 .678
Staff layoff 4.20 .792
Vendors unreliability 4.10 .814
Poor ERP quality 3.17 .790
Eigenvalue 3.52 3.00 2.05 1.63 1.45 1.24
Percentage of variance 18.5 15.54 10.78 8.56 7.61 6.52
Cummulative percentage of variance 16.47 28.66 40.16 49.78 59.18 67.51
Cronbach alpha coefficient 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.63 0.59 0.58
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could not accept advance payments. It required us to raise DN [Delivery Note] first
then raise sales invoice and they receive payment against the invoice. We don’t work
that way.
Factor 2, named “High cost further escalated by extensive customization”, comprises two items
relating to ERP system cost: High system cost and long customisation period. Cost is a major
impediment to the implementation and use of ERP systems. Both the respondents in organisa-
tions that were interviewed alluded to this fact. The cost of ERP systems implementation averages
between Kshs. 100 to 500 million (USD 1.4 – USD 7 million). However, the cost of ERP implemen-
tation varies from one ERP to another. Baan and SAP R/3, two of the ERP systems implemented
by case organisations, software license fee charged based on: 1) the number users, 2) the type of
users, 3) the number of master records in the database. Users are categorised based on what they
can do or not do in the system.
Cost continues to be a concern for many organisations. In the case of SAP R/3, their costing model
seemed not to favour Africa. For example, the cost charged per day per consultant is USD 1,200 plus
and an additional hotel and overnight stay allowance of USD 400 charged per night. This is three
times above the amount charged in the Asian continent countries like in India that is USD 600 per
day. Implementation costs were found to be, on average 25% percent over budget. Organisations
under-estimated support costs for the year following initial implementation by an average of 20%.
IS maturity had a major influence on support cost for the year following initial implementation.
Organisations with low IS maturity experienced an increase in support cost whereas IS mature
organisations experienced a decrease in costs. This disparity can be traced, in part, to the widely
varying maturity of pre-ERP environments. Lack of regional standardisation and low budget for
IT within Kenya and other African nations makes it difficult for ERP companies to find markets
with enough potential to justify investing in costly customisations of the products.
Factor 3, named “Poor change management and failure to realise ERP benefits”, comprises four
items relating to organisational changes triggered by ERP, resulting user resistance, and lack of
realisation of benefits once ERP is operational: inadequate preparation by employees, organisational
changes, benefits not recognised, and high user resistance.
Implementing an ERP will bring in changes to the way people work within the organisation, pro-
cesses will change and there may be job cuts and rationalisation of responsibilities within depart-
ments. All this will definitely evoke resistance from the employees and this has to be managed
effectively before, during and after the implementation of the ERP package. Respondents noted
that they were inadequately prepared for the major undertaking of ERP implementation. Most re-
spondents noted that they were neither aware of the reasons for the implementation nor the business
benefits that can be expected by implementing a new ERP package. ERP projects are therefore
perceived as a cost cutting measure by organisations which lead to mass staff layoff. Respondents
noted that there was no strong change management team in place to oversee to approve, imple-
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ment and track the changes in the organisation, which includes the impact and detailed structure
associated with the life cycle of the ERP project.
Factor 4, named “Unreliability of vendors and poor quality of some ERP systems” comprises two
items relating to poor services by ERP vendors and consultants, and some ERP systems being sub-
standard: vendors are unreliable and the ERP quality is poor. Respondents noted that the quality
of some ERP systems is not to standard hence not giving many users the desired results as they
are inflexible and lack some functionality. This factor was more prevalent with organisations whose
ERP systems had not matured or were relatively new such as ORION and EBIZFRAME. Organi-
sations which were running SAP R/3, Baan and Oracle Financials disagree with the statement that
expressed this factor.
The respondents also felt that the vendor representatives were unreliable and lacked knowledge of
ERP. Most of the consultants were always communication with their counterparts in the vendor
headquarters using telephone conference to try to implement the modifications and customisations.
The communication cost is meant to be catered for by the implementing company and is part of
contractual agreement. One obstacle was that the people who were available in Kenya did not
understand the software. IT manager interviewed described the lack of experience on the part of a
consultant in Kenya as follows:
The consultant in Kenya had limited experience. He always contacted the head-
quarters in India and held conferences. After 3 years of hard work without any result,
we got upset. The vendor company then sent a new consultant which meant changes
in the Implementation team.
The lack of confidence in knowledge of the consultant respondents noted often leads to ERP failure.
The use of foreign experts in implementing the ERP software as well as the reliance on their
headquarters abroad often leads to lack of confidence in ERP consultants in Kenya. Therefore
vendors suffer from a lack of local expertise in their software.
Factor 5, named“Lack of skills by both users and high staff turnover” comprises three items relating
to lack of capacity to cope with ERP on the part of all organisational members at all levels due to
lack of training and high staff turnover: insufficient training, high staff turnover, and lack of skills
by users.
An all common complaint was the frequency with which the case study organisations lose key
personnel experienced with ERP or supporting technologies. Frequently reported problems were:
(1) losing key IT specialists and user representatives working on the project while the project was
going on, often despite handsome retention bonuses, (2) losing experienced people after the project
was complete. Many IT specialists thrive on project work and view assignment as a ‘competence
centre’ and springboard to lucrative opportunities.
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One of the major challenges facing ERP systems implementation in Kenya is the non-existence
of well-qualified employees in implementing organisations to manage the implementation process
of the system. In one of the case organisations, the ERP project was supervised by the financial
controller (the ERP Project Manager) and the heads of administrations (the key users). None of
them had any knowledge about the computer or the ERP software. The organisations use India
and South Africa as a resource base for implementation. The MIS General Manager said:
All of the company’s leaders were not qualified to use the computer. . . They only
trained on the beginnings of Windows and DOS. . . Training was internal in finance de-
partment for one week. One week was not enough. It was just background information.
Factor 6, named “Complexity of ERP system further compromising its security” comprises two
items relating to complexity of ERP and security threat exposure in using ERP: complexity of
ERP and system insecure. Complexity refers to the degree to which an ERP is perceived as being
difficult to understand and use. Most respondents agreed that ERP system complexity discouraged
its adoption and lead to greater difficulty in its implementation and further usage. The ERP
systems are too complex for most users and thus users need to be trained adequately on how to use
them. The implementation of ERP systems is quite an involving exercise that calls for co-operation
between the vendors, the project teams and the management. One respondent commented that:
ERP has been notorious for its complexity. For example, SAP R/3 has more than
3000 configuration tables. We spent more than a year on only going through these
tables
Respondents noted the complexity of ERP systems also leads to security vulnerabilities. ERP
systems must be able to process a wide array of business transactions and implement a complex
security mechanism that provides a granular-level access to users. For example, in SAP R/3, hun-
dreds of authorisation objects are used to allow access to various actions in the system. A small or
medium sized organisation may have 100 transactions that are commonly used, and each transac-
tion typically requires at least two authorisation objects. If the company has 200 end users who fill
a total of 20 different roles and responsibilities, there are approximately 800,000 (100*2*20*200)
ways to configure security in the ERP system–and this scenario excludes other complexity factors,
such as multiple transactions sharing the same authorisation objects, an authorisation object hav-
ing up to 10 fields that can be assigned various values, and the possibility of using position-based
security.
B.6.2.7 ERP Implementation Scope Measures
Proposition 7: The seven ERP implementation scope measures (ERP breadth, ERP depth, BPR
breadth, BPR depth, BPR magnitude, Business automation increase, and ERP customisation) rep-
resent at least three dimensions
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In order to explore how well the seven identified ERP implementation scope dimensions discussed
in Section 5.2 correlate to each other and whether they represented reliable measure for ERP imple-
mentation scope, we carried out exploratory factor analysis. The test of reliability was conducted
to verify how well these measures quantify the ERP implementation scope variable. Cronbach’s
coefficient was computed. The reliability turned out to be low since the alpha value was 0.456. The
low cronbach’s alpha was obtained due to the fact that the data is multidimensional. The factor
analysis was conducted in order to check the multi-dimensionality of data.
An exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation of the categories resulted in three factors with
eigenvalues greater than one as shown in B.12. All variables loaded heavily onto their respective
factors while their loadings on the other factors were negligible, and they explained 75% of the
common variance.
The three factors were also interpretable and suggested a three-dimensional view of ERP scope:
ER breadth, BPR magnitude and ERP depth.
The first factor was labeled Breadth as ERP Breadth and BPR Breadth had loadings of .95 and .90,
respectively on this factor. ERP Customisation also had a loading of .35 on this factor. Recall that
ERP Customisation was assessed as the extent of modification done to the ERP software so as to
customise it to the organisation. The fact that the extent of ERP customisation moderately loads
on the same factor with the two breadth variables suggests that more widespread and geographically
dispersed ERP implementations tend to go together with greater software customisation. This may
in part suggest that the variety in the business processes and organisational requirements of multiple
sites across different geographical locations may at times be too great and difficult to homogenise
via extensive BPR in all locations, thus requiring at least some customisation of the ERP software.
The second factor was labeled Magnitude as BPR Automation Increase and BPR Magnitude had
loadings of .83 and .69 on this factor, while ERP Customisation had a loading of -.73. The negative
loading of this variable onto the magnitude factor is logical because, as mentioned above, ERP
customisation is an indicant of the extent of BPR. As such, it can be expected to negatively
correlate with ERP softwae customisation, i.e., extensive ERP software customization would mean
little BPR, since it is the software rather than the organization’s processes that are being modified.
Conversely, little ERP customisation would mean significant BPR in order to fit the organization to
the ERP software. Finally, the third factor was labeled Depth as ERP Depth and BPR Depth had
loadings of .86 and .81, respectively on this factor. The above results indicate that the seven ERP
implementation scope categories identified during qualitative data analysis can be viewed as aligned
along three dimensions that can be labeled ERP Implementation Breadth, Magnitude, and Depth.
Given that the seven measured characteristics reflect different aspects of an ERP implementation’s
scope or size, the factor analysis results suggest that conceptualising ERP implementation scope
along these three dimensions would be theoretically meaningful and thus will be incorporated in
the empirical mode to be developed in Chapter 7.
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Table B.12: Factor Analysis of ERP implementation scope categories
breadth Magnitude Depth
ERP breadth .95 -.14 -.03
BPR breadth .90 .07 .13
BP automation increase 24 .83 -12
BPR magnitude -.08 .69 .42
ERP customisation .35 -.73 .05
ERP depth .04 .03 .81
BPR depth .06 -.00 .86
Eigenvalue 2.02 1.84 1.38




Cronbach alpha coefficient 0.86 0.79 0.76
B.7 Summary
The findings from the quantitative research further supported the observations and insights gained
from the qualitative phase of this research. The findings confirm the variation in ERP implementa-
tion practices among the public and the private companies in Kenya. Furthermore, the qualitative
findings in this chapter confirms that Kenyan firms face additional challenges during ERP imple-
mentation relating incompatibility issues and the cost of ERP. Finally, the results presented in this
chapter indicate that proposition 7 (Section 6.2) identified ERP implementation scope measures
which are aligned along three dimensions.
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Appendix C
Pilot Study Data Collection
Collection Questionnaire
A. GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS






() Other, please specify:
A2. What ERP functions / modules are currently implemented at your company? (Check all that
apply)
() All ERP functions
() Financial Accounting
() Management Accounting (controlling)
() Production Management
() Sales and Distribution





() Other, please specify:
A3. What reasons justified the implementation of the ERP system? (Check all that apply)
() Standardisation of processes
() Adaptation of processes to international best practice
() Improvement of existing customer-facing services
() Creation of new types of customer-facing services
() Improved internal logistical processes
() Improved management controls
() Enabling of future growth
() Increasing the firm’s flexibility to respond to new market opportunities
() Other, please specify:
A4. What was the total cost of implementation of the ERP system?
A5. Which approach was adopted during the implementation? (Check which one (s) applies?)
() Best of breed approach
() Vanilla approach
() Big-Bang approach
() Module by Module approach
() Customised approach
A6. If the company adopted“Vanilla approach”were there conflicts emerging from company-specific




A7. If yes, Please specify the degree to which conflicts between functional departments emerged
during the implementation phase by ticking the appropriate cells:
PM PF MF MS SF HRF Other
Cross-functional relationship does not exist in the
ERP implementation project
No conflicts emerged
Conflicts emerged which were quickly settled by
the project team
Major conflicts emerged which had to be resolved
by the steering committee
Major conflicts emerged which have not yet been
resolved
B. PROJECT OUTCOME
B1. If the project implementation was not completed in time, for how long was did it delay?
() More than 3 months over schedule
() More than 1 month over schedule
() Less than 1 month over schedule
B2. If the actual project budget exceeded the planned budget, by what estimate did it exceed?
() More than 10% over planned budget
() More than 5% over planned budget
() Less than 5% over planned budget
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B3. What has been the general outcome of the implementation project with regard to original
expectations?
() Outcome surpassed original expectations
() Outcome met original expectations
() Outcome below original expectations but still some improvements realised
() No improvements realised
C. DEMOGRAPHICS
C1. Who owns your firm (in percent)?
() State () Collective entity () Private Kenyan entity () Foreign entity () public
C2. Approximately, what was your company’s total revenue for the last fiscal year?
C3. Approximately, how much were your company’s total assets at the end of the last fiscal year?
C4. What is your company’s total number of full-time employees?
C5. What is the average percentage of your IT budget (for HW and SW) with respect to your
firm’s revenues?
() Less than 1% () 1-2% () 2-3% () 3-4% ()4%
C6. Did your company have a computer-based information system before ERP was adopted?
() Yes
() No




Field Study One – Interview Protocol
1. How detailed was the planning stage of the project initiation?
• Was there an analysis of the users of the existing systems?
• Was there any formal process of analysing the users of the system before the implemen-
tation commenced?
• What was the scope of the project – did you target some parts of the organisation or
overall organisation? Did you consider upgrading your IT infrastructure?
• What was the driving force or motivation to adopt ERP system in your organisation?
• Kindly describe the process of acquiring ERP system from the time the idea was con-
ceived to when it was installed? Approach: project team.
• Were there business processes which ERP system could not support yet they were
essential to the organisation? If yes, how did you resolve the conflicts?
• How were the decisions made when changes were needed in the ERP?
• What were the considerations for choosing the ERP software?
2. How successful do you feel the implementation has been thus far?
• What types of things were documented as success factors for the implementation?
• What types of success factors were identified for the each module portion of the imple-
mentation?
• How was this information gathered to identify the success measures for this project?
• Was there any type of analysis of the users and people that this implementation would
impact?
3. Is/was the implementation of ERP on Schedule?
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• Given that, is the project likely to on budget?
4. Has the introduction of SAP/Baan had a significant impact on how the majority of users
complete their work tasks?
• Specific examples? Feedback from Development teams?
5. What (in your perspective) has been the biggest impediment to the implementation so far?
• User interaction? Technical Issues? Organisational issues?
6. Who else could I talk to about the initial planning stages of the implementation?
7. Which module implemented first?
• Was there a reason for it being implemented first?
8. To what extent was ERP package module(s) customised?
9. What lead to these customisations being recommended / completed?
• Due to some form of requirements analysis?
• Were the types of users taken into account?
• Was the objective to change the software to fit the organisational procedures, or was it
the other way around?
10. What was the reason for the development of the Web face?
• Was this linked to the needs of users?
11. What input did you have in the development of the user training?
12. Was the feedback from the User Training incorporated into the design and implementation
of the ERP Modules? item Was there any formal process of analysing the users of the system
before the implementation commenced?
13. What type of feedback have you received from your users about the implementation?
• Any resistance to change?
14. How were the resources allocated for the support for users?
15. Was the ERP implementation team involved in the User’s Role analysis?
16. With respect to the Role Analysis, did the users have any involvement in the identification
of roles, in order to identify the specific configuration of ERP?
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17. What was the impact of each group of users upon the physical design of the ERP system?
• Did the needs of your department affect the design in a way that was contrary to the
needs of other business users?
• Who made these design decisions?
18. Have you received feedback from the users regarding the changes to their view of the ERP
system?
• Difference in the feedback of certain users?
19. Have you noticed a difference between the reactions of the different User’s to the new system?
• What do you attribute this to?
• Have the user reactions been different to any other comparable projects you have been
involved in?
20. Is/was the implementation of the ERP on track?
• What have been the main problems?
21. Do you feel the implementation could have been improved?
• What Information do you think could have assisted the project?
• Do you think the implementation was carried out in the most effective way?
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Appendix E
Survey Questionnaire – Field Study 2
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
A1. Who owns your firm (in percent)?
() State () Collective entity () Private Kenyan entity () Foreign entity () public
A2. Approximately, what was your company’s total revenue for the last fiscal year?
A3. Approximately, how much were your company’s total assets at the end of the last fiscal year?
A4. What is your company’s total number of full-time employees?
A5. What is the average percentage of your IT budget (for HW and SW) with respect to your
firm’s revenues?
() Less than 1% () 1-2% () 2-3% () 3-4% ()4%





B1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements as motivations towards
implementing ERP system in your organisation?
DDD=Strongly disagree; DD=Disagree;
D=Disagree; N=Neutral; A=Slightly
agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
Replace legacy systems
Solve the Y2K problem
Ease of upgrading systems
Simplify and standardise systems
Pressure to keep with competitors




Link to global activities
C. Extent of Cusotmisation
C1. To what extent was the ERP system customised in your organisation?
() Minor () Significant () Major () Others:
C2. What ERP functions / Modules were customised most in your company?
() All ERP functions
() Financial Accounting
() Management Accounting (controlling)
() Production Management
() Sales and Distribution




() Other, please specify:
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D. ERP Implementation Scope
D1. What ERP functions / modules are currently implemented at your company? (Check all that
apply)
() All ERP functions
() Financial Accounting
() Management Accounting (controlling)
() Production Management
() Sales and Distribution




() Other, please specify:






() Other, please specify:
D3. Which approach was adopted during the implementation (Check which one(s) applies?)
() Single ERP Package
() Best-of-Breed from different packages
() Single ERP with other systems
() Multiple ERP with other systems
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E. ERP Implementation Strategies











agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
Reduced direct operating costs
Quickened information response time
Improved order management/order cycle
Lowered inventory levels
Increase interaction across enterprise
Decreased financial close cycle
Improved on-time delivery
Improved cash management
Improved interaction with suppliers
Improved interaction with customers
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DDD=Strongly disagree; DD=Disagree;
D=Disagree; N=Neutral; A=Slightly agree;
AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
None






Decrease information technology costs
Inventory management
Supplier management/procurement




G1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the challenges faced
by your organisation during ERP implementation?
DDD=Strongly disagree; DD=Disagree;
D=Disagree; N=Neutral; A=Slightly
agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
Integration of different types of data was a big
problem
Staff turnover after implementation was high
ERP system too complex
Users not well trained to use the system
The system led to major organisational changes
System led to many staff layoff
Security of the system easily compromised
Vendors are very unreliable
There was lack of skills for implementing and
using ERP
Benefits of system not recognisable
There were many problems during file conver-
sion
Resistance to the system was high
Not enough time to implement the system
Employees inadequately prepared for new sys-
tem
ERP incompatible with functional systems
Customisation of ERP to organisational needs
took too long
Quality of ERP not to standard
H. ERP Implementation Scope Measures
H1. ERP breadth
H1 (a) How many ERP modules are currently installed?
H1 (b) How many sites is the ERP system implemented?
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H2. BPR breadth




agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
BPR was carried out across modules
BPR was carried out in multiple sites / depart-
ments/ divisions
H3. BPR Automation Increase
H3 (a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the below statement?
DDD=Strongly disagree; DD=Disagree;
D=Disagree; N=Neutral; A=Slightly
agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
ERP led to increased business process automa-
tion
H4. BPR Magnitude H4 (a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the below statements
relating to the BPR magnitude in your organisation?
DDD=Strongly disagree; DD=Disagree;
D=Disagree; N=Neutral; A=Slightly
agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
Business processes were extensively changed to
align them with those offered by ERP system
The BPs were only not changed in cases where




H5 (a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the below statements relating to the ERP
customisation in your organisation?
DDD=Strongly disagree; DD=Disagree;
D=Disagree; N=Neutral; A=Slightly
agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
ERP was heavily customised
ERP was slightly customised
H6. ERP depth
H6 (a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the below statements relating to the ERP
depth (vertical peneration of ERP) n your organisation?
DDD=Strongly disagree; DD=Disagree;
D=Disagree; N=Neutral; A=Slightly
agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
ERP is at all levels of organisation (i.e. opera-
tional, tactical, and strategic level)
Analytic tools for reporting are installed and are
being used by senior managers
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H7. BPR depth




agree; AA=Agree; AAA=Strongly agree
DDD DD D N A AA AAA
Job description of many employees changed as
a result of ERP




Critical Group Discussion Guide
ERP IMPLEMENTATION MODEL
The Figure F.1 represents ERP implementation model developed in this study. It shows the in-
fluence organisational and national context has on ERP Implementation and ERP delivery, and
subsequently ERP implementation outcome (project outcome and business process outcome). It
shows organisational context as construct as being multidimensional. These dimensions have val-
ues which can positively or negatively influence ERP implementation decision and ERP delivery.
ERP delivery is used to denote the ERP project management process and it moderates the ERP
implementation outcome. In other words, if project is carried out well, then it can have positive
influence and vice versa.
Figure F.1: ERP Implementation Model
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From your understanding of the constructs and dimensions involved in the model, please let us
know your opinions in the following areas:





2. Please give a short explanation for your choice
3. The constructs and dimensions of the model and their interaction as described in Figure F.1





4. Please provide a brief explanation or comment / clarification for your choice
Please let us know your views on:
(a) How the workability of the model can be enhanced
(b) What names (descriptive words/phrases) do you think would be most suitable for the model
constructs and dimensions of this nature?
(c) What would you consider to be the major deficiencies of the model?
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ERP UPGRADE MODEL
The Figure F.2 represents ERP Upgrade decision model. It shows the factors which influence
organisations to make decisions to carry out ERP systems upgrade. Organisations resources is
shown as having a mediating effect on ERP upgrade decisions.
Figure F.2: Model of the upgrade decision process
From your understanding of the constructs and dimensions involved in the model, please let us
know your opinions in the following areas:
1. Based on your understanding of ERP implementation and upgrade practices, please assess how





2. Please give a short explanation for your choice
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3. The constructs and dimensions of the model and their interaction as described in Figure F.2





4. Please provide a brief explanation or comment / clarification for your choice
Please let us know your views on:
(a) How the workability of the model can be enhanced
(b) What names (descriptive words/phrases) do you think would be most suitable for the model
constructs and dimensions of this nature?




The IT strategy framework is tailored into four-phases: strategic vision, IT assessment, IT archi-
tecture, and IT plan. This four-phase approach can result in an IT strategy that is business-driven,
comprehensive and pragmatic for organisations which are implementing ERP systems.
Clearly outlining the strategic vision of the organisation should be the starting point. The main
sources of information which can be used in the Strategic Vision Phase are: organisation’s business
plan; interviews with senior managers of the organisation, desk research on industry trends, and
the organisation’s corporate objectives.
Figure G.1: Proposed IT strategy analysis framework
The IT Assessment should focus on five areas: (i) Systems – whether the application functionality
is sufficient and cost effective, whether there are any deficiencies in the information provided by
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them, and what unsatisfied demand exists in the context of the organisation’s business model; (ii)
People – how well the organisation manages its human resources in relation to IT (skills, attitude,
responsiveness, process effectiveness); (iii) Technology –identifying technology trends and deter-
mining whether the IT architecture is effective. It is also important to determine how responsive
is the technology infrastructure to the changing needs of the business; (iv) Delivery – determine
how resources organised, monitored and controlled in a way that delivers IT services in the most
efficient way, how the value of IT services measured and monitored, and how the value of IT per-
ceived; (v) Strategy – this should aim at determining what must or needs to be done to ensure that
the IT function effectively supports the business, and to ensure that IT is aligned with the business
goals. The main sources of information which can used in the IT Assessment Phase are: structured
interviews with organisations’ personnel, IT Questionnaires, user questionnaires, desk research of
the organisation’s documentation.
The IT Architecture gives a ‘picture’ of the future/desired IT environment to guide investments and
allocation of resources over the coming years. The IT Architecture should cover three components:
(i) the application architecture –the ERP system that will be used; (ii) the infrastructure architec-
ture –the hardware and communication that will be used; (iii) the organisation architecture –what
the IT organistion will look like in order to develop and maintain the previous two components.
The main sources of information which can be used in the IT Architecture Phase are: outputs
from Strategic Vision and IT Assessment phases, workshop and discussions with the organisations’
Project teams, desk research, and request for information on selected vendors.
The results of the three phases discussed can then be used to formulate the IT Plan based on the IT
opportunities available and how well the opportunitues support the organisation’s strategic vision.
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